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The University of Chicago 


A HISTORY OF GREEK ECONOMIC 
3 THOUGHT 


A DISSERTATION 


SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS 
AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE 
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 


BY 
ALBERT AUGUSTUS TREVER 


A Private Edition 
Distributed By 
The University of Chicago Libraries 





A Trade Edition is Published By 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
Chicago, Illinois 
1916 


CopyRiIGHT 1916 By 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 


All Rights Reserved 


Published August 1916 


Composed and Printed By 
The University of Chicago Press 
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. 


PREFACE 


The need of a reinterpretation of Greek economic theory in the 
light of our modern humanitarian economy is presented in the 
introduction to this work. If this volume may, in some degree, 
meet such a need, by awakening the classicist to the existence of 
important phases of Greek thought with which he is too unfamiliar, 
and by reminding the economist of the many vital points of contact 
between Greek and modern economy, our labor will have been 
amply repaid. There are doubtless errors both in citations and 
in judgment which will not escape the critic’s eye. We trust, 
however, that the work is, on the whole, a fair representation of 
the thought of the Greeks in this important field. In the course 
of our study, we have naturally been obliged to make constant 
reference to the actual economic environment of the Greeks, as 
a proper background for their theories. It is therefore our pur- 
pose to publish, at some future date, a general history of economic 
conditions in Greece, which may serve as a companion to this 
volume. 

We gladly take this opportunity to express our gratitude to 
Professor Paul Shorey, of the University of Chicago, for his sug- 
gestion of the subject of this work, as also for his many helpful 
criticisms and suggestions during the course of its preparation. 


LAWRENCE COLLEGE, APPLETON, WIS. 
November 1, 1915 





CHAPTER 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 


PEPUMERODUCTION, tyr. ρων bella cue Gone mn 
1. Previous works on Greek economic thought, and reasons for 


2. 
a 


the present study. 
Scope, purpose, method. 
General characteristics of Greek economic thought. 


II. Economic IDEAS BEFORE PLATO, AND REASONS FOR THE UNDE- 
VELOPED CHARACTER OF GREEK ECONOMICS. . . . . . . τ 


ESR TATON τς woe, Ὁ τὸν RA abe ciel eat De ΤΉ cers EOD 


I. 


Oo COs DAN 


General standpoint. 


2. Theory of value. 
1: 
4. Production. 


Wealth: theory; moral attitude. 


a) Agriculture. 

ὃ) Capital. 

c) Labor and industry: 
(1) Plato’s attitude toward. 
(2) Division of labor. 
(3) Slavery. 


. Money: theory; moral attitude; interest. 

. Exchange: theory; criticism of Plato’s negative attitude. 
. Population. 

. Distribution: theory; attitude toward laboring classes. 

. Communistic and socialistic ideas. 


a) Reasons for such tendencies in Greek thought. 
b) Republics before Plato: Hippodamas; Phaleas. 
c) Plato’s Republic. 

d) Plato’s Laws. 


IV. XENOPHON. . ΣΉ OF Ie 65) 


& W ND H 


. Double standpoint. 

. Theory of value. 

. Wealth: practical interest in. 
. Production. 


a) Theory; positive interest. 

ὃ) Agriculture. 

c) Capital. 

d) Labor and industry. 
(1) Positive interest in its development. 
(2) Division of labor. 
(3) Slavery. 


6 


CHAPTER 


Ὁ Ὁ ann 


GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


PAGE 


. Money: theory; in favor of unlimited increase. 

. Exchange: proposed means for its free development. 
. Population. 

. Distribution: attitude toward masses. 

. Socialistic tendencies in the Revenues. 


V. THe ORATORS—DEMOSTHENES, ISOCRATES . . . .. . . 7 
Vi CARISTOTIE i cake ᾿: 81 


I. 


o on aD 


Attitude toward matters economic; domestic and public 
economy. 


. Theory of value. 
. Wealth: theory; negative attitude toward. 
. Production: theory; negative standpoint. 


a) Agriculture. 
b) Capital: theory; negative interest. 
c) Labor and industry. 

(1) Negative attitude. 

(2) Division of labor. 


(3) Slavery. 


. Money: origin; theory; interest; reasons for the negative 


attitude of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. 


. Exchange: theory; tariff; criticism of “chrematistik.” 
. Population. 

. Distribution: theory; attitude toward masses. 

. Communism and socialism. 


a) Negative criticism of Plato’s Republic and other systems. 
b) Positive theory. 


VII. Minor PHILOSOPHERS, CONTEMPORARIES OR SUCCESSORS OF 


IPLATOVAND) ARISTOTUE, τ ἡ τ: 
τὶ 
. Theophrastus. 

. Economica; the pseudo-Aristotelian Economica. 

. Cyrenaics: Aristippus; Bion. 

. Epicureans. 

. Cynics: Antisthenes; Diogenes; Crates. 

. Pseudo-Platonic Eryxias. 

. Deles: 

. Stoics: Zeno; Aristo; Cleanthes; Chrysippus; Plutarch. 
. Communistic tendencies after Aristotle. 


Oo mon ANN PW ND 


H 
Oo 


ἀπ his ete Oe 125 
The Academy, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Crantor. 


VIII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE OF 
GREEK ECONOMICS 2006060060 6 ie 2 οι τ 


BIBLIOGRAPHY . ee OY al We AGE AS NN 


INDEX 


157 


CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 


For a complete list of scholars who have devoted more or less 
attention to the economic ideas of Greek thinkers, the reader is 
referred to the bibliography at the conclusion of this work. On 
the surface, the list appears to be reasonably extensive. It will be 
observed, however, that the majority of the works are not of recent 
date; that many of them deal largely with the practical phase of 
economics; that most of the larger works on economic history treat 
Greek economic and social theory in a merely incidental manner, 
and that nearly all are written from the general standpoint of the 
economist rather than with the more detailed analysis of the classi- 
cist. The work of Souchon, the most extensive, careful, and satis- 
factory discussion of the subject, is no exception to this latter rule, 
and since his standpoint is too exclusively that of the older English 
economists, his criticism of the Greek theories is not always suffi- 
ciently sympathetic. The monumental volumes of Poehlmann 
have treated Greek social theories thoroughly, but the chief inter- 
est of the author is rather in the actual social conditions, and his 
work is marred by a constant overemphasis of the analogy between 
ancient and modern capitalism and socialistic agitation. More- 
over, there is no book in the English language, on Greek economic 
thought, that treats the subject in anything more than the cursory 
manner of Haney and Ingram." There is, thus, still a place for 
a work of this type in the English language, written from the 
standpoint of the classicist, but with a view also to the needs of 
twentieth-century students of economics. 

The present work aims to fulfil such a need. Its scope differs 
quite essentially from all other accounts of Greek theory pre- 
viously published, in that our purpose is not merely to consider 
the extent to which the Greek thinkers grasped the principles of 

tF, Wilhelm (Rhein. Mus., XVII, No. 2 [1915], 163, n. 2) says: ‘‘ Eine Geschichte 


der theoretischen Behandlung der Oekonomik bei den Griechen ist noch zu schreiben.” 
The present work was undertaken in the year rgrt. 


7 


8 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


the orthodox economy of Ricardo and Mill. We shall also endeavor 
to ascertain how far they, by the humanitarian and ethical tone 
of their thinking, anticipated the modern, post-Ruskin economy, 
which makes man, not property, the supreme goal, and recognizes 
the multiplicity of human interests and strivings that belie the 
old theory of the “economic man.” Our verdict as to the impor- 
tance of the Greek contribution to economic thought is thus likely 
to be somewhat more favorable than that which is usually rendered. 

We purpose also to emphasize more than is often done the 
important fact that Greek theory is essentially a reflection of 
Greek economic conditions, and that a true interpretation of the 
thought depends upon a clear understanding of the economic his- 
tory of Greece. However, as we shall see, this by no means implies 
that the anti-capitalistic theories of the Socratics are evidence of 
an undeveloped state of commerce and industry in fifth- and 
fourth-century Athens. 

The method of presentation is primarily chronological. Thus 
the ideas of each thinker can be discussed in a more thorough and 
unitary manner, and more in relation to the contemporary eco- 
nomic conditions that gave rise to them. Moreover, despite some 
practical advantages of the topical method, it savors too much of 
an artificial attempt to force the Greek thinkers on the procrustean 
rack of the concepts of modern economy. 

The general characteristics of Greek economic thought have 
often been enumerated. They may be restated with advantage, 
at this point, together with some additions and needed criticisms. 

τ. Simplicity—The theory of economics as a separate science 
never developed in Greece. The consideration of economic prob- 
lems was incidental to the pursuit of politics and ethics. In so far 
as Greek thinkers treated such subjects, their theories reflect the 
comparative simplicity of their economic environment. Without 
prejudging the issue as to the actual extent of capitalism in ancient 
Athens, we need only to think away the vast international scope 
of our modern commercial problems, our giant manufacturing 
plants with their steam and electric power, our enormous wealth 
and its extreme concentration, the untold complexity of modern 
business and finance, the vast territorial expanse of modern nations, 


INTRODUCTION 9 


almost all our luxuries and commonplace comforts, to begin to 
appreciate something of this ancient simplicity.t However, as 
a direct result of this limitation, the Greeks were led to deal with 
their problems more in terms of men than in terms of things, and 
thus their economic vision was sometimes clearer and truer than 
our own. Aristotle struck the keynote in Greek economic thought 
in stating that the primary interest of economy is human beings 
rather than inanimate property.” 

2. Confusion of private and public economy.—As a result of this 
simplicity, the terms οἰκονομία and οἰκονομικῆ were, both in deri- 
vation and largely in usage, referred to household management 
rather than to public economy.’ Domestic and public economy 
were regularly defined as differing merely in extent.* Aristotle, 
however, distinctly criticizes the confusion of the two. More- 
over, there is no warrant for the frequent assertion that Greek 
thinkers never rose above the conception of domestic economy. 
Xenophon’s treatise on the Revenues of Athens, and Aristotle’s 
entire philosophy of the state are a sufficient answer to such general- 
zations. The statement of Professor Barker that “political 
economy,’ to Aristotle, would be a “contradiction in terms,” is 
extreme.® There is also a certain important truth in the Greek 

«Cf. Zimmern, Greek Commonwealth, pp. 211 ff.; but the statement on p. 222 


is extreme: “where competition and unemployment are unknown terms, where hardly 
anyone is working precariously for money wages or salary.” 


2Cf. Roscher, Ansichten der Volkswirtschaft} (1878), I, chap. i, p. 7; Ar. Pol. 
1259b18-21. 

3Cf. Plato Rep. 498A; Xen. Econ., a treatise on household management; Ar. Pol. 
i. p. 3, on the divisions of οἰκονομία; chap. 8, on whether finance (χρηματιστική) is 
a part of οἰκονομική; pseudo-Ar. Economica; cf. infra, p. 63, nn. 5 and 6; p. 82,n.1; 
p. 128, for fuller discussion. 

4 Xen. Mem. iii. 4. 6 ff., especially 12; Econ. xx; Plato Pol. 259 B-C; cf., on this 
passage, Espinas, Revue des Etudes Grecques, XXVII (1914), 105; cf. Ruskin: ‘‘Econ- 
omy no more means saving money than it means spending money. It means the 
administration of a house’”’ (A Joy Forever, I, 8, Allen ed., London, 1912, Vol. XVI, 
19). Weshall frequently quote from this monumental edition of Ruskin. 

5 Pol. 1. τ. 2: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν Kal βασιλικὸν Kal οἰκονομικὸν Kal δεσποτι- 
κὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν. 


6 Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 357; cf. Zmavc, Zeitschr. [. d. gesammt 
Staatswissenschaft, 1902, pp. 59 f., and his references to Boeckh, Meyer, and Beloch; 
Kautz, Die Gesch. d. Entwickelung der National Okonomik, p. 133, 0. 5; for note on the 
authorship of the Revenues, cf. infra, p. 63, n. 2. 


10 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


confusion, which has been too generally missed by modern critics 
and statesmen—that the public is a great property-holder, and 
that politics should be a business which requires the application of 
the same economic and ethical laws as are admitted to govern in 
private affairs. 

3. Confusion of economics with ethics and politics—The assertion 
that Greek economic theory was confounded with ethics and 
politics has become a commonplace. The economic ideas of 
Greek thinkers were not arrived at as a result of a purposeful study 
of the problems of material wealth. All economic relations were 
considered primarily from the standpoint of ethics and state 
welfare. ‘“‘The citizen was not regarded as a producer, but only 
as a possessor of wealth.’* Such statements are too commonly 
accepted as a final criticism of Greek thinkers. Though the con- 
fusion was a source of error, and caused Greek economic thought 
to be one-sided and incomplete, yet some important considerations 
should be noted. 

a) The Socratic philosophers are our chief source for the eco- 
nomic ideas of the Greeks. ‘Too sweeping conclusions should not, 
therefore, be drawn from them as to the general attitude of the 
Greeks. Xenophon is much freer from the ethical emphasis than 
the other Socratics. Thucydides 15 entirely free from it, and very 
probably his standpoint came much nearer being that of the 
average Athenian citizen. 

b) The confusion was not merely with individual ethics, for 
Greek moral philosophy always had the welfare of the state for 
its goal. Indeed, the basal reason for this close union of economics, 
ethics, and politics is the true idea that the state should rise above 
internal strife, and unite all in a care for the common interest.” 

c) The standpoint of the Greek philosophers is certainly no 
more to be criticized than is that of the so-called orthodox political 
economy.’ They represent two extremes. If the Greek theory 


* Ingram, History of Political Economy, p. 12; cf. Souchon, Les Théories économiques 
dans la Gréce antique, p. 34. 


2 Cf. Souchon, of. cit., pp. 31 ff. 


3Cf. V. Brants, Xenophon Economiste, reprint from Revue Catholique de Louvain, 
1881, pp. 4 fi. 


INTRODUCTION II 


did not give to wealth its full right, and was open to the charge 
of sentimentalism, the Ricardian doctrine, with its ‘economic 
man,” which eliminated all other ideals and impluses, was an unreal 
and pernicious abstraction. Of the two errors, the Greek is the 
less objectionable, and is more in accord with the trend of economic 
thought today. The best economists are now insisting more and 
more on the Greek idea that economic problems must be considered 
from the standpoint of the whole man as a citizen in society. 
Modern political economy “has placed man as man and not 
wealth in the foreground, and subordinated everything to his true 
welfare.” ‘Love, generosity, nobility of character, self-sacrifice, 
and all that is best and truest in our nature have their place in 
economic life.’ “The science which deals with wealth, so far 
from being a ‘gospel of Mammon,’ necessarily begins and ends 
in the study of man.’* “Es soll kein Widerspruch zwischen 
Ethik und Volkswirtschaft bestehen, es soll das Sittengesetz fiir 
die Wirtschaft gelten und in ihr ausgefiihrt werden.’ Such 
strong statements taken at random from modern economists should 
serve to temper our criticism of the Greek confusion. Plato’s 
definition of economics, as suggested by one of the most recent 
historians of economic thought,’ could easily be accepted by many 
a modern scholar: “Economics is the science which deals with the 
satisfaction of human wants through exchange, seeking so to regu- 
late the industries of the state as to make its citizens good and 
happy, and so to promote the highest well-being of the whole.” 
The contention of the Socratics, that all economic operations must 
finally root in the moral, that all economic problems are moral 
problems, and that the province of economics is human welfare, 


*Ely, Studies in Historical and Political Science, 2d series, pp. 48 ff., especially 
p. 64, where he states that it is a return to the Greek view. 


2 Ely, Outlines of Economics, 1908, pp. 4 ff.; cf. Seligman, Principles of Economy, 
(1905), pp. 4 ff., especially p. 14, where he even quotes the sentences of Ruskin with 
approval: ‘There is no wealth but life’; ‘‘ Nor can anything be wealth except to a 
noble person” (Unto This Last, IV, 77 (Vol. XVII, 105]). All citations will be from 
the Allen library edition unless otherwise stated. 


3 Schoenberg, Handbuch der polit. Econ. (1890), I, 56. 


4Haney, History of Economic Thought, p. 52; cf. Ely, op. cit., p. 48, n. 1, cited 
in n. 1, above, for a similar definition based on Plato. 


12 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


is thus a dominant twentieth-century idea. And just as the 
ethical interest of the Greek philosophers caused them to empha- 
size the problems of distribution and consumption, so these are the 
phases of economics that receive chief consideration today. To 
be sure, modern thought appreciates more fully the complementary 
truth that all our social and moral problems root essentially in 
economic conditions, though this too was by no means overlooked 
by Plato and Aristotle. 

4. Ascetic tendency.—It cannot be denied, however, that, as 
a result of the overemphasis on the ethical, Greek economic thought 
was hampered by a certain asceticism. But this was also an out- 
growth of pessimistic tendencies in Greek philosophy itself. More- 
over, the ascetic ideas of the philosophers cannot be accepted as 
the common attitude of Athenian citizens, any more than Thoreau 
can be recognized as a criterion of the economic thought of his day 
in New England.t_ Asceticism was certainly foreign to the mind 
of Pericles and Thucydides. In the course of our discussion, also, 
we shall find that it represents, after all, only one phase of the 
thought of the philosophers themselves. 

5. Socialistic tendency.—Since Greek economy was chiefly 
interested in the problems of distribution, it tended toward social- 
ism, both in theory and in practice. This was also a natural out- 
growth of the fact that individual interests were subordinated to 
public welfare. Though the latter half of the fifth century wit- 
nessed a great individualistic movement in Greece, and though 
individualism and independence are often named as prominent 
Greek characteristics, yet these terms did not constitute a basal 
political principle, even in the free Athenian democracy, in the 
same sense as they do with us today. The life of the Greek citizen 
was lived far more for the state, and was more absolutely at the 
disposal of the state, than is true in any modern democracy. In 
Greece, politics was thus the social science of first importance, and 
the supreme purpose of all human activity was to make good 
citizens. State interference or regulation was thus accepted as 
a matter of course, and the setting of prices, rigid regulation of 


"Kautz (op. cil., p. 57) goes to the extreme of saying that antiquity represents 
“die Negation der konomischen Interessen und der wirtschaftlichen Arbeit.” 


INTRODUCTION 13 


grain commerce, exploitation of the rich in the interest of the poor, 
and public ownership of great material interests such as mines 
were not revolutionary ideas, but common facts in Greek life." 
The tendency of the theorists was therefore naturally toward 
centralization of power in the hands of the state, and an ex- 
aggerated idea of the omnipotence of law.? Yet despite the error 
inherent in it, this socialistic tendency of Greek economic thought 
had its basal truth, which is becoming an axiom of modern eco- 
nomics and statesmanship—the belief that private property is 
not a natural right, but a gift of society, and hence that its activi- 
ties should be controlled by society, and made to minister to public 
welfare. Indeed, we have by no means escaped the error of the 
Greek thinkers, for one of the most common mistakes of statesmen 
and political theorists today is an overestimate of the effectiveness 
of law. 


t Even abolition of debts and redivision of lands were not unknown in Greek 
history. Grote (History of Greece, III, 105 f. and notes) denies this, but the heliastic 
oath, which he cites (Dem. Adv. Timoc. 746, and Dio Chrysost. Or. xxxi. 332), proves 
that such measures were agitated, or there would be no reason for protective 
measures. Cf. infra, Plato (Laws, 736E), who takes this for granted. Cf. Solon’s 
Fragments; Isoc. (Panath. 259) says that it would be hard to find a Greek state, except 
Sparta, that has not fallen into “the accustomed accidents,” viz., στάσιν, σφαγάς, 
φυγὰς ἀνόμους, ἁρπαγὰς χρημάτων, χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς, γῆς ἀναδασμόν, etc. 


2 Cf. infra. for citations and qualifications. 


CHAPTER II 


ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO, AND REASONS FOR THE 
UNDEVELOPED CHARACTER OF GREEK ECONOMICS 


As stated above, the economic ideas of the Greeks were unsys- 
tematized and inextensive.’ The extant literature previous to 
Plato presents only incidental hints on matters economic. Hesiod, 
in interesting antithesis to classical thinkers, emphasizes the dig- 
nity and importance of manual labor.?, The contrast, however, 
is not so great as it appears, for the labor which he dignifies is 
agricultural. He constantly urges its importance as the chief 
source of wealth. On the other hand, he opposes the commercial 
spirit that was beginning to be rife in his age, and decries the evil 
of unjust gains.4 His mention of the fact of competition between 
artisans of the same trade is of interest for the development of 
industry in Greece.’ His Erga was, in a sense, the forerunner of 
the later Economica in Greek literature. 

Solon proved by his reforms that he had some sane economic 
ideas as to the importance of labor, industry, commerce, and 
money in the development of the state. He also showed some 
insight into the solution of the problem of poverty. His ideas, 
however, are not definitely formulated in his extant fragments, 
and belong rather to economic history.° The Elegies of Theognis 

* Cf. infra for qualifications. Zimmern (op. cit., p. 227) rightly insists: “In 
spite of what is often said, Greece did produce economists.” 

2 Erga 308, 314, 307 ἴ., 311 (ἔργον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ὅνειδος, depyln δέ τ᾽ ὄνειδος), 310, 
303-6, 413. Any material in Homer applies rather to a history of economic conditions. 
Cf., however, 71. xiii. 730-32; iii. 65; xxiii. 667 on specialization of gifts. 

3 Cf. Erga and Theogony 960-75; cf. n. 2. 


4Cf.n. 2 above; a common theme of seventh- and eighth-century poets; cf. e.g., 
Sappho (Bergk-Hiller, Lyr. G. Vet. [1897], I, 204, fr. 79 [45]); ὁ πλοῦτος ἄνευ «τὰς» 
ἀρετὰς οὐκ ἀσίνης πάροικος. Cf. also III, 168, fr. 49 (50), Alcaeus. 

5 Erga 25 f. 

°Cf. his poems, especially fr. xiii. 43 ff.; Ar. Ath. Pol. x. 1; Plut. Solon το, 
22-24; Kautz, op. cit., pp. 114 f. and note, on Solon and the other lawgivers; Gilliard, 
Quelque Réformes de Solon. Cornford (Thucydides Mythhistoricus, p. 66) thinks he 
was ‘“‘on the verge” of discovering the law that exports must balance imports. 


14 


ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO 15 


are full of moral utterances on wealth, emphasizing its temporary 
nature as compared with virtue.‘ Pythagoras and his followers 
have often been given a prominent place in the history of com- 
munism, but this is probably due to a false interpretation? It is 
likely, however, that he opposed the evils of luxury, and moralized 
on the relation between wealth and virtues Democritus wrote 
a work on agriculture.4 Like the other philosophers, he taught 
that happiness was to be sought in the gold of character, rather 
than in material wealth. ΤῸ his mind, poverty and wealth alike 
were but names for need and satiety (κόρου). Wealth without 
_ understanding was not a safe possession, depending for its value 
on right use.? The amassing of wealth by just means, however, 
was good,® though unjust gains were always a source of evil.’ 
Excessive desire for wealth was worse than the most extreme 
poverty.” Itis possible also that Democritus held to a mild form 
of the social contract theory of the origin of society." Heraclitus 
complained bitterly of the unwisdom of the masses and their 
merely material view of life.* He made the common antithesis 
between material and spiritual wealth,™ and observed the fact that 
gold is a universal medium of exchange."* Hippodamas of Miletus 

ΚΕ ΡΠ 5, ται} 1, 227 i. t157L, 181f., 267 ff., 173 ff., 351 f., 393 ff., 523 f., 
62: fe, Too... 753, 145 f., 550 ἴ-, etc. 

2 On this error, cf. infra, on communism before Plato. 

3 Cf. Kautz, op. cit., p. 114; Jamblichus, De Pyth. vit., chap. xii, p. 58; chap. xvi, 
p. 69. 

4 Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker (1912), 11, 20, 69. 

5 [bid., p. 95, ft. 171; p- 73; ir. 40. 6 Tbid., p. 119, fr. 283. 

7 Ibid., p. 77, fr. 77; cf. Stob. Flor. 94. 24; χρημάτων χρῆσις ξὺν νόῳ μὲν χρήσι- 
μον els τὸ ἐλευθέριον εἶναι καὶ Snuoperéa: ξὺν ἀνοίῃ δὲ χορηγίη ξυνή. Cf. Xenophon 
and Plato, infra, on value and wealth. 

8 Thid., p. 78, fr. 78. 9Tbid., p. 105, frs. 200, 218, 221. 

τὸ Thid., fr. 219; p. 106, fr. 224. The ethical fragments of Democritus, cited 
above, may be spurious. Cf. Mullach, Frag. Phil. Gr., 1, 138; Zeller (Gesch. d. Gr. 
Phil. 1, 2,925, n. 1) leaves the question open. Diels (0p. cit., II, 1912) cites the 
above passages under the “echte fragmente,’”’ though some are starred. 

τ Cf. Barker, op. cit., p. 37. 

2 Diels, op. cit., I, 83, fr. 29; δι δὲ πολλὸι κεκόρηται ὁκώσπερ κτήνεα. 

13 Tbid., Ὁ. 82, fr. 22; cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. iv. 2. p. 565, and his comment. 

14 Diels, op. cit., I, 95, fr. 90: πυρὸς ἀνταμείβεται πάντα Kal πῦρ ἁπάντων, ὥσπερ 
χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσὸς. 


10 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


and Phaleas of Chalcedon proposed new plans for the distribution 
of wealth, but we have the barest outline of their theories from 
Aristotle.t Their systems will be discussed in a following chapter. 

The Sophists, true to their character as philosophers of extreme 
individualism, developed a new theory of the origin of society. 
The already current term φύσις, “nature,” which had been accepted 
as a sufficient reason for the state’s existence, was now opposed 
to “law,” νόμος, as natural to artificial. The Sophists argued 
that, in a primitive state of nature, perfect individualism was the 
rule. Men did injustice without restraint. The weaker, however, 
being in the majority, and finding it to their disadvantage to 
compete with the strong, agreed neither to do nor to suffer injustice, 
and constrained the stronger minority to co-operate in their 
decision. ‘Thus arose the social contract whereby nature gave up 
its real instinct for an artificial convention (συνθήκη), and thus 
society came into being. The theory, at first, though untrue, 
was not intended to be destructive of moral foundations, but was 
opposed rather to the traditional idea of the laws of a state as the 
“decrees of a divinely inspired lawgiver.’’> In the hands of men 
like Thrasymachus! and Callicles,> however, it became a means of 
denying that the life according to nature was bound by any laws 
which the strong need observe, and that might was the only final law. 

In line with their radical individualism, the Sophists were also 
pioneers in the more cosmopolitan spirit that characterized the 
Cynics and Stoics. They taught the doctrine of the fundamental 
worth and relationship of men,° and thus, with the Cynics, started 
the attack upon the theory that upheld slavery as a natural insti- 

t Pol. ii; cf. infra for details. 

2 Cf. Glaucon’s tentative argument presenting the Sophist theory, Rep. 358E ff., 
very similar to that of Hobbes. Cf. Barker’s (0p. cit., pp. 27 ff.) excellent presenta- 
tion of the rise of this theory and its causes. 

3 Cf. A. Dobbs, Philosophy and Popular Morals in Ancient Greece (1907), p. 48. 
For examples, cf. Hippias, cited below, n. 6, or Lycophron, opposed by Aristotle, cited 
below in Aristotle’s criticism of socialism (Pol. 1280b10-12). 

4 Rep. i, and the story of Gyges, Rep. ii. 

5 Gorg. 482E ff., though Callicles was hardly a Sophist. 

°E.g., Hippias in Protag. 337C, where he says that men are related (συγγενεῖς, 


οἰκείους) by nature, not by law, and that the law is a tyrant of men that does much 
violence contrary to nature (παρὰ τὴν φύσιν). 


ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO EF 


tution." Little further is known of their other social or economic 
ideas. Protagoras wrote a work on “wages,” but it was probably 
an argument relative to the acceptance of pay by Sophists.2 In. 
any event, this fact that the Sophists were so ready to be enriched 
through their lectures is clear evidence that their teaching on 
wealth was not the negative doctrine of the other Greek phi- 
losophers.s Prodicus seems to have scorned menial labor as 
morally degrading, though he agreed with Hesiod in his doctrine 
of the dignity of all work that is noble* He emphasized the 
necessity of labor in the production of material good,5 and, like 
Democritus, was the forerunner of the Socratics in his insistence 
upon right use as a criterion of wealth.® Hippias prided himself on 
his accomplishment in many arts,’ and thus probably did not share 
the prejudice of the philosophers against manual labor. 

Euripides, though markedly individualistic, like the Sophists, 
shows traces of the older use of nature to explain the necessity 
of the state. He draws a parallel between the social order and 
the order of nature, by which law and government are justified, 
and the right of the middle class of farmers to rule is upheld’ 

«Cf. Alcidamas frag., cited infra on Aristotle’s theory of slavery, and Ar. Pol. 
i. 3. 1253b20-23; Lycophron (pseudo-Plut. Pro. Nob. 18. 2) denies the reality of the 


distinction between noble and ill-born. Cf. also on Euripides, infra. On the devel- 
opment of the opposition to slavery in Greece, cf. Newman, Pol. of Arist., I, 139 ff. 

2Diog. L. ix. 55: δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ, Cf. Diels, op. cit., 11, 220, 231; Croiset, 
Hist. de la Litt. Gr., IV, 54. Souchon (op. cit., p. 23, ἢ. 1) thinks that it may have 
taught the dignity of alllabor. Cf. also Plato (Sophist 232 Ὁ): τὰ mpwrayépea.... 
περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. Gomperz (Die A pologie der Heilkunst, p. 33) 
infers that Protagoras had published a Gesammtapologie der Kiinste. Cf. Pol. 299C, 
and Diog. L. ix. 8. 55. 

3 Cf. Plato Protag. 328B, where Protagoras states his rule as to charges for his 
lectures. Cf. Zeller, op. cit., I, 2, 1080 ff., on the earnings of the Sophists. Cf. Plato 
Euthyd. 304C: ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαί φατον διακωλύειν οὐδέν. 

4 Plato Charm. 163 B-D on Hesiod. 

5 Xen. Mem. ii. τ. 21-34, the story of Heracles (28). 

6 Pseudo-Platon. Eryxias 397 D-E, discussed infra. 

7 Hippias Minor 368 D, where he is presented as the jack of all trades. Cf. 
infra for the antithetic attitude of Plato. 

8 Orestes 917-22; Supplices 399-456, 238-45; Phoenissae 535-51 (Dindorf), 
cited by Diimmler, Proleg. zu Platons Staat (1891), to show that there are traces of 
a political treatise of the school of Antiphon in Euripides. Cf. Barker, of. cit., p. 25 
and note. 


18 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


He emphasizes the importance of agriculture, and the dignity of 
the peasant farmer (αὐτουργός), who works his own land, as the 
stay of the country.t This latter accords well with his cosmopolitan 
spirit, which he shares with the Sophists. He opposes the arti- 
ficial distinctions of birth, slavery,3 and the traditional Greek 
idea of the inferiority of woman.4 His attitude toward wealth is 
that of the moral philosopher rather than that of the Sophist.s 

Thucydides reveals considerable insight into economic prob- 
lems, though he does not deal with them directly. Roscher 
declares that the Greek historian contributed as much as any 
other writer to give him the elements of his science, since he alone, 
of all Greek writers, did not confuse his economic ideas with ethics.° 
He recognizes the place of labor in production, and the importance 
of material wealth as the basis for all higher development.? He 
also has some appreciation of the true nature of capital. In his 
description of the undeveloped condition of early Greece, which 
lived from hand to mouth, he writes like a modern economist 
describing primitive conditions in Europe in contrast to the capital- 
ism of his own day.’ Cornford’s attempt? to discredit Thucydides 

* Orestes 917 fi.; cf. also the noble character of the peasant (atrovpyés) in the 
Electra, who is a noble soul (252 f.), and who speaks the prologue, though he is only 
a secondary person in the play. Cf. also 367-82. 

2 Fr. 345 (Nauck), the unjust man is ignoble (δυσγενής5), though better born than 
Zeus; frs. 54 (Alex.), 514 (Melanippe), 8 (Electra); cf. n. 1 above, and infra. He 
puts worthy sentiments into the mouths of slaves and dresses his nobles in rags. 

3 Jon 854; ἕν γάρ τι τοῦς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει || τὀύνομα; frs.828 (Phrixus), 515 
(Melanippe) (Nauck); Helena 730; cf. Decharme, Euripide et l’esprit de son théatre, 
pp. 162 ff. 

4His finest portrayals are noble women. He was no woman-hater, but freely 
presented both sides of female character. Cf. Medea 230 ff. and other such passages 


complaining of woman’s lot; fr. 655 (Protes.), advocating community of wives. Cf., 
however, Decharme, op. cit., 133 ff. 

5 Cf. Nauck, frs. 642 (Polyidus), 55, 56 (Alex.), 95 (Alcmene), 143 (Andromeda), 
326 and 328 (Danae); cf. Decharme, op. cit., pp. 163 ff. and notes; Dobbs, of. cit., 
Ὁ: 78, 0. 5. ‘ 

6 Op. cit., p. 7: “Ich auch in volkswirtschaftlicher Beziehung von keinen Neuern 
mehr als von ihm gelernt habe.” Cf. Kautz, of. cit., pp. 123 ff. 

7 Thuc. ii. 40. 1; i. 70. 8; ii. go. 2; etc. 8’ Thue. i. 2. 

9 Thucydides Mythhistoricus (1907); cf. Shorey’s critical review, Dial, July- 
December, 1907, pp. 202 ff.; also W. Lamb, Clio Enthroned (1914), especially 
pp. 34-67. Lamb’s citations of Thucydides (pp. 35f.), present sufficient evidence 
of the Greek historian’s economic insight. 


ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO 19 


as a historian, and to show that he missed the true cause, economic, 
of the Peloponnesian War, is not convincing. Cornford both ex- 
aggerates the influence of commercial interests in fifth-century Ath- 
ens and belittles the economic insight of Thucydides. The Greek 
writer is, however, like Herodotus, a historical source for the actual 
economic conditions in Greece, rather than an economic theorist. 

Aside from the fragmentary hints presented above, Greek 
economic thought begins with the Socratics, Plato, Xenophon, and 
Aristotle, and is continued, in a very incidental way, in the orators, 
and in the Stoics and their contemporaries. As we shall see, how- 
ever, even in the Socratics, no real science of wealth is developed, in 
the modern sense. The reason for this lack, which is most com- 
monly emphasized since it is closest at hand, is that the phenomena 
of actual production were but slightly developed. This explanation 
is well summarized by Haney’ as follows: (a) that economic rela- 
tions between individuals and states were far simpler than now; 
(6) that international commerce was not encouraged by ancient 
states, whose ideal was rather national exclusion; (c) that public 
finance was then very limited and unimportant; (d) that division 
of labor was not extensive; (e) that the relative lack of security 
of life and property discouraged exchange and saving; (/) that in all 
these respects, the situation is analogous to that of mediaeval 
Europe. 

There is certainly much force in this general reason. The 
development of economic thought must, of course, depend upon 
the actual conditions under which the thinkers live. We have 
already admitted also the vast difference between the present 
economic complexity and the simplicity in ancient Greece. The 
foregoing summary of Haney, however, is misleading. Though 
the ideal of Sparta was national exclusion, it was surely not that 
of Athens and some other Greek states. All extant records agree 
that Athens, at least, the home of the economic theorists, encour- 
aged international commerce by every means in her power. The 
division of labor, while insignificant compared with the minute 
division of modern mechanical industry, was by no means inex- 
tensive, as is evidenced by the fact that this is a point on which 

t Op. cit., pp. 18 1. 


20 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Greek thinkers show especial insight. The notion that Greek 
industry was chiefly limited to household economy, and that the 
era of capitalism had not yet dawned, has long ago been refuted 
by Meyer and others. The alleged insecurity of life and property, 
while relatively true, is exaggerated for Athens, at least. Above 
all, the common attempt to draw an analogy between classical 
Greece and mediaeval Europe economically is due to an utter 
misconception. The period of Greek economic history, which 
corresponds to that of the Middle Ages, is rather the era of eco- 
nomic awakening, between the middle of the ninth and the end 
of the sixth century B.C." 

Other reasons for the limited development of Greek economic 
thought are: 

a) The dominance of the state over the individual citizen, 
which fact caused political rather than economic speculation to 
absorb the attention of Greek thinkers. It is stated that the 
importance of the individual must be recognized before a science 
of economics can develop.2. This reason is also usually over- 
emphasized. 

b) The general prejudice in Greece against industry, labor for 
another, and finance for its own sake. That such a prejudice 
existed to some degree, arising from the old aristocratic feeling, 
moral objections, the reflex influence of slavery, the spirit of inde- 
pendence, and the belief that leisure was necessary for the proper 
performance of the duties of citizenship, is generally admitted. 
The commonly assumed universality of this feeling is, however, 
open to grave question. The prejudice against skilled labor was 
probably limited to the moral philosophers, and perhaps to the 
more aristocratic portion of the citizens, and we shall see in another 

*“T)ie wirtschaftliche Entwickelung des Alterthums,” Kleine Schriften, 1910; 
cf. also Beloch, Zeitschr. f. Socialwiss., II, 21 ff.; ‘‘Griechische Geschichte,” ibid.; 
Poehlmann, Geschichte des antiken Socialismus und Kommunismus, I (2d ed., 1912, 
Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Socialismus in der antiken Welt). Citations 
from Poehlmann throughout the book are to this work unless otherwise specified. 
He exaggerates the development of capitalism. Meyer and Beloch are also somewhat 
misleading in their use of the modern terms for Greek conditions. Francotte (L’Indus- 
trie dans la Gréce ancienne {1900]) is more conservative. For the older extreme con- 


servative view, cf. the works of Rodbertus and Biicher. Cf. infra for further notice 
of the subject. 


2 Haney, op. cit., p. 17. 


ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO 21 


chapter that the hostile attitude of the philosophers themselves 
has been considerably exaggerated. The evil effects of slavery 
also could not have been so marked in Greece, before the age of 
machinery. Moreover, as Meyer has pointed out, a prejudice 
against manual labor is evident among the more favored classes in 
most European countries today, yet it does not appear to retard 
the advance of industry in the least. 

c) The approval of conquest as a legitimate source of wealth. 
This is somewhat true as applied to the state, but it certainly is 
irrelevant for the individual citizen of fifth-century Athens. To 
appeal to Aristotle’s list of legitimate employments as evidence 
of this is to misinterpret his meaning, for he is thinking of a primi- 
tive life, not of contemporary Greece.? 

d) Economic facts are a commonplace of daily life, and familiar- 
ity breeds contempt. This statement contradicts the first reason 
given by Haney. Moreover, it is somewhat unfortunate as applied 
to Greece, since the very opposite reason is given for the prominence 
of political speculation—the commonness of practical politics. 

6) Perhaps the strongest reason for the comparative unim- 
portance of Greek economic thought is usually not emphasized. 
It is the patent fact that almost our only extant sources are the 
Socratic philosophers, who represent avowedly a direct moral 
reaction against the commercial spirit and money-greed of their 
age.4 Thus the limited development of Greek economics, so far 
from being an evidence of primitive economic conditions in Greece, 
is a direct argument for the opposite. To be sure, a man with the 
scientific mind of Aristotle would scarcely have failed to gain 
a clearer apprehension of certain fundamentals of economics than 
he did, had his economic environment been more complex. Yet 
the fact remains that he and Plato are moral prophets, protesting 
against that very capitalism whose existence many modern his- 
torians have sought to deny to their age. 

t For a full discussion of the Greek attitude toward labor, with citations from 


ancient and modern authors, cf. infra, p. 29, n. 4; pp. 32 ff., and notes; pp. 47 ff. and 
notes; pp. 69 f. and notes; pp. 93 ff. and notes. 


2 Pol. i. 8. 125662. 3 Haney, op. cilt., p. 17. 
4Emphasized by Poehlmann, oP. cit., 1, 593 f. Our citations will always be from 
the second edition, 1912. 


CHAPTER SIM 7 
PLATO 


As seen above, Plato was the first great economic thinker of 
Greece.’ Plato, however, was primarily interested in neither 
economics nor politics, but in moral idealism. He is pre-eminent, 
even among the Socratics for this. All his economic thought is 
a direct outgrowth of it, and is shot through with its influence. 
Yet, despite this fact, he exhibits considerable insight into some 
of the basal principles of economics,? and his entire Republic is 
founded upon an essentially economic theory of society. He 
traces its origin to mutual need,’ and makes little of the innate 
social impulse, so prominent in Aristotle’s analysis.4 He is the 
predecessor of Aristotle, however, in opposing the social contract 
doctrine of the Sophists with its interpretation of law as mere 
convention, by a natural theory of social origins. To his thought, 
the very foundations of society are established in eternal justice. 
They are not the result of mere convention, nor altogether the 
work of inspired lawgivers, but a complex product of natural and 
artificial elements.5 


VALUE 


Strictly speaking, Plato’s contribution to a theory of economic 
value and a definition of wealth is practically nil. In his dis- 
cussion of just price, he merely hints at the fact of exchange value. 
He implies that, since goods exchange according to definite pro- 

*To judge by Xen. Mem., this might have been said of Socrates had he been 
a writer. 

? Robin (Platon et la science sociale, p. 239) makes him the forerunner of the triple 


division of economics—production, exchange, distribution—but this is hardly war- 
ranted. 


3 Rep. 369 B-C. 


4 Pol.i. chap. 2. But in the Laws, Plato’s theory of origins is more social, tracing 
society back to clan and family. 


‘Cf. Laws 889 D-E, 709 B-D, and Robin, op. cit., pp. 224f.; also the entire 
argument of the Republic on justice. 


22 


PLATO 23 


portions, they should have a common quality capable of measure- 
ment, and that just price corresponds to this.‘ He offers no sug- 
gestion as to the nature of this quality, except that, in stating 
that “the artisan knows what the value of his product is,” he 
seems to be thinking of labor, or cost of production, as the chief 
element in value.” 

In other passages, he insists on the doctrine taught previously 
by Democritus,’ and later by Xenophon and other philosophers, 
that so-called goods depend for their value upon the ability of the 
possessor to use them rightly.4 This idea is represented in modern 
thought especially by Ruskin.’ The theory is, of course, true of 
absolute value, and, in a sense, even of economic value, in that 
“all exchangeableness of a commodity depends upon the sum of 
capacity for its use.”° It cannot be made a criterion of economic 
value, though the allied idea, implied by Plato and urged by 
Ruskin, that the innate quality of the thing, its capacity for good 
or harm, is a real element in economic value, is being recognized 
today. This is evident in the increasing hostility toward such 
so-called commodities as opium and intoxicating liquors. Since 
we have begun to define political economy in terms of human life 
rather than in terms of property, Ruskin’s definition of wealth is 
more acceptable: “the things which the nature of humanity has 
rendered in all ages, and must render in all ages to come... . 
the objects of legitimate desire.’” 


t Laws g21B. The word is ἀξία. 

2 Thid.: γιγνώσκει yap ὅγε δημιουργὸς τὴν ἀξίαν. 

3 Οἵ, p. 15, n. 7 above. 

4 Euthydemus 280B-E, 281B, D, 288E-289A; Meno 88D-E. 

5 Unto This Last, 1V, 62: “Useful articles that we can use”’; 64: ‘‘ Wealth is the 
possession of the valuable by the valiant” (Vol. XVII, 86 ff.); Fors Clavigera, Letter 
70 (Vol. XXVIII, 712 ff.); Munera Pulveris, 1, 14 (Vol. XVII, 154); II, 35 (Vol. XVII, 
166 f.). Plato’s economic ideas greatly influenced Ruskin. Cf. infra, p. 149, n. 2. 
Cf. also Vol. XXXVIII, 112; XXXIX, 411, of Ruskin. He says, in the preface to 
Unto This Last (Vols. XVII, XVIII), that his “real purpose is to give . . . . a logical 
definition of wealth,” which has “often been given incidentally in good Greek by 
Plato and Xenophon.” Cf. zbid., τι. 1, for other such references. 

6 Ibid. 

7Cf. above note and Mun. Pul., I, 30, notes; Fors Clav., Letter 70, 3 (Vol. 
XXVII, 713), the “good things.” 


24 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


WEALTH 


Plato has much to say of wealth, though he deals with it strictly 
from the standpoint of the moralist. We look in vain for a clear 
definition, or for a consistent distinction of economic wealth from 
other goods. His terms are πλοῦτος, used of both material and 
spiritual wealth; χρήματα, often interpreted literally of “useful 
things,” as the basis of the subjective doctrine of value discussed 
above; κτήματα, “possessions,” and such words as χρυσός and 
ἀργύριον. His use of these terms, especially the first, is ambiguous. 
At times he means material goods only; again, like Ruskin, he 
includes every human good, intellectual and moral as well;? again 
he means “excessive wealth.’” As a result of his conception of 
value, he includes in material wealth all those objects that depend 
for their worth upon wise use and character in the possessor. 
Material wealth is regularly placed last by Plato, as inferior to all 
other goods of soul or body, a mere means, and not an end in itself, 
for virtue does not come from property, but property and all other 
goods from virtues Material goods should be the last thing in 
one’s thought,° and the fact that people universally put them first 
is the cause of many ills to state and individual alike.? Wealth 
is not blind, if only it follows wisdom.’ The things usually called 
goods are not rightly so named, unless the possessor be just and 
worthy. To the base, on the other hand, they are the greatest 
evil? In all of this, Plato is the forerunner of Ruskin, with his 


t Fors Clav., Lett. 70, 8 f. (Vol. XXVIII, 718 ff.), where he refers to Plato’s Laws 
727A. 

3 Cf. infra for citations. 3 Cf. p. 23 and notes. 

4 Laws 697B, 631C, 728A, 870B; Apol. 29D-E. 

SA pol. 30B; also Laws 743E; Gorg. 451E; cf. Ruskin, Fors Clav., Lett. 70, 6 and 
τι (Vol. XXVIII, 717), where he cites Laws 726-728A, on the value of the soul. 
He also cites Laws 742-743 and Rep. 416E (cf. Mun. Pul. [Vol. XVII, 89, 148)). 

6 Laws 743E. 

7831 C-D. Ruskin (Crown of Wild Olive, 83 [Vol. XVIII, 456f.) cites Critias 
120E ff., in urging the same idea. He also cites Plato’s myth of the metals, Rep. 
416K, in similar vein (Mun. Pul., ITI, 89 [Vol. XVII, 211)). 

§631C cited by Ruskin, Mun. Pul., III, 88 (Vol. XVII, 210). 

9 661A, 661B; Rep. 331A-B. 

te Laws 661B; Hipp. Maj. 290D; Menex. 246E. 


PLATO 25 


characteristic assertions: ‘‘Only so much as one can use is wealth, 
beyond that is illth’’; and ‘Wealth depends also on vital power in 
the possessor.’”* 

Plato especially inveighs against excessive wealth and luxury.? 
Men aré urged not to lay up riches for their children, since great 
wealth is of no use to them or the state. The prime object of 
good legislation should not be, as is commonly supposed, to make 
the state as rich as possible,* since excessive wealth and luxury 
decrease productive efficiency,’ are incompatible with the highest 
character or happiness, being based on both unjust acquisition 
(κτῆσις) and unjust expenditure (ἀναλώματα), produce degenera- 
tion in individual and nation,’ and are the direct cause of war’ and 
civic strife. Were it feasible, he would prefer to go back to the 
simpler life of earlier times, before luxury and the inordinate 
desire for riches had so dominated all society.*? Of course he 
realizes that such a return is impossible, but he has little hope 
of any other escape from the evils. He is thus led to express the 
belief that the fewer wants the better, a doctrine common also 
to Ruskin, Carlyle, and Thoreau.” 


τ Mun. Pul., ΤΙ, 35 ff.; he refers to both Xenophon and Plato as being right 
on this point. Cf. Fors. Clav., I, 8 (Vol. XXVIII, 122); Unto This Last, 64 (Vol. 
XVII, 80). 

2 Rep. 550D, 373D: ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἄπειρον 
ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅρον. On ἄπειρος cf. infra under Aristotle. Cf. Dobbs, 
op. cit., pp. 202f. and note, on the evil results of excessive wealth and poverty 
in the Greece of that age. Like Ruskin, Mun. Pul., VI, 153 and note (Vol. XVII, 
277), who cites Laws 736E; Aratra Pentelici, IV, 138 (Vol. XX, 295 f.) on money as 
the root of all evil, citing Laws 7o5B. 

3 Laws 729 A. 4742D. 5 Rep. 421D. 

6 Laws 742E, especially πλουσίους δ᾽ αὖ σφόδρα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀδύνατον. For the 
modern application of this doctrine, cf. infra; cf. also 743A, Ο; Rep. 550E, 551A. 


7 Rep. 422; cf. 372E ff. on the φλεγμαίνουσα state. 

8 373E; Phaedo 66C. Compare the modern doctrine that lasting peace is impos- 
sible under the present economic system. 

9 Laws 744D: διάστασις: also a basal idea of the Republic. 

10 This is the spirit of the Republic throughout, but cf. especially 369C-374D, 
and p. 25, n. 7. 

1 Laws 736E: καὶ πενίαν ἡγουμένους εἶναι μὴ τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ 
τὴν ἀπληστίαν πλείω, Cf. infra on Xenophon for similar ideas. Carlyle, Sartor 
Resartus, chapter on ‘“‘Everlasting Yea”: ‘‘The fraction of life can be increased in 


26 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


However, Plato has no prejudice against moderate wealth. 
His sermons are directed against excessive commercialism, which 
puts money before the human interest,’ thereby causing injustice, 
degenerate luxury, vicious extremes of wealth and poverty, political 
graft, individual inefficiency, and wars both within and without 
the state. Though his philosophy leads to asceticism, and his 
attitude toward wealth seems, on the surface, to breathe this spirit, 
yet Plato is not an ascetic in his doctrine of wealth, as is often 
wrongly asserted. He describes the true attitude as that which 
partakes of both pleasures and pains, not shunning, but mastering 
them.2. He recognizes an assured competency to be practically 
a prerequisite for the development of the good life,’ while, on the 
other hand, he considers poverty to be an evil only second to 
excessive wealth.‘ 

To be sure, Plato’s demand for a limitation of private and 
national wealth, and his general negative attitude are, if inter- 
preted rigidly, unfruitful and economically impossible.’ It is not 
business that should be curbed, but bad business.® Individual or 
nation cannot become too prosperous, provided there is a proper 
distribution and a wise consumption of wealth, and Plato’s idea 
that great prosperity is incompatible with this goal can hardly be 
accepted by modern economists. 

Nevertheless, there is much of abiding truth in his doctrine of 
wealth. Aside from the profound moral value of his main con- 
tention, we may state summarily several points in which he remark- 


value not so much by increasing your numerator as by lessening your denominator.” 
Ruskin, Time and Tide, ΤΙ, ς ff. (Vol. XVII, 319 ff.); cf. 320, n. 1, for other references. 
Thoreau: “A man is wealthy in proportion to the number of things he can let 
alone’—an overemphasized truth. 

τ So Socrates (A pol. 41E, 29 D-E) and Jesus (Matt. 6:33). 2 Laws 634A. 

3 Rep. 329E-330A, 330D-331B; cf. also the prayer of Phaedrus 279C: τὸ δὲ 
χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτ᾽ ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων; Laws 679B; Gorg. 
477E: τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀππαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική: cf. also 452C. 

4 Cf. preceding notes; also Rep. 421D-E; Laws 744D. 

5 Bonar (Philosophy and Political Economy, pp. 13 1.) criticizes Rep. 400-402 for 
not seeing that unlimited wealth is necessary for the realization of the highest art and 
beauty. 

6 Plato also emphasizes this, Laws 743E, 870B: οὐ χρὴ πλουτεῖν ζητεῖν τὸν evdal- 
μονα ἐσόμενον, ἀλλὰ δικαίως πλουτεῖν καὶ σωφρόνως. 660E; though he implies that 
unlimited wealth is necessarily evil. 


PLATO 27 


ably anticipated the thought of the more modern humanitarian 
economists: (1) in the fact that excessive private wealth is practi- 
cally impossible without corresponding extremes of poverty, and 
that such a condition is a most fruitful cause of dissension in any 
state; (2) in the fact that extremes of wealth or poverty cause in- 
dustrial inefficiency; (3) in the prevalent belief that no man can gain 
great wealth by just acquisition, since, even though he may have 
done no conscious injustice, his excessive accumulation has been due 
to unjust social conditions; (4) in the growing belief that expendi- 
tures of great private fortunes are not likely to be helpful either 
to individual or to community, but are too liable to be marked by 
foolish luxury and waste that saps the vitality of the nation; to 
Plato, such are mere drone consumers of the store (τῶν ἑτοίμων 
ἀναλωτής, . . . . κηφήν); in this, he was a forerunner of Ruskin, 
who opposed the old popular fallacy that the expenditures of the 
wealthy, of whatever nature, benefit the poor;? (5) in the dominant 
note in economic thought today, so emphasized by Plato and 
Ruskin, that the prime goal of the science is human life at its best 
—as Ruskin states it, ‘‘the producing as many as possible full- 
breathed, .bright-eyed, and happy-hearted human creatures’ ;3 
(6) in the fact that the national demand for unlimited wealth is 
now recognized, as Plato taught, always to have been the most 
fruitful cause of international differences; (7) in the fact, which 
is receiving ever-greater recognition by modern economists and 
statesmen, that the innate quality of the object for good or harm 
must be considered in a true definition of economic wealth. 


PRODUCTION 


Plato seems to have had little positive interest in the problems 
of production. He was too much engrossed with suggesting means 
for limiting excessive acquisition. He was, however, quite apt 


t Rep. 552B-D; cf. Robin, op. cit., p. 243, n. 1, on κηφήν. 

2In Mun. Pul., IU, 91 (Vol. XVII, 213), he makes Circe’s swine a type of false 
consumption; cf. Fors Clav., Letter 38 (Vol. XXVIII, 30ff.); Mun. Pul., Pref., τό 
(Vol. XVII, 139 f.); Queen of the Air, III, 124 ff. (Vol. XIX, 404 ff.); Pol. Econ. of 
Art, I, 48 ff. (Vol. XVI, 47 ff.); Unto This Last, IV, 76 (Vol. XVII, 102); Mill also 
attacked this idea. 

3 Unto This Last, II, 40 (Vol. XVII, 56); cf. also Mun. Pul., II, 54 (Vol. XVII, 
178 f.). 

4 Discussed above. 


28 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


in his use of illustrations from industrial 116. He was also appa- 
rently the first to give a real classification of trades,? as follows: 
furnishers of raw materials (rpwroyevés εἶδος), makers of tools 
(ὄργανα), makers of vessels for conserving products (ἀγγεῖα), 
makers of vehicles (ὄχημα), manufacturers of clothing and means 
of defense (προβλήματα), workers in fine arts (παίγνιον), producers 
of food (6péupa)—a fairly inclusive catalogue for that age; if com- 
merce and the learned professions were included. But some of the 
classes overlap, since they follow no necessary principle of division. 
He divided productive arts into co-operative (συναιτίους), which 
provide tools for manufacture, and principal (durias), which pro- 
duce the objects themselves They were further divided into 
productive arts (ποιητικαί), which bring something new into 
existence, and acquisitive (κτητικαί), which merely gain what already 
exists. In the latter class, he placed all commerce, science, and 
hunting.4 Plato would thus appear to exclude commerce and the 
learned professions from the true sphere of production. This, 
however, is only apparent, in so far as legitimate exchange is con- 
cerned. He clearly understood that the merchant and retailer 
save the time of the other workers,5 and that they perform a real 
service to the community, in that they make necessary exchange 
convenient and possible.° He thus recognized them as producers 
of a time and place value, and he cannot be accused of the physio- 
cratic error, which denied productivity to all workers except those 
who produce directly from natural resources.7?’ His distinction 

1 Cf. Pol. 281D-283A, for an excellent description of the weaving industry; also 
Crat. 388C ff.; Phileb. 56B, on carpentry. 

2 Pol. 287D—289B; cf. Espinas, op. cit., pp. 35 f.; ““L’Art économie dans Platon,”’ 
Revue des Etudes Grecques, XX VII (1914), τοῦ ff. 

3 Pol. 281D-E; cf. also Phaedo g9A-B; Phileb. 27A; Timaeus 46C-D. 

4 Sophist. 219A-D. Bonar’s (op. cit., p. 20) criticism of this on the ground that 
learning may produce something new, while the arts may merely change the shape 
of things, takes Plato too seriously. We have here only a characteristic Platonic 
generalization. Cf. Shorey, Unity of Plato’s Thought (1903), p. 64, mn. 500, on the 
foregoing passages from Sophist. and Pol.; cf. Robin, op. cit., pp. 231 f. 

5 Rep. 371C. 

ὁ Laws 918B-C, especially πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εὐεργέτης πᾶς ὃς ἂν οὐσίαν χρημάτων ὧντι- 
νωνοῦν, ἀσύμμετρον οὖσαν καὶ ἀνώμαλον, ὁμαλήντε καὶ σύμμετρον ἀπεργάζεται. 

7Cf. DuBois, Precis de V’histoire des doctrines économiques dans leurs rapports 
avec les faits et avec les institutions, pp. 45-47, comparing Plato and Aristotle on this 


PLATO 29 


of productive and acquisitive arts can, furthermore, hardly be 
interpreted as intending to limit production to the material merely, 
though learning is relegated to the acquisitive class. Such an 
interpretation would be out of harmony with the whole trend of 
his thought.'' His further classification of productive agencies 
as creative (ἕνεκα τοῦ ποιεῖν τι) or preventive (τοῦ μὴ πάσχειν)" sub- 
stantiates this, for many of the preventive agencies are intellectual 
and scientific. 

The general attitude of Plato toward economic production may 
be inferred from his insistence upon the thorough application of 
the division of labor for the perfection of industry. He evidently 
recognized it as the necessary basis of all higher life. We have 
seen above, also that one of his chief objections to excessive wealth 
or poverty was the fact that they caused inefficiency in production. 

A griculture.—Of the three factors that enter into production— 
land, labor, and capital—the most important in the mind of the 
Greek thinkers was land. ‘The relative prominence of agriculture 
was partly the cause of this, but in the case of the philosophers, 
their ethical passion, their idea of the necessity of leisure for 
personal development, and their conservative attitude toward 
industry and commerce were the chief motives that impelled them 
to urge their contemporaries back to the simple life of the farm.‘ 
point. Laws 743D and Plato’s attitude on agriculture (cf. infra) might seem to 
point the other way. Cf. infra, p. 41, nn. 7-10. Espinas (Revue des études Grecques, 


XXVII [1914], 247, n. 1) is extreme in calling him a physiocrat. The term would 
more nearly apply to Aristotle. 


τ Ar. (Pol. vi [iv]. 1291a12-19) so interprets him, because he finds the origin of 
the state in physical needs (Rep. 3600 ff.), but this is a carping criticism. Blanqui 
is hardly fair to Plato on this point (Histoire de l'économie politique en Europe, p. 88). 
Cf. above, p. 22, n. 4, on Plato’s other theory of origins. 


2 Pol. 270C. 
3 Cf. infra and Poehlmann, op. cit., 1, 574. 


4 As we shall see, the third reason has been exaggerated for the philosophers. On 
the favorable attitude to labor at Athens, cf. V. Brants, Revue de l’instruction publique 
im Belg., XXVI (1883), τοῦ f., roo f.; he distinguishes between the doctrine philoso- 
phique and the doctrine politique. So also Guiraud, La main-d’euvre industrielle 
dans Vancienne Gréce (1900), pp. 36-50; Zimmern, op. cit., pp. 382 ff., 256-72. 
For the older view of general prejudice against free labor in Greece, cf. Drumann, 
Arbeiter und Communisten in Griechenland u. Rom (1860), pp. 24 ff. Francotte 
(L’Industrie) takes the more conservative position. Cf. infra for further notice of 
this problem. 


30 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


oO 


The aristocratic feeling, still strong in European countries, that 
landed property is the most respectable, probably also had some 
influence, though land was not so distinctively in the hands of the 
upper classes in Attica. 

Though the praise of agriculture was a characteristic feature 
of Greek literature in all periods, it was not at first a conscious 
economic theory. Later, toward the end of the fifth century, it 
became a definite ethico-economic doctrine of the philosophers, 
as a criticism of their times, and as an appeal to what was deemed 
to be the more healthful life of the earlier days. 

Plato does not devote so much attention to this theme as do 
Xenophon and Aristotle. His standpoint, however, is practically 
the same, though his tendency toward the physiocratic error is not 
so marked. In his second state, he orders that agriculture shall 
be the only means of money-making,’ and he even strikes the 
modern note of conservation, in his directions for the care of 
land, waters, springs, and forests.s On this point, he and the 
other Greek thinkers accord well with the economy of the past 
decade with its urgent preachment, “Back to the land,” though 
the modern watchword has, of course, a more economic emphasis. 

Capital—Though the function of capital, aside from natural 
resources, was a familiar fact in the Athenian life of the fifth and 
fourth centuries B.c.,‘ there is scarcely any consideration of it by 
the theorists before Aristotle. Plato has no definition of capital, 
nor indeed scarcely any recognition of the fact of its existence.’ 
His emphasis on the virtue of economy, however, and his criticism 
of those who spend the ‘‘stored wealth,” imply the idea that wealth 
should be used not merely for enjoyment, but also for productive 


τ Hesiod Erga; Theog. 969-975, though even here it is opposed to commerce. 

2 Laws 7431), but he would even limit this, so that it may not become a sordid 
occupation. 

3 Laws 760E-761C, 763D. Ruskin cites this in Fors Clav.; cf. Vol. XXIX, 546. 

4 Cf. pp. το f., and notes; cf. alsop.106,n.1. The extensive commerce of Athens 
necessitated the presence of a comparatively large amount of money capital, and a 
large amount was also invested in slaves. For further notice, cf. infra, p. 68, 
nn. 8 ff., on the terms. 
‘But cf. Laws 742C (κεφάλαιον), and infra, under Xenophon, on the terms for 
capital. 


PLATO 31 


purposes.’ His strictures upon interest show that he has but 
slight appreciation of the productive function of money-capital.? 

Labor and industry.—On the other hand, Plato has considerable 
insight into the réle of labor in production. ‘To be sure, he shares 
with the other philosophers a certain prejudice against manual 
labor as degrading to freemen. The mechanical arts call forth 
reproach.4 Free citizens should not be burdened with such ignoble 
occupations, and any person who disobeys this rule shall lose his 
civic rights until he gives up his trade.® Agriculture alone shall be 
open to them, and only so much of this as will not cause them to 
neglect their higher welfare.? However, this prejudice has been 
read into some passages in Plato by a forced interpretation. The 
assertion of Socrates,’ that craftsmen have not temperance (σωφ- 
ροσύνη), since they do other people’s business, is made merely to 
draw Critias into the argument. The statement that all arts 
having for their function provision for the body are slavish,’ does 
not necessarily imply prejudice against physical labor. Such 
arts are slavish, to Plato, because they have no definite principle 
of service as gymnastics has. He is merely illustrating the point 
that it is an inferior type of statesmanship that works without 
a definite principle for the highest political welfare. The idea, 
expressed in the Politics, that the masses (πλῆθος) cannot acquire 
political science is a criticism against unprepared statesmanship 
rather than against labor. Indeed, Plato asserts the same of the 
wealthy.” 

Cf. Rep. 552B, and p. 27. Kautz (op. cit., p. 119) overemphasizes this; cf. 
Souchon, op. cit., p. 91, n. 2, who observes, however, that Plato, by his insistence upon 


collectivism in landed property implies that “la terre est toujours un capital, et que 
la fortune mobiliére ne |’est jamais.” 


2 Cf. infra on money. 


3On the general attitude toward labor in Athens, cf. p. 30, n. 4. On Plato’s 
regard for the laborer, cf. infra, under distribution. 


4 Rep. 590C, but only for him whose higher nature (τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος) is 
naturally weak, though the implication is that this is characteristic of the artisans. 
Cf. Poehlmann, op. cit., II, 49 f. 


5 Laws 842D, 806D-E, 741E, 846D, 919D. 
6 847A. 8 Charm. 163A-C. 10 292E, 28gE-290A. 
7743D. 9 Gorg. 517D-518E. 1 7014. 300E. 


GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


we 
to 


Moreover, the following facts should be observed: that the 
prejudice of Plato against the manual arts is chiefly limited to the 
Laws; that even there his prejudice is primarily against retail 
trade rather than against industry; that in so far as a real hos- 
tility exists, its true source is not in any opposition to labor or indus- 
try per se, but rather in the political belief that only as citizens have 
leisure for politics can prepared statesmen take the place of super- 
ficial politicians,? and in the moral feeling that constant devotion 
merely to the physical necessities of life causes men to neglect the 
primary purpose of their existence. 

Modern scholars have usually been extreme in their interpre- 
tation of Plato on this point.* Such unwarranted generalizations 
as the following are common: 1] ne découvre dans les professions 
qui tendent au lucre qu’égoisme, bassesse d’esprit, dégradation 
des sentiments.”’ ‘‘Platon et Aristote voient dans le commerce et 
dans l’industrie deux plaies de la société; ils voudraient les extirper 
a’fond, si cela était possible.”’ One of the worst misinterpretations 
has been perpetrated by Roscher, in inferring from the Republic 
(372 ff.) that Plato “das Leben der Gewerbetreibenden als ein 
Leben thierischen Behaglichkeit schildert, sie wohl mit Schweinen 
vergleicht.’ Such absurdities are unfortunately not rare, though 
they might be avoided by a careful reading, even in a translation.’ 

* Cf. Rep. 371C for a contrast in his attitude toward the two; cf. Bonar, op. cit., 
pp. 21 f. 

? Laws 8461), 847A. Ruskin (Fors Clav., Letter 82, 34 [Vol. XXIX, 253 f.]) 
contrasts the fevered leisure that results from extreme money-making with the true 
leisure, citing Laws 831. 

3 Laws 7431). The aristocratic Greek feeling of independence against selling 


one’s powers to another, and the fact of the frank acceptance of slavery, by most 
contemporary thinkers, as the natural order, also exerted some unconscious influence. 

4 Cf. infra for citations from Zeller, and Poehlmann’s able, but somewhat extreme, 
defense of Plato (op. cit., II, 36 ff.). He cites Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, V, I, 
Pt. 2, art. 2, in similar vein to Plato, on the ill-effects of mechanical labor, despite his 
undoubted interest in the industrial arts. 

5 Francotte, L’Industrie, I, 246, in reference to the Laws. 

© Op. cit., p. 26, n. 2. 

7 Eisenhart (Geschichte der Nationalékonomie, p. 5) also says that Plato calls 
“Volkswirtschaft gerade zu den Staat der Schweine.” Dietzel (“Beitriige zur Ge- 
schichte des Socialismus und des Kommunismus,” Zeitschrift fiir Literatur und Ge- 
schichte der Staatswissenschaften, p. 397, n. 1) criticizes both the foregoing. 


PLATO 33 


It should not be overlooked either that Plato’s utterances on 
labor are by no means all negative. Skilled labor is recognized 
in several of the minor dialogues as fulfilling an actual need in 
civilization. Laborers are represented as having their part in 
knowledge and virtue,’ and are admitted to be the necessary 
foundation of all human well-being.? A positive interest is also 
manifested by Plato in labor and the proper development of the 
arts in both the Republic and the Laws. He constantly harps on 
the necessity of each doing his fitting work, and doing it well, and 
in his opinion happiness consists in this rather than in idleness. 
Indeed, that each one perform well the task for which nature has 
fitted him is the definition of justice itself.4 The indolent rich 
man is a parasite and a drone, a disease of the state. This is 
Plato’s favorite figure in both the Republic and the Laws, a figure 
that is suggestive of Hesiod, the pioneer champion of labor.s He 
is even ready to admit that it is, after all, not the kind of labor 
but the character of the workman that ennobles or degrades any 
work.® In fine, his attitude toward the mechanical arts is similar 
to that of Ruskin, who also thinks that manual labor is degrading.’ 

τ Sympos. 209A; Phileb. 56C. 2 Protag. 321E. 

3 Rep. 420E, 421C; Laws 779A, 807A-E, 808C. The passages in the Laws apply 
particularly to the work of the soldier and the citizen. Cf. Ruskin, Unto This Last, 
I, 22 (Vol. XVII, 40) for a similar idea that the function of the laborer is not pri- 
marily to draw his pay, but to do his work well. 


4 Rep. 433A. 

5 Rep. 552A, C, 564E; cf. Laws gorA, where he refers to the passage in Hesiod’s 
Erga 304: κηφηνέσσι κοθούροις, Cf. p. 27, n. 1, above. Poehlmann (οῤ. cit., 11, 
87 f.) points to Plato’s demand that woman be freed, so that the total number of free 
workers may be increased, but Plato is thinking only of the ruling class. 

6 Laws g18B-g19C, referring to retail trade; but if he could admit it for this, he 
surely could for the industries. Cf. Aristotle’s passage on liberal and illiberal work 
(Pol. 1337b5-22). 

7Mun. Pul., V, τος and note (Vol. XVII, 234 f.), where he refers to Plato’s 
diminutive, ἀνθρωπίσκοι, as applied to laborers (Rep. 495C; Laws 741E); Time and 
Tide, 103 (Vol. XVII, 402), 127 (p. 423 and note); Crown of Wild Olive, 2 (Vol. 
XVIII, 388), on the furnace; Lectures on Art, IV, 123 (Vol. XX, 113); on the evil 
effects of arts needing fire, as iron-working, where Xen. Econ. iv. 2, 3 is cited. He 
makes frequent reference to the Greek attitude, e.g., Vol. XVIII, 241, 461, and above. 
But he was not absolutely opposed to machinery; cf. Cestus Aglaia, 33 for what is 
called the finest eulogy of a machine in English literature. He even anticipated the 
great future mechanical development (Mun. Pul., 17). 


34 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 

But as with Plato, the chief secret of his prejudice lies in the fact 
that laborers usually do their work mechanically, without thought. 
He believes that ‘“‘workmen ought often to be thinking, and think- 
ers ought often to be working.” He is willing to classify all work 
as liberal on this basis, the only distinction being the amount of 
skill required.t However, in agreement with Plato’s idea, he 
would set the roughest and least intellectual to the roughest work, 
and this he thinks to be ‘‘the best of charities” to them.? With 
Plato, he is also convinced that, under actual conditions of labor, 
the degradation is very difficult to avoid, and therefore he would 
emphasize chiefly agricultural labor, where education of head and 
hand are more fully realized. 

It is, however, in Plato’s constant insistence upon the principle 
of the division of labor, as a prerequisite for any succces in the 
mechanical arts or elsewhere, that he reveals insight into, and 
interest in, productive labor. This is the basal idea in the Repubdlic. 
It is also one of the chief regulations in the Laws, where its direct 
application to the artisan is a clear evidence that he appreciates 
the economic significance of the principle.4 To him, it is the 
foundation of all human development. Society finds its source in 
mutual need (ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία). Man isnot self-sufficient (atrapxns). 
Reciprocity is necessary even in the most primitive states Out of 
this necessary dependence arises the division of labor, a beneficent 
law, “‘since the product is larger, better, and more easily produced, 
whenever one man gives up all other business, and does one thing 
fitting to his nature, and at the opportune time.’ 

1 Stones of Venice (Vol. X, 201); cf. also IV, 6 (Vol. XI, 202 f.), where he cites 
Plato Alc. I. 129. 

2 Fors. Clav., VII, 9 (Vol. XIX, 230). 

3 Cf. Vol. XXVII, Intro., p. Ixv. 

4 Rep. 370A-C and many other passages. Cf. infra; Laws 846E-847A. Cf. 
infra on the unfair interpretation of Rep. 421A by Zeller and others. Plato implies 
by the passage merely that specialization is more important for the statesman than 
for the cobbler (4210). 

5 Rep. 369C. Adam Smith makes this the basal fact of exchange (Wealth of 
Nations, I, ii). 

ὁ Rep.370C: πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ρᾷον, ὅταν els ἕν κατὰ φύσιν, 
καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ. He first states the principle less plausi- 
bly as a literary device, Rep. 369C; cf. 433A. 


PLATO 35 


The basis of this law Plato finds in the fact of the diversity of 
natures, which fits men for different tasks. In this he differs from 
Adam Smith, who believes that the differences of natural talents 
in men are much less than is generally supposed. Smith makes the 
propensity to barter the source of specialization, which, in turn, is 
based on the interdependence of men. He thus considers the 
diversities in human nature to be the effect rather than the cause 
of the division of labor.? Plato, however, is probably nearer the 
truth, since the very reason for mutual interdependence is diversity 
of nature. 

The advantages of specialization, according to Plato,‘ are four, 
as stated above. It enables one to accomplish more work with 
greater ease, more skilfully, and at the proper season. The second 
and fourth of these are not mentioned by Adam Smith, but he notes 
the resulting increase in opulence for all the people, and the develop- 
ment of inventive genius. He also observes that the division of 
labor causes the growth of capital, and that this in turn increases 
specialization.’ Of course Plato could not appreciate the important 
fact of the influence of the division of labor on the development of 
inventive genius, since he lived before the age of machinery. 

Plato is also a forerunner of Adam Smith in his recognition of 
the fact that the division of labor depends for its advance upon 
a great increase in the size and complexity of the state.6 It means 
a multiplication of trades, a development of industry,’ the entrance 
of the retail trader (κάπηλος) ὃ and the invention of money as a means 
of exchange.? The necessity of the division of labor between 
states is also recognized. It is impossible to establish a city where 
it will not be in need of imports (ἐπεισαγωγίμων). International 
trade therefore arises, and with it are born the merchant (ἔμπορος) 

t Rep. 370C, B. 2 Op. cit., I, chap. ii. 


3So Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology (1900), III, 342-49. Cf. also 
Ruskin, Fors Clav., IV, 15 (Vol. XXVIII, 160). 

4 Rep. 370B-C, 374B-E. 

50. cit.,I, chap. 1. Plato implies the increase in wealth. Haney (op. cit., p. 41) 
observes that Plato thought especially of the advantages of division of labor to the 
state, rather than to the individual. Cf. further Wealth of Nations, II, Intro. 


6 Rep. 370C-371B; cf. DuBois, op. cit., p. 37. 
7 Rep. 370C-D. δ ΤΟΣ 9371B; Laws 918B. 


36 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


me ] 


and the sailor class, together with all ‘those who are engaged in 
the labor of the carrying trade.* Thus Plato, the idealist, and 
reputed enemy of trade and industry, develops them directly out 
of the basal principle of his Republic. He appreciates the necessity 
of a full-fledged industry and commerce to the existence even of 
a primitive state, and his hostility to them is actually directed 
only against what he terms their unnatural use.2 Moreover, in 
his opinion, one function of the division of labor should be to limit 
them to the performance of their proper tasks, and keep them from 
degenerating into mere money-making devices. It should also 
result in limiting such vocations to the less capable classes since 
the rulers should be artisans of freedom. 

It would take us too far afield to discuss the diverse ways in 
which Plato uses his principle. We may observe in passing, 
however, that he applies it to war, in his interesting criticism of 
the citizen-soldier;+ to the finer arts, even when they are quite 
similar to each other;’ to politics, as noted above; to justice and 
the moral life in general;® and to the intellectual life, in his unspar- 
ing critcism of the superficial versatility and dilletantism of the 
contemporary Athenian democracy, which trusts the government 
to any incompetent, professes to be able to imitate everything, and 
makes the many-sided Sophist (πολλαπλοῦς) the man of the hour.’ 
Though he begins with the development of the principle as an 

τ Rep. 370E-371A. In the Laws, he does not extend the principle to international 
trade. Cf. Bonar, op. cit., Ὁ: 17. 

2 Poehlmann (op. cit., II, 185 f.) notes a contradiction between Plato’s insistence 
upon the division of labor and his desire for the simple life. But the philosopher is 
aware of this, and knows that the simpler ideal is impossible. Cf. V. Brants, Revue 
de lV’instr. pub. en Belg., XXVI (1883), 102-4, on the fact of the extensive division of 
labor in Athenian industry. ἡ 

3 δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας. Rep. 395C, 434A-D; cf. also 420B-421B. In the 
Laws, the artisans and traders are non-citizens (846D, 847A, 918B-C), not because 
of prejudice primarily, but for the sake of better government. 

4 Rep. 374B-E. 

5 395A-B; cf. Adam’s note to 395A, explaining Sympos. 223D, where Plato asserts 
the opposite. He thinks Plato is speaking ideally in the Republic passage, but here 
of the actual fact. But cf. Shorey, Unity, etc., p. 78, n. 597. 

ὁ Rep. 433A-B, Ὁ, 434A-D, 432A, 443-444A, 396D-E; Charm. 161E. In his 
broad application of the law, he has advanced beyond Adam Smith. Cf. Souchon, 
op. cit., p. 81 and n. 2. 


7 Rep. 397E-308A. 


PLATO 37 


economic fact, his primary interest in it is as a moral and 
intellectual maxim. The fact that the cobbler sticks to his last 
is only a symbol (εἴδωλον) of justice.t Nevertheless Plato does 
appreciate to a remarkable degree the economic bearings of the 
law, and his discussion of it is notably scientific and complete.’ 
He sometimes pushes its application to an extreme, though such 
instances are perhaps meant in a playful Socratic vein’ At least, 
like Ruskin, he understands that extreme specialization must 
produce narrow and one-sided men, and that progress revolts 
against its too rigid application. He is aware too that the division 
of labor breaks down in the case of the poor unemployed of the 
state, since they have no special work. 


SLAVERY 


Plato is not blind to the ethical aspects of the problem of slavery. 
In his first healthy state (ὑγιείνη), slavery and war are conspicu- 
ously absent, and it is the natural inference that the author believed 
these to be necessary evils of the more complex state.° He appre- 
ciates the dangers of absolute power, even in private life, and 
believes that few men can stand the strain.’ He conceives human 
nature as a unity that defies absolute division into separate classes.’ 


t 443C-D; cf. Nettleship Lectures on the Republic of Plato, p. 71. 


2 Oncken observes (Geschichte der Nationalikonomie, pp. 34-36) that while Smith 
drew from the law the idea of freedom of trade and industry, Plato inferred the 
strictest subordination of these to the will of the state, and that he also based the 
caste system on the principle. For the alleged caste system, cf. Souchon, oP. cit., 
p. 82, and infra, under distribution. Aristotle’s state implies even a more rigid sepa- 
ration of the capable few. On Plato’s insight into economic principles, cf. Robin, 
op. cit., pp. 229 ff. He criticizes Guiraud for belittling the value of Plato’s social 
ideas, and urges that he should be judged, not by the worth of his proposed remedies, 
but by his scientific insight (p. 252). 

3 Rep. 395A-B; 374E, 395B; εἰς σμικρότερα κατακερματίσθαι. 

4A pol. 21C-22E; cf. Rep. 495D-E, though it applies rather to the evil effects 
of the banausic life. Cf. Bonar, op. cit., p. 16. Ruskin (Stones of Venice, VI, 16 
[Vol. X, 196]), says: It is “not the labor that is divided but the men—divided into 
segments of men.” It stunts their faculties. 

5 Rep. 552A. 6 396C-373E; cf. Bonar, op. cit., Ὁ. 27. 7579D. 

8 Cf. Zimmern, op. cit., p. 389, note; Laws 777B: δῆλον ws ἐπειδὴ δύσκολόν ἐστι τὸ 
θρέμμα ἄνθρωπος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν διόρισιν, Td δοῦλόν τε ἔργῳ διορίζεσθαι Kal ἐλεύθε- 
ρον καὶ δεσπότην οὐδαμῶς εὔχρηστον ἐθέλει εἶναι τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι. On his alleged caste 
system, cf. above, n. 2, and infra. 


38 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Though he does not renounce slavery in the Republic, he would 
limit it to the barbarians and to those who seem unfit for the higher 
116. It plays a remarkably small part in his first state, and it 
would seem that his idealism is here struggling against what he 
feels to be an economic necessity. In the Laws, he frankly accepts 
the necessity, and puts even agriculture, as well as the other 
industries, into the hands of slaves.2, However, they are not to 
be treated as animals, but as rational men, in whom a proper usage 
may develop a certain degree of morality and ambition for good 
work.3 To be sure, his purpose is economic rather than ethical— 
to make the slaves satisfied with their lot, and thus better pro- 
ducers.4. He makes no mention of freedom as a reward for good 
behavior, though he elsewhere provides for the existence of freed- 
men in the state, and stipulates that they shall not become richer 
than their former masters.5 


MONEY 


As Plato was the first of extant Greek thinkers to grasp the 
principle of the division of labor, so he was the first to give any 
hint as to the origin of money. He states that it came into use by 
reason of the growth of necessary exchange, which in turn resulted 
from increased division of labor.® 

The function of money he defines somewhat indefinitely by the 
term ‘“‘token of exchange,’” an expression suggestive of Ruskin’s 


τ Rep. 469C; cf. Pol. 309A. 

2 Laws 806D. For Ruskin on slavery, cf. infra on Aristotle. 

3 Laws 776D-777E. Espinas (Revue des Etudes Grecques, XXVII [1914], 256) 
observes that Plato adopts the mean between the two extremes in his attitude to 
slaves. 

4Cf. Xen. Ath. Pol. i. 10-12 on the easy life of slaves in Athens, and Zimmern, 
op. cit., pp. 382 f., who points out that this resulted from economic necessity. Cf. 
777C-D; cf. Rep. 578D-579A on the dangers and troubles arising from extensive slave- 
holding. ’ 

5 Laws 915A ff., another striking evidence of the actual status of freedmen and 
slaves in Athens. 

° Rep. 371B. The word is νόμισμα, something established by usage, hence “cur- 
rent coin,” not necessarily suggestive of intrinsic worth, as are χρήματα and the metals. 
Ci. Ar. Clouds 248 for a play on the word, Geol ἡμῖν νόμισμ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι. Cf. the simile, 
Frogs 720, and Phaedo 69A, for an analogy between it and wisdom. 

7 Rep. 371B: ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς. 


PLATO 39 


definition “‘a ticket or token of right to goods.’ It seems to 
imply that money is not itself a commodity to be trafficked in. 
In the Laws, he specifies more clearly the functions of this symbol. 
It acts as a medium of exchange and as a measure of να]. The 
latter office is performed by reason of the fact that money is a 
common denominator of value, changing products from incom- 
mensurable (ἀσύμμετρον) and uneven (ἀνώμαλον) to commensurable 
and even. 

Since Plato did not consider money to be a commodity to be 
bought and sold, and since he did not appreciate its productive 
function as representative capital, his theory of interest was super- 
ficial. His attitude toward it was somewhat similar to that of 
many people today toward speculation in futures in the stock 
market, as a practice contrary to public interest and policy. The 
application of the term τόκος to interest by Plato* and Aristotle, 
as though interest were the direct child of money, is probably only 
a punning etymology, and not intended seriously. It can there- 
fore hardly be used, as it often is, to prove the superficiality of the 
theory of the Socratics. Plato, however, would have no money- 
making by usury,’ nor indeed any loaning or credit at all, except 
as an act of friendship.® Such contracts should be made at the 
loaner’s own risk,’ and held legal only as a punishment for breaking 
other contracts.’ He calls the usurer a bee that inserts his sting, 
money, into his victims, thereby beggaring them and enriching 
himself. 

Such strictures against interest were common in mediaeval 
Europe, reappeared in Ruskin,’ and are implied in the present 


t Fors Clav., IV, 11, note (Vol. XXVIII, 134 f.); cf. also Vol. XVII, 50, 194 f. 
2742A-B: νόμισμα δ᾽ ἕνεκα ἀλλαγῆς; gi8B: ἐξευπορεῖν καὶ ὁμαλότητα ταῖς οὐσίαις, 
referring directly to traders. 


3 Laws g18B. 5 Laws 743D. 
4 Rep. 553E; for Aristotle, cf. infra. 6 849E. 
7742C, 915D-E; Rep. 556A-B; Laws 850A. 

8 g21C, an obol per month. 9 Rep. 555E. 


τὸ Fors. Clav., notes to Letter 43, 14 (Vol. XXVIII, τῶι f.), notes to Letter 81, 16 
(Vol. XXIX, 212), where he refers to Plato and Aristotle; Mun. Pul., IV, 98, note 
(Vol. XVII, 220), where he absolutely condemns it; On the Old Road, Vol. XXXIV, 
425, on usury, ends with a citation from the Laws 913C; ἃ μὴ κατέθου, μὴ ἀνέλῃ. 


40 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


opposition, in some quarters, to so-called “unearned income.’” 
The motive in mediaeval times, however, was distinctively reli- 
gious, and was also partly due to the absence of a developed capital- 
ism. With Ruskin and modern theorists, on the other hand, the 
objection is, at bottom, socialistic. ‘The motive of the Socratics 
was essentially moral and political. 

Plato’s other error concerning money, as above observed, was 
that it need possess no intrinsic value for domestic use. He looked 
upon gold and silver as causes of degeneration in state and indi- 
vidual,? and would therefore have put a ban on them for use within 
the state To his mind, a mere state fiat was sufficient to give 
currency and value.4| This doctrine has also often recurred in the 
history of economic thought, as in Ruskin and the Greenback 
party of a generation ago.s The error, however, was not so grave 
in Plato’s case, for he, at least, recognized the need of the precious 
metals for international purposes. Moreover, in his proposed 
state of such limited extent, the problem would have been far 
simpler, and he would have distinguished between actual condi- 
tions and possibilities in Greece and his admittedly more or less 
utopian ideal. 


EXCHANGE 


Exchange in Greek economy held a very minor place, compared 
with its dominant importance in modern theory. It was dis- 
cussed chiefly in a negative manner, as the object of the moral and 
aristocratic prejudice of Greek thinkers. We find, however, some 
appreciation of its true place in the economic life of a state. Plato 
divides trade, ἀλλαγή or ἀγοραστική, into αὐτοπωλική, which sells 
its own products, αὐτουργῶν, and μεταβλητική, which exchanges 
the products of others. He further divides the latter into καπηλική, 
the exchange within the state, which he calls one-half of all the 


*E.g. J. Scott Nearing’s recent book on Income. 

ἡ Laws 679B, 831C; Rep. 545B ff., 548B. Cf. Ruskin on the evils arising from 
money, Vol. XX, 295 f. 

3 Laws 743D, 742A-B, 801B. 4 742A, 

5 Ruskin, Mun. Pul., 1, 25. He thinks it is a relic of a barbarism that will dis- 
appear as civilization develops. 

6 Laws 742A-B. 


PLATO 41 


exchange, and ἐμπορική, foreign commerce.’ He finds its origin 
in the division of labor, and in the mutual interdependence of men 
and states.? He understands the necessity of the reciprocal atti- 
tude in international, as well as in private, exchange, and thus has 
a clearer insight than the mercantilists and some modern statesmen. 
A state must raise a surplus of its own products, so as to supply the 
other state from which it expects to have its own needs satisfied.? 

Since a tariff on imports played little part in Greek life, except 
in so far as it was imposed for sumptuary or war purposes,‘ the per- 
plexing modern problem of the protective tariff scarcely came 
within the horizon of Greek thinkers. Plato would prohibit the 
import of certain luxuries, as a moral safeguard. He divides 
merchandise into primary and secondary products, and would not 
permit the import of the latter. Elsewhere, however, he legislates 
against imposts upon either imports or exports, though unconscious 
of the significance of his suggestion.° 

He appreciated something of the function of exchange in 
society. It performed a very important service, as a mediator 
between producer and consumer.’ Like money, it served to 
equalize values, and thus acted as an aid to the satisfaction of 
needs.2 When limited to this primary function, it was of advan- 
tage to both parties to the exchange,’ and merchants and retailers 
had then a real part in the production of values.” 

The sweeping assertion is too often made that the Greek people 
were hostile to trade, and therefore that their theorists were espe- 
cially opposed to it. We have already seen how false this idea is 


t Sophist. 223C-D; cf. Pol., 289E for the triple division of commercials, κάπηλοι, 
ἔμποροι, and dpyupapolBa; cf. Phaedo, 69A for a figurative use of ἀλλαγή. 

2 Rep. 370A-E, home; 370E-371E, foreign; cf. Adam Smith’s idea above. 

3 370E-371A; Cornford (op. cit., p. 66) wrongly asserts that Plato did not know 
the law that exports must balance imports. Cf. op. cit., p. 37. 

4 Boeckh, Die Staataushaltung der Athener, 1, pp. 382 ff.; Zimmern, op. cit., st ed., 
p. 317. But cf. Brants, Xenophon Economiste, p. 18, n. 2 and references, on the pro- 
tectionist tendency of the commercial policy of Athens. 

5 Laws 847C; Souchon (op. cit., p. 102) sees in this a mercantile trend, but the 
purposes are entirely different. 

6 847B. 7 Rep. 371C-D. 8 Laws g18B-C. 9 Rep. 369C. 

τὸ On the relation of exchange to production, cf. above, p. 28. 


42 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


for the Greeks themselves,’ but it also needs a great deal of quali- 
fication in the case of their writers. Their hostility is directed 
especially against the more petty business of retail trade (καπηλική) 
rather than against the extensive operations of the merchant 
(ἔμπορος). But their opposition even to this is not entirely undis- 
criminating. We have seen that Plato clearly understands the 
necessity of exchange to the life of the state.2 He admits that 
even retail trade is not necessarily evil. The chief reason why it 
appears so is because it gives free opportunity for the vulgar greed 
of unlimited gain, which is innate in man.’ If the noblest citizens, 
who are governed by rational interests, should become retailers 
and innkeepers, the business would soon be held in honor.$ 

Plato, however, would limit exchange to its primary function 
as defined above.® Like Ruskin, he believes that, whenever it is 
pursued merely for private gain, it becomes a source of degeneration 
to individual and state. It is then akin to the fraudulent or 
counterfeit pursuits (κιβδήλοις). The retailers in well-ordered 
states are generally the weakest men, who are unable to undertake 
other work. The rulers in the Republic must keep themselves 
entirely free from the trammels of trade, lest they become wolves 
instead of shepherds,? though Plato is grappling here with a very 
real problem that still faces us—how to prevent graft among 
public servants.”? In the Laws, retail trade is entirely prohibited 
to citizens," and permitted only to metics and strangers,” and, 
indeed, only to those whose corruption will be of least injury to the 
state.* These aliens are not to be permitted to gain overmuch 
wealth, and they must depart from the state, after twenty years’ 

UPD. To}. 3 Laws g18B. 5 g18E. 

2P. 41 and notes. 4918D. ®P. 41 and notes. 

7 Laws g18A,920C. He seems to feel that trade as regularly pursued is a form of 
cheatery, in which one gains what the other loses. Cf. Ruskin, Unto This Last, I, 
22 (Vol. XVII, 40 f.); IV, 66 ff. (Vol. XVII, 90 ff.); Mun. Pul., IV, 95 ff. (Vol. XVII, 
217 ff.), where he refers to Rep. 426E, on the difficulty of curing this disease of traders; 
cf. Vol. XVII, Intro., p. xlvi, citing Xen. Mem., iii. 7. 5, 6, on those who are “always 
thinking how they may buy cheapest and sell dearest.” 

8 Rep. 371C. 9 416A-a4r7A. 

Cf. 415E, χρηματιστικάς in contrast to στρατιωτικάς. 

1 741E, 743D, 919D. 12.920A. 13 g19D. 

4 915A-B, though it applies especially to freedmen. 


PLATO 43 


residence, with all their belongings.‘ Retail trade, even in their 
hands, must be strictly limited to the demands of the state,? and 
confined to the market-place for the sake of publicity All 
exchange must be honest, dealing with unadulterated products 
(ἀκίβδηλον). There shall be no dickering over sales, but only one 
price shall be set upon goods each day. Ii this is not accepted, the 
goods must be removed from sale until the following day. If 
possible, the executors of the laws should try to fix a just schedule 
of prices, to allow of moderate gain, and should see that this is 
observed by the retailers.6 As a climax to all these precautions, 
Plato would have the rulers take pains to devise means whereby 
the retailers shall not degenerate into unbridled shamelessness 
and meanness of soul.?7 Under such limitations, he has faint hopes 
that retail trade may be freed of its stigma, so as to do least harm 
to those who pursue it, and to benefit the whole state.’ 

It need not be observed that this attitude of Plato toward trade 
and commerce is alien to the spirit of economic progress, and that 
no advanced civilization could be developed on such a basis. His 
profuse legislation, too, as above outlined, strikes a modern as 
naive and visionary. No man, however, is more aware of this 
than Plato himself. He should be judged, not in a spirit of rigid 
literalism, but with a sympathetic criticism which tries to under- 
stand the psychological reasons for his attitude. His suggestions 
are not offered as a proposed scheme for actual legislation,” but 


t 850B-C, and n.1, above. 2 g19C. 

3 849D-E, 850A, 15D; cf. infra on this and the other regulations in their appli- 
cation to modern economics. 

4916D-E; cf. 917. 5 917B-D. 

6 g20B-C. Plato’s market regulations would exclude all selfish competition and ' 
all gain, beyond mere return for labor expended, from exchange, and would base it 
upon a mutual spirit of reciprocity. Thus here, as often, he is the model for Aristotle, 
who usually fails to recognize his debt. Espinas (Revue des Etudes Grecques, XXVII 
[1914], 246) is hardly in accord with the modern spirit in declaring that competition 
is the social bond, and that Plato misconceives the nature of this bond. 

7920A-B, gi19D. 8 Laws g20C. 

9Zimmern (oP. cit., p. 280, n. 1) calls it “grandfatherly.” 

τὸ But cf. Robin, op. cit., p. 212, n. 1, who argues that many of his suggestions are 
based on actual legislation in Athens or elsewhere in Greece. Cf. also Hermann, 
Ges. Abh. (1849), pp. 141, 153, 159, whom he cites; J. Schulte, Quomodo Plato in 


44 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


rather in the spirit of the moralist, who, observing that almost 
inevitable evils accompany retail trade and commercialism, with 
human nature as it is, and that commerce, the servant of man, has 
become his master, sees almost the only hope of escape in its limi- 
tation to what is barely necessary. The age-long problem of a 
greedy commercialism, which is blind to the appeal of all other 
goods when profits are at stake, Plato certainly saw clearly, and 
outlined with the hand of a master. The problem faces us still, 
in a form even more acute, but the protests of Plato, Ruskin, and 
Carlyle are bearing positive fruit today, in a political economy that 
takes as its supreme goal human life at its best. 

But aside from these generalities, a sympathetic study of Plato’s 
thought on exchange reveals an insight into certain specific points, 
of interest to modern economics, which are commonly overlooked. 
His protest against the former axiom of economics, that the prime 
purpose of trade is profit, and that the mere fact that goods change 
hands, necessarily increases the wealth of a country, is substan- 
tially correct. Commerce for commerce’ sake is a clear case of 
mistaking the means for the end, and is contrary to sound eco- 
nomics as well as ethics. The objections of Plato and Ruskin? 
against the principle too generally accepted by business and 
economy of the past, at least tacitly, that “it is the buyer’s function 
to cheapen and the seller’s to cheat,” are being recognized today 
as worthy of consideration. 

The anxiety of Plato over the effect of trades or professions 
upon character is well worthy of modern imitation, and this is, to 
a considerable extent, an economic as well as a moral question. 
Zimmern’ has well observed: ‘‘Our neglect to study the effect of 
certain modern professions upon character, when we are always 


legibus publica Atheniensiwm instituta respexerit (1907, dissertation), and the bibli- 
ography cited there. But he deals very little with Plato’s economic and social laws. 

1 Plato saw that it might add a time and place value (p. 41, and notes). 

2 Cf. above, p. 42, ἢ. 7; also Fors Clav., Letters 45, 82; Crown of Wild Olive, ΤΙ, 
75{. (Vol. XVITI,450f.). He argues that there should be no profit in exchange, 
beyond merely the payment for the labor involved in it. He insists that ‘‘for every 
plus in exchange there is a precisely equal minus.” Cf. infra on Aristotle for a 
similar idea, pp. 107 ff. 


3 Op. cit., Ὁ. 278, n. 2; cf. above, pp. 421. 


PLATO 45 


insisting, and rightly, upon the importance of a character-forming 
education, is one of the strangest lapses, due to the sway of nine- 
teenth-century economics.” 

As we have seen, one of the chief purposes of Plato in his limi- 
tation of commerce was to eliminate graft from the government. 
Though his remedy was not acceptable, yet his remarkable appre- 
ciation of a very grave problem that still faces us should be recog- 
nized. Furthermore, no better solution for it has ever been offered 
than the separation of politics from big business. This was the 
underlying principle of his suggestion, and it is in accord with the 
trend of modern statesmanship. 

Another impelling motive of Plato in his stringent legislation 
was to render impossible the development of extremes of wealth 
or poverty in the state. Again, we should credit him with having 
clearly appreciated the problem, though we may criticize his 
attempted solution. The great commercial prosperity of today 
has made the situation vastly more acute, and still economics has 
no satisfactory solution to offer. After all, in the light of modern 
tendencies toward the regulation of industry and commerce, some 
of Plato’s ideas do not seem so “grandfatherly,” but rather pro- 
phetic, and in accord with sound economy. His legislation against 
the sale of adulterated products,’ and in favor of publicity in busi- 
ness,? and state supervision of prices* has a startlingly modern ring. 


POPULATION 


The problem of population and food supply, which disturbed 
Malthus and some of the other English economists, was also a cause 
of concern to Greek thinkers. This might well be expected, since 
it is a recognized fact that the source of the grain supply was always 
a matter of grave concern to Athens and many other Greek cities.4 

“Cis 43; 2 Ibid. 

3 1014. Cf. Ruskin’s more socialistic idea that all retailers be made salaried off- 
cers (Time and Tide, XXI, 134 [Vol. XVII, 427]). 

4Cf. 6. g., Dem. De corona 87; Cont. Lept. xx. 31; Cont. Andr. xxii. 15; Cont. 
Lacrit. xxxv. 50; Lysias xxii; Hdt. vil. 102; Thuc. iii. 86, and many other passages. 
For modern discussions, cf. Droysen, Athen und der Westen (1882), pp. 41 ff.; Grundy, 
Thucydides and the History of His Age (1911), pp. 58-95; Zimmern, op. cil., 1st ed., 
pp. 349 ff.; Gernet, ““L’Approvisionment d’Athénes en blé,’’ Mélanges d’histoire, 
ancienne, 1909; Beloch, G. G., I, 406 f.; Bevolkerung im Alterthum (1898), p. 30, etc. 


46 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Plato states the problem clearly and hints at a solution, when he 
says that the natural increase of population in his state shall not 
exceed the economic basis for 11. In the Laws, he suggests specific 
means for preserving the proper number by restraining over- 
productive people, and by encouraging the opposite.? If such 
general provisions should not prove sufficient, he would then resort 
to colonization. On the other hand, should population be greatly 
depleted by war or disease, he would even open the doors of citizen- 
ship to the undesirable classes.4 His interest in the problem of 
population, however, is primarily moral and social rather than 
economic. Moreover, in antithesis to Malthus, he limits his 
consideration to a very small, artificially constructed state. With 
the narrow political vision of a Greek, he thinks that the pro- 
duction of a multitude of ‘‘happy-hearted”’ men in a state is impos- 
sible. 
DISTRIBUTION 

As stated in the Introduction, the economic interest of Greek 
thinkers was particularly alive in the fields of distribution and 
consumption. It is here that they are especially interesting and 
suggestive. However, they dealt very little with the important 
principles of distribution as laid down by modern economists. 
Theories of the several elements that enter into distribution— 
wages, profits, and rent—are for the most part conspicuously 
absent.? 

The problem of distribution is also hardly considered from the 
modern standpoint. We look in vain for a treatment of the 

τ Rep. 372C: οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας. 

5 Laws 7401); but his specific methods for carrying out his difficult suggestion, 
if he had any to offer, were probably impracticable, judging by his discussion of women 
and children in the Republic. Ruskin’s suggestions for meeting the problem are 
colonization, reclamation of waste lands, and discouragement of marriage (Unto 
This Last, IV, 80 [Vol. XVII, 108]). 

3 Laws 740E; Ar. (Pol. 1265b6-12) unfairly criticizes him for limiting the amount 
of property, and making it indivisible, while failing to provide against a too high 
birth-rate. 

4 74rA. 5 Cf. Ruskin, cited above, p. 27. 

ὁ For the Greek term, cf. infra on Aristotle. 

7 Cf., however, Xen. Mem. ii. 7. 12-14, discussed infra, which may be a suggestion 
of a theory of profits. 


PLATO 47 


modern dominant question of the relation between capital and 
labor. Moreover, the Greek theories of distribution are, on the 
whole, not the outgrowth of the sentiment of human sympathy 
for the poor and the common laborer, which is so prevalent today. 
The purpose seems to be to guard against dishonesty rather than 
oppression from either contracting party.t. This lack in Greek 
theory is not strange, in an age when slaves took the place of 
machinery, so that capital and labor were largely united in them, 
while the majority of free laborers worked directly for the public, 
or on the land.? The goal of the theorists, therefore, is the con- 
servation of the state rather than the relief of any class of the 
citizenship. 

Plato discusses the importance of a proper distribution of 
wealth in the Republic, but the point that looms large to him is the 
fact that excessive wealth or poverty is likely to endanger the 
stability of the state. As seen above, also, some of his regulations 
in the Laws seem to strike a modern note. He would have a state 
commission fix prices, would permit the state to limit the freedom 
of inheritance,’ and perhaps even intervene in securing a just 
wage.® Yet in all of this, the dominant motive is to avoid civic 
discord. 

Before proceeding to the larger subject in distribution, Plato’s 
theory of private property, we will discuss briefly his attitude 
toward the laboring classes.?7 It is commonly asserted that the 

t Laws 921A-D, discussed on p. 39, n. 8; cf. also 847B. 

2 The passages above cited, n. 1 above, need not imply labor for capitalists. It 
does not appear that there was ever a considerable body of free citizen laborers at 
Athens, who worked for capitalists, though the number of free workers, aside from 
labor on the farms, was fairly large. Cf. C.J.A. for records of such labor on the 
buildings of the acropolis; Boeckh, op. cit., I, 58: ‘‘Der geringere war durch seine 
Umstinde so gut als der arme Schutzverwandte oder Sklave zur Handarbeit ge- 
nothigt.” On the favorable attitude toward free labor at Athens, cf. above, p. 20, 
n. 4. Poehlmann (op. cit., in loc.) takes the opposite view as to the number of free 
laborers for capitalists. 

3 Rep. 552B-D, a characteristic passage; Gorg. 507E; Laws 757 B. 

4920C. 5 740B ff., 923; but his purpose is to keep the allotments intact. 

6847B: μισθῶν δὲ αὐτοῖς περὶ καὶ τῶν ἀναιρέσεων τῶν ἔργων, καὶ ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς 
ἕτερος ἢ κεῖνοί τινα ἄλλον ἀδικῶσι, μέχρι δραχμῶν πεντήκοντα ἀστυνόμοι διαδικαζόντων, 
etc.; perhaps a strained interpretation. 


7On his attitude to industry, cf. pp. 32 ff. 


48 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Greek philosophers had little or no regard for the masses. As 
usually expressed, however, the statement is very unfair, and 
especially to Plato. Such extreme assertions as the following are 
frequent: “They [the masses] are of no account altogether.’ 
Plato in the Republic ‘“voue ἃ ignominie, au mépris, 4 la misére, 
a la servitude éternelle la classe des ouvriers.’? ‘‘Fiir die des 
Erwerb obliegenden Personen bedarf es keiner Erziehung.’ 
“Plato, in treating of the ideal state, deems it not worth while 
to concern himself with the trading and artisan classes.’4 ‘‘Und 
im iibrigen will er sie [the masses], wie es scheint, durchaus sich 
selbst tiberlassen.’’s 

To be sure, as above admitted, the interest of Greek thinkers 
was not marked by the modern sentiment of sympathy for the 
laborer. Their writings are characterized by a certain aristo- 
cratic feeling, and they do not emphasize the worth or importance 
of the masses. Yet they are far from being indifferent or hostile 
to them. 

Aristotle himself was the first to make this false criticism of 
Plato. But the author of the Republic foresaw that he might be 
misinterpreted, and excused himself for his indefiniteness in the 
details of the ideal state.? Moreover, Aristotle’s criticism is not 
borne out by a study of the Republic. Plato implies with sufficient 
clearness that his communistic regulations are limited to the two 
upper classes.2 It is not true either, as Aristotle asserts,? that 
there is a rigid caste system in the Republic. The very opposite 
principle is laid down.” The myth of the three metals presents 

t Bonar, op. cit., p. 29. 

? Bussy, Histoire et Réfutation du Socialisme (1859), p. 119. 

3 Oncken, op. cit., Ὁ. 34. 4 Haney, op, cit., Ὁ. τό. 

5 Zeller, Phil. Gr., II, 1 (1889), 907; cf. also above, pp. 32f. Historians of eco- 
nomic thought generally state the case extremely; 6. g., Kautz, op. cit., p. 59; Blanqui, 


op. cit., p. 45; Souchon also, to some extent. Poehlmann (09. cit., II, 36-108) errs 
in the opposite way. 


ὁ Pol. il. 5. 1264a11-17, 36-38; 1264b11-13. 

7423D: ὡς δόξειεν ἄν τις. also 425D, both cited by Poehlmann. 

*415E-417B, 420A-421C admit of no other interpretation. Cf. 421C, how he 
turns to the next related point (τοῦ τούτου ἀδελφόν) the question of the effect of wealth 
or poverty on the artisans (τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς). Cf. also infra for other citations. 


9 Pol. 1264a36-38, repeated by many moderns. το Rep. 415B-C. 


PLATO 49 


an aristocracy based strictly on intellectual and moral excellence. 
No arbitrary obstacle hinders either the degradation or the rise of 
any individual from his class. It depends entirely upon the 
possession of the gold of character and mentality, for which all 
may strive. Moreover, the life of the so-called first caste is liter- 
ally dedicated to the best service of the rest. If this be aristocracy, 
we cannot have too much of it. 

Neither is Aristotle’s criticism warranted, that Plato makes 
the happiness of the whole state something different from the sum 
of its parts.?, He merely states the principle, universally true, 
that no class has a right to expect to be happy at the expense of 
the whole state, and that, in the long run, the prosperity of each 
is bound up in the prosperity of all. Indeed, he puts the very 
objections of Aristotle and Grote into the mouth of Adeimantus, 
and answers them satisfactorily, in his illustration of the painted 
statues There could hardly be a better example of Plato’s lofty 
ideal, that each part is to contribute its share toward the utility, 
beauty, and happiness of the whole, and that through this co- 
operation each realizes the highest quantum of happiness for 
himself. This doctrine of mutual interdependence is the basal 
principle of Christianity, taught by Jesus and Paul in a strikingly 
similar figure of the body and its members,‘ though naturally 
Plato’s idea of brotherhood is narrower in scope. 

The common assertion that Plato has no regard for the artisan 
class, then, is unwarranted.s The entire Republic is built upon the 
opposite principle, to prevent exploitation of the lower by the 
upper classes; and his comparison of good and evil rulers to 

«Cf. the undiscriminating statement of Souchon, op. cit., p. 41: “Et il n’y a 


guére eu, au cours de l’histoire de la science politique, de conception plus aristocratique 
que le mythe fameux des trois races d’or, d’argent et d’airain.” 

2 Pol. 1264b15—25, repeated by Grote and others. 3 Rep. iv. beg.-421C. 

41 Cor. 12:14 ff.; for other evidence of Plato’s interest in all classes, cf. 519E ff., 
and the entire argument against Thrasymachus, Book I. 

5 Rep. 421A, cited by Zeller, op. cit., Il, τ, 907, as evidence of this, states merely 
that it is more important that there be efficient rulers than efficient cobblers. Cf. 
Poehlmann, op. cét., II, 36-108, a masterly defense of the Republic on this point, 
criticizing both Zeller and Gomperz. He errs on the other side, however, as 6.8.» 
p. 96, where he infers from Rep. 462C that Plato intended his communism to apply 
to the whole people. 


° GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


«σι 


shepherd dogs and wolves’ is a precursor of the famous passages of 
Milton and Ruskin on the same theme. ΑἹ] classes of citizens in 
the state are brothers.2. The rulers are saviors (σωτῆρας), allies, 
shepherds (ποίμενες), nurses (τροφέας), paymasters, and friends. 
This happy unity (ὁμόνοια), or harmony (ξυμφωνία), of all classes 
is to Plato the highest goal toward which the true statesman should 
strive,‘ and the point of next highest importance to the communism 
of the guards is the proper regulation of wealth and poverty for the 
artisans.. The mere fact that he does not believe the artisans to 
be capable of political independence by no means indicates that he 
is indifferent to their social or economic welfare. It is to conserve 
this that he would put the government into the hands of the most 
capable,® and, in any event, the artisans are not to be held in sub- 
jection so much by external force as by their own free self-restraint.’ 
This, in itself, is sufficient evidence that Plato intended to include 
the third class in his lower scheme of education, a fact borne out 
also by other passages.® 

It must be admitted that a somewhat different spirit pervades 
the Laws, where he seems to have despaired of the lofty ideal of 
the Republic. He relegates the working classes to non-citizenship. 
But here, also, he is still anxious that they shall have the sort of 
education that befits their station,’ and that justice be done them.” 
He also provides against the existence of beggary in the state.” 
Whatever may be said of his aristocratic spirit, therefore, he cannot 
be justly accused of the gross indifference of the early nineteenth- 
century economy and of modern capitalism toward either masses 
or public, in their concern for material wealth.” 


t 416A-B, 417B. 


4 415A, introducing the alleged aristocratic myth. 


3 463B, 417B, 416A, 5476. 4 431E-432A, 443E, 423D. 
5 421C-E, cited on p. 48,n. 8. Cf. Poehlmann, of. cit., 11, 91. 
® s90C. 7431D-E, 434C. 


§378B, E, 377B, insisting upon proper stories for all children; 915E-520A, 
implying that the artisans shall share in all benefits of the state up to their 
capacity. 

9 643B-C. 10 847B, g21C-D. τ 936B-C. 


% Mill is an exception, but despite his thoroughgoing definitions of economics. 


PLATO 51 


COMMUNISTIC AND SOCIALISTIC IDEAS 


The Greek theory of distribution was employed chiefly in the 
criticism of the institution of private property, and in the sug- 
gestion of more or less communistic systems to succeed it. This 
tendency, however, was not like the modern either in motive or in 
general type. Modern socialism aims to be scientific, and pro- 
fesses to build a scientific system on a basis of economic laws. 
Greek socialism had no such aim. It did not lay claim to any 
relation to economic law, but frankly presented itself for what it 
was, a politico-moral sentiment. Other points of distinction will 
be observed as we proceed, but this primary one must not be 
overlooked, if either the spirit or the meaning of the Greek social 
theory is to be understood. 

Two considerations made the communistic sentiment a normal 
one to the Greek democrat. (a) The institution of private property 
had not become so thoroughly imbedded in the very foundations 
of society as it has today. The custom of family tenure was not 
entirely forgotten, and in some backlying districts may well have 
been still in vogue.*' In some states, also, a part of the land was 
probably still held in common by the citizenship. The frequent 
establishment of cleruchies in conquered territories, in which the 
land was regularly assigned by lot, and the ever-recurring revo- 
lutions, which usually resulted in confiscation of the land in favor 
of the victorious party, must have assisted materially in unsettling 
the confidence of the Greeks in private property as a basal insti- 
tution of society. The actual existence of a polity like that of 
Sparta, where private ownership does not seem to have been so 
absolute,? doubtless also exerted its influence on the imagination 
of Greek thinkers. (Ὁ) As is generally recognized, the Greek, far 
more than the modern, took for granted the subordination of the 
individual citizen to the state. We have also seen that he tended 
to magnify the power of legislation as sufficient to encompass any 
reform, even in the face of economic laws. ΤῸ him, therefore, the 


τ Cf. Ar. Pol. ii. 1266017—24. 

On the Spartan system, cf. Guiraud, La Prop. fonc., pp. 41 f.; Poehlmann, 
op. cit., I, 75-98, both of whom oppose the more extreme theory of communism in 
Sparta. 


52 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


demand that the state be made the dispenser of private property 
did not seem unnatural.t. We should be on our guard, however, 
against exaggerating the extent of this sentiment among the 
Greek writers, or against reading into them the modern socialistic 
doctrines. 

A consideration of the predecessors of Plato in social speculation 
may be conveniently introduced at this point, before we proceed 
to the discussion of the Republic. Some have thought to find 
traces of communism in Homer. The evidence of any real com- 
munism, however, is very slight, and the frankly individualistic 
spirit of the poems is against it. Moreover, this is a problem that 
concerns the economic conditions rather than the theory.’ Little 
is definitely known of Pythagoras and his school, but it is improb- 
able that he either taught or practiced a real communism. 

As for Hippodamas of Miletus, it is difficult to gain a clear idea 
of his ideal state from Aristotle’s meager description,’ but it seems 
not to have been markedly socialistic. He divides his body of ten 


™On this general subject, cf. Guiraud, La Prop. fonc., 573 {.; cf. 5. Cognetti de 
Martiis, Socialismo Antico (1889), pp. 515-17, on socialistic tendencies in Greek 
constitutions and politics. 


2E.g., Esmein, Nouvelle Revue historique, 1890, pp. 821 ff. For a refutation, cf. 
Poehlmann, of. cit., 1st ed., pp. 20ff.; Guiraud, op. cit., p. 37; Souchon, of. cit., 
pp. 135 f. 

3 For a refutation of the common error, cf. Zeller, op. cit., I, 1, 317, n. 1, and 318, 
n. 2; Guiraud, op. cit., pp. 574 f. and 7-11; Souchon, op. cit., pp. 136-39 and notes. 
The earliest witnesses for Pythagorean communism, Epicurus, in Diog. L. x. 2, and 
Timaeus of Tauromenium, ibid., viii. 10 are remote from his time and untrustworthy. 
The later writers (Diog. L. viii. 10; Aul. Gell. i. 9. 12; Hippolytus Refut. i. 2. 12; 
Porphyry Vit. Pyth. 20; Jamblichus De Pyth. vit. 30, 72, 168, 257, etc.; Photius, under 
κοινά) quoted, and made the tradition general. The older writers know nothing of 
the tradition. Moreover, some passages give evidence of private property among 
the Pythagoreans (Diog. L. viii. 1. 15, 39). The origin of the tradition has been 
plausibly assigned to a misunderstanding of the proverb κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων, and to 
the doctrine of moral helpfulness among the Pythagoreans. S. Cognetti de Martiis 
(op. cit., pp. 4598.) calls it socialismo cenobito. 


4 Pol. ii. 8. Hippodamas the Pythagorean, cited by Stob. Flor. xliii (xli). 92 f., 
should not be confused with him. The former wrote in the Dorian dialect, and 
differs materially in his ideas. His three classes are rulers, soldiers, and all laborers, 
including merchants and farmers. He says nothing of the division of the land or who 
shall own it, but provides that the third class furnish a living to the rest. But cf. 
Robin, op. cit., p. 228, ἢ. 1, who identifies them. 


PLATO 53 


thousand citizens into artisans, farmers, and soldiers.. He makes 
a corresponding triple division of the land—sacred, to provide for 
the expense of worship; public, for the support of the soldiers; 
private, to be owned and worked by the husbandmen.? Thus 
only the farmers are to own land, and the question as to who shall 
work the land for the military class is left in obscurity. It seems 
likely that Hippodamas intended that the farmers should work 
all the land, and own one-third of it for their own support. His 
system contains some communistic elements, as the fact that two- 
thirds of the land is public, but it is certainly not socialistic 
in spirit and purpose. The prime interest of Hippodamas was 
very probably not in a system to supplant private property, but 
rather in a plan of assured support for the priestly and military 
classes.4 

Phaleas of Chalcedon, according to Aristotle’s description, 
approaches much nearer to the modern socialistic idea.s Aristotle 
makes him a type of those thinkers who lay chief stress on the 
right system of property as the necessary basis of civic peace.® 
His central tenet is equality of possessions and of education for all 
the citizens,” but he seems to have specified only landed property.’ 
This demand, though only landed property is included, seems to 
strike a truly modern socialistic note. But nowhere better than 
here may we see the gulf that separates ancient and modern social- 
ism. The avowed interest of Phaleas is not in the masses. The 
artisans are all to be public slaves.? His interest is rather in the 
classes, and not even in these primarily, but rather in the state 


t Pol. 1267b31-33. Cf. Cornford’s visionary article (Class. Quart., VI [1912], 
246 ff.), in which he seeks to prove that the tripartite psychology of Plato’s Republic 
is an inference from this triple division of society. Cf. a similar idea of Pohlenz, 
Aus Plato’s Werdezeit (1913), pp. 229 ff. 


211, 8. 1267633-36. 3 1268034 ff. 
4 So Souchon, op. cit., p. 141, who makes him an individualist. 
5 Pol. 11, 7. 6 12664037 ἴ. 


71266a40: φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν; 1266b31-33, to be 
realized in an old state, partly by allowing only the rich to give dowries and only the 
poor to receive them; 1266b2-4. 


8 Ar. (1267b10) criticizes him for this. 
91267615; cf. Poehlmann, of. cit., II, 7 1. 


54 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


itself. His entire system has for its fundamental motive the 
avoiding of civic discord in the state." 

The ideal state of Plato’s Republic has often been presented 
by socialists and other modern writers as the great prototype of 
all socialistic doctrine. We must consider to what extent such a 
view is justified. In his famous myth of the three metals, Plato 
divides his citizens into three classes—rulers, auxiliaries, and 
farmers and artisans.2 His avowed purpose here, as indeed 
throughout his Republic, is to secure the highest degree of happi- 
ness for all the citizens. In order to gain this end, he provides 
for a most thoroughgoing system of communism, including all 
property, both for production and for consumption, except such 
as is necessary for the immediate need.4 He extends it even to the 
common possession of wives and children,’ that all private inter- 
ests may be reduced to ἃ minimum.® He provides further for 
a common work’ and education® for men and women. 

Such, in brief, is the system proposed in the Republic.2 Super- 
ficially considered, it would seem to be the parent of modern 
socialism and communism. There is, however, actually but slight 
similarity between them. The so-called communism of Plato 
extends only to the first two classes, which can include but a small 
minority of the citizenship.*? Thus the masses, with whom modern 


1 1266a37 f.; 1267a1f. Aristotle’s account of these writers, as of Plato, is 
incomplete and unsatisfactory. 

2 Rep. 415A; cf. above, pp. 48 ff. on this and the following note. 3 420B-C. 

4410D-E, 458C; cf. also Critias 112B-C, where common houses, common meals, 
and the prohibition of gold and silver are presented as an ideal. 

5457D. 6 462B-C. 

7451D-455D. Poehlmann points to this doctrine of the Ebenbiirtigkeit of women 
as an advanced ground even for Christianity. 

8 acik. 

9 Guiraud (La Prop. fonc., p. 578) distinguishes these elements in Plato’s system, 
Republic and Laws: exclusive right of property vested in the state; use of land granted 
to a part of the citizens; distribution of the product among all the citizens; obliga- 
tion to work, tempered by equality of service; inequality of classes, and equality of 
men in each class; heredity of profession, corrected by selection of talents. 

 Cf.pp.48 f.and notes. Even Aristotle admits (1264033) that Plato makes his hus- 
bandmen absolute owners of their lots, on condition of paying rental. The rulers alone 
(μόνοι5) are to keep themselves from silver or gold (417A). Cf. Book IV, beg.: οἷον ἄλλοι 


PLATO “ss 


socialism is especially concerned, are not directly touched by his 
system. Again, the primary motive of Plato’s communism is not 
the modern motive at all. His thought is not to secure a just share 
for all in the products of industry. Though he recognizes the 
importance of providing against the evils of extremes of wealth 
and poverty,’ the motive is not the material interest of any class. 
It is an intense desire for unity and for escape from civic strife in 
the state? for provision against graft, corruption, and tyranny 
in the rulers, and for insuring as efficient work as possible. Like 
Ruskin, Plato is no democrat. Equality is not in his thought. 
Unlike many a modern socialist, he realizes that absolute arith- 
metical equality is impossible, and that if gained it would be the 
greatest injustice. He knows that the true equality must be 
proportional, demanding not that each receive exactly the same, 


ἀγρούς Te κεκτημένοι Kal οἰκίας οἰκοδομούμενοι, etc.; 420A, 416D-E, 458C, 464B-D, where 
the community is applied to the guards only, and 464A-D, where the same is true 
of family communism. Doubtless he would have extended it farther, had he thought it 
feasible (462B-C), but Poehlmann (op. cit., I, 569 f.; II, 96f.) overemphasizes this 
demand of Plato. Adler (Geschichte des Socialismus und Kommunismus von Plato 
bis zur Gegenwart, p. 44), DuBois (0p. cit., p. 40), Oncken (op. cit., p. 34), Souchon 
(op. cit., 148); Malon (op. cit., pp. 90 f.), Shorey (Class. Phil., October, 1914, art. 
on “Plato’s Laws’’) all agree with the foregoing conclusion. Francotte (L’Industrie, 
II, 258 ff.) leaves the question open, but (261 f.) observes that the third class is at 
least restrained from extremes of wealth and poverty. 


1. 42110, 421E-422E. 


2 Ibid., the fundamental idea of the Republic. L. Stein (Sociale Frage, p. 164) 
rightly says: ‘‘Denn der Kommunismus Platons ist seinem Schoepfer nicht Zweck, 
sondern blosses paedagogisches Mittel.’’ 


3 415E-416A, 417B, 420D, 421A, 421C. He would also avoid vulgarization of 
the rulers through trade (416E-417A). 


4 4210). 


5 Ruskin thinks that inequality of possessions, in itself, does not necessarily 
mean either evil or good for a nation (Unto This Last, II, 31 (Vol. XVII, 46 f.]); he 
argues that each is born with an absolutely limited capacity, and calls the idea of 
natural equality of men ‘‘radical blockheadism” (Fors Clav., VIII, Letter 95, 6 
[Vol. XXIX, 496]); cf. Unto This Last, III, 54 (Vol. XVII, 74); Modern Painters, 
III, Pt. IV, chap. x, 22 (Vol. III, 189); Seven Lamps of Architecture, IV, 28 (Vol. VIII, 
167); Fors Clav., ΤΙ, Letter 14, 4 and note (Vol. XXVII, 248); Stones of Venice, 
III, 4 (Vol. XI, 260), all of which emphasize its impossibility. He strongly opposes 
socialism, cf. above, and Mun. Pul., 21 (Vol. XVII, 144), though his economic ideas 
contained essentially the germ of modern socialistic doctrine. 


56 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


but that each receive his ἀπο. His third class, comprising a large 
majority of the citizens, is practically without political activity, 
a fact in marked contrast to the modern social-democratic spirit. 
His emphasis is not economic and material, as is that of modern 
socialism, but political and moral.? 

In fine, the Republic contains some socialistic elements. Plato’s 
restriction of the freedom of the individual so as to subserve the 
interest of the whole,’ his tendency to magnify the power of law 
in the face of economic principles and of human nature,’ his interest 
in the welfare of the common people, his declaration against inequal- 
ity of fortune, his denial of the right of private property for the 
upper classes, and his proposed community of wives and children, 
a measure too radical for the better type of modern socialism,5 
all seem socialistic in trend. 

The tendency to magnify the power of law, and the submission 
of individual to state interest, however, were characteristics of 
Greek civilization, and not distinctly Platonic or socialistic. His 
interest in the welfare of the masses, as we have seen, was not 
primarily economic, but had for its ulterior motive the preser- 
vation of the peace of the state. His denial of private property 
and family interests to the guards, and his opposition to extreme 
wealth or poverty were, as seen above, devoid of socialistic motive. 
Moreover, in his hostility to retail trade, he was not moved by 


1 Cf. his ironical criticism of democratic equality in Athens, 558C: ἰσότητά τινα 
ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα; Laws 757B-D, 744B-C; cf. infra for Aris- 
totle’s idea. Cf. p. 61,n.1 for further notice of these passages. 


2 Poehlmann (op. cit., I, 553, n. 3) is extreme in asserting that Plato’s account 
of the growth of the proletariat, and the rise of class struggles (Book VIII) contains 
“alle wesentlichen Ziige des Bildes, welches die moderne Plutokratie gewahrt,” and 
(560), ‘“Das vierte Jahrhundert v. Chr. hat uns den Kampf vorgekimpft in welchem 
wir selbst mittenhineinstehen.” 


3 Pohlenz (op. cit., p. 240) makes his socialism a reaction against the individualism 
of Pericles, but makes the extreme assertion: “Die Grundlage auf der Plato seinen 
Idealstaat aufbaut, ist der strengste Socialismus.” 

4 ΟἹ. p. 43,n. 10. He evidently recognizes his ideas on the family and on the 
philosopher-king as utopian; cf. also 425D-E; but Poehlmann (op. cit., 11, 144-52) 
opposes this view. Cf. Shorey, Class. Phil., October, 1914, pp. 357 ἴ., on the idea of 
law in the Laws and Politics. 


‘When advocated, it has not been with the lofty motive of Plato. 


PLATO 57 


the. modern socialistic demand for immediate contact between 
producer and consumer. The conditions that called forth such 
a demand were not then in existence,’ as is also true of the modern 
agitation for a proper distribution of the profits of industry. 
Above all, Plato made no pretense to any economic basis for his 
communism, but presented it as a moral and political ideal. The 
Republic cannot therefore be classified as truly socialistic either in 
motive or in general plan.” 

In any event, there is nothing in common between the high 
moral idealism of Plato’s so-called communism and the crass 
materialistic communism that is the subject of Aristophanes’ 
satire in the Ecclesiazusae. Dietzel has well pointed out that the 
latter is extremely individualistic, atheistic, and immoral, demand- 
ing all from the state with no return; that the Republic, on the 
other hand, demands the loftiest morality and renunciation, and 
is a direct protest against such tendencies in Athens as are attacked 
by the comic poet. As he shows, the two are as far apart as are 
the watchwords, “All for self,” and “All for all.” 


τ Poehlmann (op. cit., 1, 579, 598) admits this. Guiraud (La Prop. fonc., p. 594) 
points out that the analogy with modern socialism is difficult, owing to the modern 
abolition of slavery, great extent of states, and large increase in personal property. 

2So Souchon, op. cit., pp. 145 ff.; Guiraud (La Prop. fonc., p. 638) well says: 
“Si ces derniers [modern socialists] reussissaient 4 appliquer leurs projects, les sociétés 
qui sortiraient de leurs mains n’auraient pas la moindre ressemblance avec la société 
hellenique.” Cf. also ibid., p. 594, where he distinguishes between Plato and modern 
socialists. Francotte (L’Industrie, II, 250, n. 1) makes the Republic essentially 
socialistic, though he admits that it has not the modern aim (p. 255). Poehlmann 
(op. cit., ΤΙ, 123-43) makes it a “‘Koinzidenz der beiden Prinzipieen” (p. 143). Wolf 
(Gesch. d. Ant. Kommun. u. Individ., p. 96) distinguishes Plato’s two aims as a strong 
community spirit, and a strong central authority, devoid of selfish interest. Cf. 
S. Cognetti de Martiis, op. cit., pp. 524-89, on the Socialismo filosofico of the Republic. 


3 Vierteljahrschrift f. Staats τι. Volkswirtschaft, 1, 375 ff. Of course Aristophanes 
may have caricatured Plato as he did Socrates in the Clouds. However, since both 
were opposed to extreme individualism, and since the comedy was written before the 
Republic, it is improbable. But cf. Drumann, Arbeiter τι. Communisten in Griechen- 
land τι. Rom (1860), pp. 133 f., who thinks the poet was satirizing the oral discussions 
of Plato. Pohlenz (of. cit., pp. 223-28) argues for an earlier edition of the Republic, 
and states that, though the comedy is not a direct satire on the Republic, yet its 
numerous specific ideas and expressions that are similar to Plato’s warrant the 
conclusion that the poet followed Plato. Cf. also 5. Cognetti de Martiis, of. cit., 
pp. 541-61, on the relation of the two. 


58 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Plato’s idea that society is the exact counterpart of the indi- 
vidual in the large, however, is quite analogous to the modern 
comparison of society to an organism.’ Both are wrong in attempt- 
ing to press the analogy too far, yet they contain a truth of pro- 
found importance, which is at the foundation of the marked change 
in the spirit of economics in recent years. It is the notion of 
solidarity, which demands that the individual shall no longer seek 
the content of his being in himself alone, but also in the conditions 
that shall produce the highest life for the commonwealth. 

In the Laws, Plato reluctantly abandons some of the utopian 
suggestions of the Republic for a more practical legislation,? though 
his ideal is really unchanged. Communism of property and of the 
family are both discarded even for the rulers, as feasible only for 
a supernatural order of beings. As a noble ideal, however, it still] 
hovers before him.‘ Private property is permitted to the citizens,5 
but under protest, and if practicable, Plato would like to prohibit 
it, as the primary root of all social disturbance and corruption.® 
He would advocate, therefore, a return to the old régime of family 
tenure, somewhat on the model of the Spartan system.? He would 
also hamper this by limitations so as to make it no real ownership 
at all. The land is to be practically state property, over which the 
citizens exercise merely the right of use.’ It is to be divided into 
lots of equal value, corresponding exactly to the number of citizens.? 
Natural disadvantages shall be compensated for by an increase in 
the size of the lot, and part of each allotment shall be near, and 
part at a distance from the city, that all may be on an equal footing, 


*434D-E, and the entire plan of the Republic. Cf. Poehlmann, of. cit., I, 527 ff.; 
also II, 210 f., on Plato’s idea of a pre-established harmony between individual and 
common good. 

2 Poehlmann (op. cit., II, 205 ff.) suggests that this change resulted from Plato’s 
experiences with Dionysius of Syracuse, but it may be easily accounted for by the 
natural conservatism of age. Cf. Shorey, Class. Phil., IX (1914), 353- 

3739D, 740A. 4739C-E, 8078. 5 737E, 741C 

°831C-D, though it refers to the love of wealth, 807B, 713E. 

ΤΟΙ. Guiraud (La Prop. fonc., pp. 582 f.; cf. infra for details. 

ὃ 740-741A, 923A-B, a remarkable passage, which declares that they are not full 
owners either of themselves or their property, but that they belong to the whole race, 
past, present, and future (ξύμπαντος δέ τοῦ γένους ὑμῶν τοῦ τε ἔμπροσθεν και TOU ἔπειτα 
ἐσομένου), and especially to the state. 

9 737E, 745C-E. 


PLATO 59 


and alike ready to defend against invasion.t In order that no 
citizen may lose his lot, and no man may possess more than one, 
very stringent regulations are advised.2— No lot may be purchased 
or sold,3 confiscated,‘ or divided by will to more than one heir,S 
and no citizen, in any manner whatsoever, may become owner of 
more than one lot. The living of the other members of the family 
is arranged for by a provision for a general distribution of the 
product of the soil, in imitation of the Cretan law.7’ The annual 
product of grain and cattle shall be divided into three equal parts, 
one for citizens, one for their servants, and one for the artisans, 
metics, and strangers. The first two parts shall not be subject 
to sale, but each head of a family shall receive from them enough 
to nourish his family and slaves. 

It is evident from all these regulations that Plato’s citizens 
do not actually own their lots, but merely enjoy the usufruct of 
them from the state on certain conditions. He takes away with 
one hand what he gives with the other. Under such a system all 
his precautionary measures could not have prevented the growth 
of an even more oppressive poverty, unless the growth of popu- 
lation could be checked. 

The regulations limiting the acquisition or possession of per- 
sonal property are even more stringent, though here an absolute 
equality is not attempted. He seeks, however, to prevent the 
rise of inequality of fortunes, at the very threshold, by making 
undue acquisition difficult or even impossible for the citizens. All 
money-making occupations are practically closed to them’—trade,’ 
the mechanical arts,’ and even agriculture, so far as their own per- 
sonal work is concerned. ‘The latter is given over to slaves,™ the 
arts and trade to aliens, with strict limitations to be enforced by 
the officers of the market.% As seen above, two-thirds of the farm 
products are not to be subject to commercial dealings.¥ The 
loan of money at interest is forbidden, and he who disobeys will 

 745C-E. 2 740B. 3 741B-C. 47454, 855A-B, 754E-755A, 744E. 

5 740B, 923C. If the family is large, the women are to be married off, and the 
men adopted by the childless (740C). Personal property may be willed to the other 
children (923D); cf. also above, pp. 45 f. and notes. 

6 7a0C, 741B-D. 8 varE.  846D, 847A, 919}. 

7847E-848C. 9847D, g19D. τ 806E. 

12920A; cf. above, on exchange. 13 849C. 


60 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


risk the loss of both principal and interest... A bulky coinage of 
baser metal is provided for the daily use of private citizens, such 
as will not pass current in another country.?_ No dowries are to be 
given or received,’ and there shall be no hoarding, but the entire 
produce of the lots must be annually distributed for consumption 
among the whole population of the state.’ To make assurance 
doubly sure, Plato prohibits his citizens from owning personal 
property above four times the value of the lot,’ or four minas.° 
Any amount in excess of this must be handed over to the state on 
pain of severe fine for disobedience.’ This is to be accomplished 
by the regulation that all property except the lot must be publicly 
registered, and failure to fulfil this obligation entails the loss of 
all but the original lot, and public disgrace.® 

In all this drastic limitation of property rights, Plato’s chief 
motive is to render excessive wealth or poverty impossible,? and 
to harmonize the citizenship by reducing all inequalities to a mini- 
mum.’ This he purposes to accomplish, not merely by the fore- 
going restrictions, but also by means of a common education," 
and by the institution of the swssitia.2 He makes the road to com- 
parative equality easier than in his first state by relegating all 
the third class, the artisans, merchants, and farmers, outside the 
pale of citizenship.% The actual difference, however, is not so 
great as it might appear. In the Republic there is equality in the 
upper class, while in the Laws there is comparative equality among 
the citizens who comprise only the upper class. In neither case 
is there a real equality in the whole state. Plato is well aware 
that only approximate equality can be attained, and that differences 


Cf. p. 39 and notes. 2Cf. p. 4oand notes. 3742C. 4 Cf. p. 59 and notes. 


5744E. The entire wealth will thus vary from the bare lot to five times its 
value. Cf. Jowett, Dialogs of Plato, 3d ed., V, 127, though the division into four 
classes might mean that the highest was only four times the lot value. Espinas 
(Revue des Etudes Grecques, XX VII [1914], 237) accepts the former interpretation. 


6754D-E. The value of the lot was thus only a mina. 7 744K, 745A. 


δ 745A, 754D-E (which requires it only for the excess), 755A. Espinas (op. cit., 
pp. 118 ff.) emphasizes the ascetic tendency of his regulations. 


9 729A ff., 919 B, 936B-C, against beggars. 

10 744B-E, and above notes. 1 Book VII. 

12. 780B; women and children separate, 806E; on its Cretan origin, 625E ff. 
15 8461), 847A, D, 919D, 806E. 


PLATO 61 


not only in property, but also in birth, virtue, strength, and beauty, 
ate bound to exist." He would therefore have taxes and distri- 
butions unequal in the same ratio, so as to avoid dissatisfaction 
and dispute.? The difficulties incident to such a scheme of legis- 
lation he would obviate by starting a new state in virgin soil. 
Souchon‘ recognizes the Plato of the Laws as a true socialist, 
and points to his attempt to prevent all inequality, and to his 
extreme state intervention as characteristic elements of socialism. 
Plato certainly does approach nearer to a real socialism in the 
Laws than in the Republic. In addition to the points noted by 
Souchon, there may be observed the application of the system of 
equality to the whole citizenship, though at the cost of shutting 
out all the workers; the strong sense of the social function of 
property;> the practical denial of real private ownership of land; 
the demand for publicity in business, which is one of the chief 
suggestions for the regulation of corporations today;® the active 
interest in the conservation of natural resources, which, while not 
socialistic, lies in the direction of greater social control;?7 and the 
fact that distribution of the products of industry is made practically 
a function of the state.* The demand for equality and unity is 
also somewhat analogous to the modern socialistic hostility to 
competition, which Ruskin calls the “law of death.’ It may be 
1744B; cf. pp. 55 {. on equality; cf. 757B-D, contrasting the mere arithmetical 
equality (τὴν ἀριθμῷ ἴσην), which is easily realized, and the true equality,which is very 
difficult. This latter apportions to each in accord with his nature (πρὸς τὴν φύσιν 


αὐτῶν). The two are almost opposites (ἐναντιαῖν). Espinas (of. cit., p. 236) thinks 
that the division into property classes in the Laws is an attempt to realize this principle. 

2 744B, 3 736C-D, 704. 

4 Op. cit., Ὁ. 143; cf. also pp. 163-65, where he compares it to modern collectivism; 
cf. p. 162; also Poehlmann, op. cit., II, 295. 

5 923A; cf. 877D, and much of the legislation on property, above. 

6 Cf. pp. 59 f. and notes. The modern analogy is not close, yet in each case the 
aim is to prevent undue gains whereby the public is oppressed. 

ΘΕ Ῥ. 30, ἢ. 3. 

8 (ἢ, p. 59 and notes. The socialistic tendency to overemphasize the power of 
law is also strong here as in the Republic. But cf. p. 36, n. 4, and Laws 807B, 746A-B, 
7478. 

9 Time and Tide, IX, 5-9. Modern Painiers, V, Pt. 8, chap. i, 6 (Vol. VII, 207). 
Espinas (Revue des Etudes Grecques, XXVII [1914], 246) calls this Platonic denial of 
“conflict of interest’’ in trade “16 théme éternel de la chimére socialiste.” 


62 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


added further that Plato’s description of the economic strife in 
his day is slightly suggestive of the criticism of capitalism by 
modern socialism.t However, the basal motive of Plato is, again, 
not that of modern socialism. His aim is still primarily moral and 
political rather than material,? and he exhibits less interest in the 
welfare of the laborers than he does in the Republic. Moreover, 
his demand for equality is prompted by exactly the same motive 
as was active in the Republic, not to ameliorate the condition of the 
laborer, whom he has relegated to slavery, but to avoid the hated 
civic discord (διάστασις) and to preserve the unity of the state.‘ 
The equality too, is in no sense analogous to that sought by modern 
socialism, for, as seen above, it is merely equality within a class, 
comprising the aristocratic minority of the state, and does not 
touch the working masses at all.5 In fine then, though there are 
perhaps enough truly socialistic elements in the Laws to warrant 
the classification of Souchon, yet if Plato’s ideal were realized, it 
would be mainly a restoration of the old economic régime in Greece, 
based on agriculture and the family tenure of property. Such an 
ideal, modern socialists would doubtless fail to recognize as having 
much in common with their own.® 

1 Laws 626E: τὸ πολεμίους εἶναι πάντας πᾶσιν. cited by Poehlmann, op. cit., 
I, 557; but he exaggerates the analogy. 

2 Cf. 742D-E, 743D-E, 729A, and the remarks on retail trade, 918B-g19E, 870B; 


cf. also, above, on wealth. 

3 As seen above, they are all slaves or strangers. A direct comparison is hardly 
possible, since in the Republic, the masses are the majority of the citizens, while in the 
Laws, there are none. 

4744D; cf. Shorey, Class. Phil., IX (1914), 363: ‘‘Plato’s object, however, is not 
socialistic equalization of the ‘good things’ of life, but the enforced disinterestedness 
of the rulers, and the complete self-realization of every type of man, in limitation to 
his own proper sphere and task.” 

5 Cf. pp. 55 and 60, on equality; also note 4, above. 

6 Francotte (L’Jndustrie, II, 250) suggests that l’étatisme, “nationalism,” would 
be a more applicable term for the Laws. He distinguishes this from socialism, as 
being not so thoroughgoing a limitation of the individual as is the “‘socialism” of 
the Republic. Cf. Shorey, Class. Phil., 1X (1914), 358, on the famous ‘‘communistic”’ 
passage in Laws 739C: ὄντως ἐστὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, etc. He calls it a ‘rhetorical 
exaltation of that ideal unity of civic feeling, which Demosthenes upbraids Aeschines 
for not sharing.” For further communistic ideas of Plato, cf. his incomplete romantic 
story of Atlantis in the Critias. The ideal is similar to that of the larger works. Cf. 
Poehlmann, op. cit., II, 348 ff. 


CHAPTER IV 
XENOPHON 


Xenophon was a man of affairs, whose interests touched the 
practical life of the world on many sides, as is evidenced by the 
broad scope of his extant works. He was also, however, a pupil 
of Socrates. In his economic thought, therefore, he vacillates 
between the positive interest of the practical economist and the 
negative criticism of the Socratics.‘ On the whole, his practical 
bent dominates, and is especially exhibited in his essay on the 
Revenues of Athens, as also in the fact that he was the first writer 
to produce a work devoted entirely to economics.’ The spirit 
of the moral philosopher, on the other hand, is prominent wherever 
the influence of Socrates is felt, as in the first chapters of the 
Economicus and in the Memorabilia. When the Socratic ideal 
dominates, he, in common with other Greek thinkers, confuses 
economics with ethics, and private with public economy.* He 
makes the science of economy deal with the management of pri- 
vate estates,> and believes with Plato and Ruskin that the same 
qualities are necessary for the successful handling of the affairs 
of either house or state.® 


τ We shall not try to distinguish between the actual ideas of Xenophon and those 
which he reports objectively as Socratic. 

2On the Xenophontine authorship of the Revenues, cf. Croiset, op. cit., IV, 393 
and notes; Christ, Griechische Literatur-Geschichte, 4th ed., pp. 367 f. and notes. 
Other authorities are cited there. 

3 The οἰκονομικός, at least, the first extant, devoted to private economy, and 
especially agriculture, but revealing a practical interest in the details of the production 
of wealth. Cf. infra for further discussion of Economica in Greek literature. 

4 ἘῸΓ some qualifications, cf. above, Introduction. 

5 Econ. i. 2: οἰκονόμου ἀγοθοῦ εἶναι οἰκεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον: cf. 3: τὸν ἄλλου δὲ 
οἶκον. οἶκον is used of one’s entire property (5). 

6 Mem. iii. 4. 6; cf. further above, p. 9, ἢ. 4. Cf. Ruskin, Pol. Econ. of Art, I, 
12: “Precisely the same laws of economy, which apply to the cultivation of a farm 
or an estate, apply to the cultivation of a province or an island.” Cf. the story in 
Hdt. v. 29 on this idea. Espinas (Revue des Etudes Grecques, XXVII [1914], 111) 
contrasts Xenophon, to whom the royal administration is a greatly expanded private 
economy, with Plato’s absorption of all private economy by the state. 

63 


64 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


VALUE 


Xenophon insists strongly on utility or serviceableness as 
a necessary quality of property (χρήματα, κτήματα). By this, 
however, he means primarily, not potential utility in the object, 
but ability of the owner to use rightly.. Even exchangeability 
does not insure value in anything, unless the seller can use to 
advantage that which he receives in return.? This idea of value 
is true enough from the ethical standpoint, and should not be left 
out of account, as is being recognized by modern economists. But 
to attempt to build a theory of economic value on such a basis, 
as Ruskin does,’ would result in hopeless confusion. Value is not 
merely an individual and moral, but also a social and economic, 
fact. 

A hint of exchange value is given in the implied classification 
of goods as usable or salable.4 But there is no discrimination 
between useful things in the economic and uneconomic sense. In 
the Revenues, on the other hand, when free from Socratic influence, 
Xenophon makes a positive contribution to the theory of value. 
He observes that the exchange value of goods varies with supply 
and demand, and that this law is, in a sense, self-regulative by the 


τ Econ. i. 7-15; cf. το: ταὐτὰ dpa ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἐπισταμένῳ χρῆσθαι αὐτῶν ἐκάστοις 
χρήματά ἐστι, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ οὐ χρήματα. Cf. Ρ. 23 and notes on Plato and Rus- 
kin. Η. Sewall (“‘Theory of Value before Adam Smith,” Publications of the American 
Economic Association, ΤΙ, Part III, p. 1) says that the conception of value (ἀξία) as 
a quality inherent in the thing was not questioned, but Xenophon seems to question 
it here. As she observes, n. 1, the term originally meant ‘‘weight,” at first weight 
in money, as well as actual worth. 


21: rit. 


3 Unto This Last, beginning; cf. preceding n. 1; Ruskin took Xen. Econ. as the 
foundation on which he built all his own economic studies. Cf. Unto This Last, 
Pref., Vol. XVII, pp. xlix and 18; Vol. XXXI, Introd.; pp. xv ff. It was the first 
in his Bib. Pastorum. Cf. his Preface to his translation of the Economicus; Arrows of 
the Chace, Vol. XXXIV, 547; Letters, II (Vol. XXXVII, 350). In Mun. Pul., IV, 105 
(Vol. XVII, 230); also on pp. 288 and 88, he refers to Xenophon’s “faultless” defini- 
tion of wealth, citing Mem. ii. 3. 7. Cf. also Vol. XXXI, pp. xvii and 27. Font- 
pertuis (“‘Filiation des idées économiques dans l’antiquité,”’ Jour. des écon., September, 
1871, p. 361) thinks this is at bottom the true theory of value. 


4 Econ. i. 2: ἀποδιδομένοις μὲν of αὐλοὶ χρήματα, μὴ ἀποδιδομένοις δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκτη- 


μένοις οὔ͵ τοῖς μὴ ἐπισταμένοις αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι. Brants (Xen. Econ., p. 8) overemphasizes 
this. 


XENOPHON 65 


fact that workmen tend to enter other fields of activity whenever 
any industry becomes unprofitable through an oversupply of its 
products." 

WEALTH 


The double standpoint of Xenophon is well illustrated in his 
doctrine of wealth. On the one hand, he values it highly, and 
tries to deduce practical rules for its increase and enjoyment.? 
On the other hand, like Socrates and Plato, he makes derogatory 
comparisons between economic and spiritual wealth.s As in the 
case of value, he offers no clear definition of economic wealth 
(κτῆσις). It is defined indiscriminately as ‘“‘whatever is useful 
to life,” and “useful” is “everything that anyone knows how to 
use.”4 But, as seen above, this is a purely subjective notion, and 
is only one element in economic wealth. He also defines it (χρή- 
para) as ‘‘the excess of goods over needs,” making it a merely 
relative term:® but here again the thought is ethical rather than 
economic, an attempt to teach the somewhat ascetic principle that 
a man’s riches are measured by the paucity of his wants.?7’ The 
hostile or indifferent attitude to wealth is also assumed in the com- 
parison of it with so-called mental wealth and wisdom’ and in the 
implication that it involves many cares.2 The idea so prominent in 
Plato, however, that the acquisition or expenditure of great wealth 

t Rev. iv. 6-10, a remarkable passage, though he fails to include silver in the law. 
Cf. Kautz, op. cit., p. 129; Kaulla, Die geschichtliche Entwickelung der modernen 
Werttheorien, p. 2. 

2 Especially in the story of Isomachus (Econ.), and the Revenues. 

3 Cf. infra; also Espinas, Histoire des doctrines economiques, p. 20. 

4 Econ. vi. 4; cf. 1. 7 ff., cited above, p. 64, n. 1. 

5P. 64 and notes. Biichsenschiitz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 15) criticizes it as too 
broad, including spiritual goods; too narrow, including only what one can use. 

6In Econ. ii. 2-8, Socrates’ comparison of himself with the wealthy Critoboulos; 
Hiero iv. 6-10; Mem. iv. 2. 37 {.; i. 6. 1-10, where Socrates defends his own simple 
life, especially 10: ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐνόμιζον τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι. If meant in 
the economic sense, this would approach a definition of capital, as “excess of goods 
over needs.” 

7 Cf. p. 25, n. 11, on the similar modern doctrine. 

8 Symp. iii. 8 and iv. 34-44, given as the doctrine of Antisthenes, the Cynic, 
though with apparent approval; Mem. iv. 2. 9. 


9 Econ. xi. 9. 


66 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


is not consistent with justice, is not emphasized by Xenophon. 
He calls that man happiest who has best succeeded in just acquisi- 
tion, and who uses his wealth in the best manner.? 


PRODUCTION 


The Greeks had no specific word for production, as we have, 
since industry, though well developed, was not a dominant feature 
of Greek life, and economics had not become a separate science. 
The word ἐργασία, meaning ‘‘labor’’ or “business,” served the 
purpose. The term was used of productive labor,? of building or 
manufacturing,’ of work in raw materials,4 most commonly of 
agriculture,’ of industries in general,° of the trades, commerce, or 
other business for money-making,’ and of a guild of laborers.’ 
The term ἡ ποιητικὴ τέχνη, ‘the productive art,’”’ which approaches © 
more nearly to a specific, technical expression, was also used. 
Thus, though there is no clear-cut term for production, the state- 
ment of Zimmern” that the Greeks had no better word for “‘busi- 
ness”’ than ἀσχολία, “lack of leisure,” is hardly warranted. 

Xenophon was far more interested than Plato or Aristotle in 
the problem of practical production. His shrewd discussion of 
agriculture, and his urgent appeal to Athens to increase her revenues 
by systematic exploitation of the mines, and by the encouragement 
of industry and commerce, reveal a mind awake to economic 
advantage. Though at times he seems almost to make war and 
agriculture the only true means of production, it is evident that 
he has a live interest in all means of acquisition." Toward the 
theory of production, however, his contribution is not large. In 


1 Cyrop. viii. 2. 23. 2 Mem. ii. 7. 7; Rev. iv. 20. 
3 Thue. vii. 6. 2, of walls; Gorg. 449D, ἱματίων, Theaet. 146D, ὑποδημάτων. Xen. 
Econ. vii. 21, ἐσθῆτος. 


4 Hdt. i. 68; Charm. 173E; Thuc. iv. τος. 5 Ar. Frogs 1034; Isoc. Areop. 30. 
°Isoc. Areop., 146d, cited infra on the terms for capital; Ad Nicocl. 18C. 
7 Mem. iii. 10. 1; Dem. xxxiii. 4. 9 Ar. N. Eth. vi. 4. 2 ff. 
® C.I.A. 3924: ἡ ἐργασία τῶν βαφέων. 10 Op. cit., ist ed., p. 50. 


™ Econ., especially chaps. v-vii; iv. 4; Mem. ii. 1. 6; Econ. v. 17: εὖ μὲν γὰρ 
φερομένης τῆς γεωργίας ἔρρωνται καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι ἅπασαι, ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν ἀναγκασθῇ ἡ γῆ 
χερσεύειν, ἀποσβέννυνται καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι σχεδόν τι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, 
ἃ very true statement, which does not belittle other industries. 


XENOPHON 67 


the Economics, he recognizes the importance of labor and natural 
resources in production, and in the Revenues, he sees the necessity 
of capital." But naturally, like Aristotle and the southern planter, 
he confuses capital with labor, in the person of the slave? The 
fable of the dog and the sheep reveals a knowledge of the machinery 
of production, and some insight into the proper relation between 
the employer and the laborers Xenophon’s distinct contribution 
to future economic thought, however, consists in his appreciation 
of the fact that economic production has its definite limits; that 
the same ratio of profits cannot be increased indefinitely by the 
constant addition of more labor and capital, but that these must 
be proportioned to the greatest possible return. To be sure, he 
does not appreciate the scientific significance of the principle. His 
purpose is rather to emphasize the danger of overproduction, and 
he even fails to grasp the necessary application of this danger to 
the silver mines. However, as the enunciator of the principle, he 
may be called the forerunner of the doctrine of diminishing returns. 

As seen above, special emphasis was laid by Xenophon upon 
natural resources as an element in production, both in land and in 
the mines. His great interest in and eulogy of agriculture as the 
basal industry, upon which all other sources of wealth depend, 
have caused him to be classed with the physiocrats of modern time 
but such an interpretation is hardly warranted. Without doubt, 
agriculture is, in his opinion, the supremely honorable occupation. 
It shares with war the right to be placed above all other vocations.® 
It permits the maximum of leisure and physical development, and 
is not unworthy of the personal attention of a prince.’ It is the 


Sots. 2; ii. 15. ΤΙ, 16; Rev. 1. 2 ff., etc. 2 Pol. i. 8 and o. 

3 Mem. ii. 7. 13 f., from Socrates. Cf. infra under distribution, on this. 

4 Rev. iv. 5-7; Cossa, op. cit., p. 148; Kautz, Histoire des doctrines économiques, 
p. 127; Fontpertuis, op. cit., p. 367. 

5 Econ. v. 17, cited on p. 66,n. 11, perhaps the strongest statement of the economic 
importance of agriculture in Greek writers. Ruskin follows Xenophon in his high 
appreciation of agriculture. He thinks it should be largely done by the upper classes 
(Mun. Pul., 109 [Vol. XVII, 235]); cf. also Vol. VII, 341, 429; Vol. X, 201. 

6 Econ. iv. 4; cf. Rev. v and Cyrop. iii. 2. 17, which favor peace for the sake of 
economic advance. 


7 Econ. iv. 8 to end of chapter, especially 21. 


68 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


most pleasant, most productive, most dignified, of callings; 
the best exercise for the athlete, the finest school for education in 
patriotism and justice, and it offers the greatest opportunity for 
the exercise of hospitality to men and reverence to gods. Indeed, 
it is the first of all occupations for an honorable and high-minded 
man to choose.2. Here we have the highest eulogy of agriculture 
in Greek literature. It is in essence a sound statement, and offers 
a needed message for today. 

Though Xenophon recognized the practical importance of 
capital in industrial enterprises,’ he developed no theory of it in 
his writings. He appreciated, however, the value of being able 
to keep a surplus.4 The term ἀφορμή, as used by him of the pro- 
vision of raw material for weaving, probably signified nothing 
more than it would have done to any Athenian business man of 
his time.’ The word originally meant a ‘‘starting-point,” espe- 
cially in war.’ Later, it signified the “means” or “resources” 
with which one begins a project,’ especially in business. It was an 
easy step from this general business use to the meaning, “financial 
capital” of a banker.’ Other terms for capital were évepya, used 
of interest-bearing capital in antithesis to ἀργά, of goods merely 
for use κάρπιμα, “goods that yield a produce,” as opposed to 
ἀπολαυστικά, “goods to be enjoyed,’”° which is suggestive of Mill’s™ 

τ Econ., ν. 1; 2-16; vi. 9-10; cf. Fontpertuis, of. cit., pp. 362 f. 

2 Econ. vi. 8. 3 Cf. Revenues. 

4 Econ. ii. το, περιουσίαν. Brants thinks (Xen. Econ., p. 13) that the theory is 
implied in his principle of sparing (Mem. ii. 7). Blanqui (op. cit., I, 81) emphasizes 
Econ. i. 7-15 as defining productive and unproductive wealth, but this merely dis- 
tinguishes wealth from non-wealth, from the standpoint of consumption. 

5 Mem. ii. 7. 11 f. 6 Thuc. i. go. 2. 

7Cf. n. 1, although Liddell and Scott cite the passage as having the meaning of 
“capital”; Mem. iii. 12. 4, where it need mean no more than wealth; Econ. i. 1. 16; 
Dem. xxxvi. 54: πίστις ἀφορμὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμόν. Here πίστις is 
almost called capital. Cf. p. 106, n. 3. 

8 Dem. xxxvi. 11: καίτοι εἰ ἣν ἰδία τις ἀφορμὴ τουτῳῖ πρὸς τῇ τραπέζῃ; xiv. 36; 
Lysias fr. 2. 2, p. 343, ed. Thalheim; Rev. iii. 9 and 12 and iv. 34 are also used of 
large financial undertakings; cf. Harpocration’s definition; ὅταν τις ἀργύριον δῷ 
ἐνθήκην, ἀφορμὴ καλεῖται ἰδίως mapa rots’ Αττικοῖς- for the term in Ar. Pol, vi. 1320035- 
1320017 cf. infra. Cf. Isoc. Areop. 146d for a similar passage. 

9 Dem. xxvii. 8 and 13. 


Loy Arete 1: Seize τι Laughlin, ed., 1907, pp. 66 and 93. 


XENOPHON 69 


definition, “that part of his possessions . . . . which he designs 
to employ in carrying on fresh production,” and of his two kinds 
of capital, “circulating” and “fixed”; ποιητικά, “things for 
further production,” as opposed to πρακτικά, “things merely for 
use” ;’ κεφάλαιος, of capital as opposed to interest or income.’ 
The term épavos, also, since it came to mean a “contribution of 
money,’ was often used of a loan, and therefore approached the 
signification of ‘‘money capital.’ 

Xenophon is considerably more favorable to labor and the 
industrial life than are the other Socratics. He quotes Socrates 
with apparent approval, that to do something well is well-being, 
while he who does nothing well is neither good for anything nor 
beloved of God.4 Work is far better than idleness. It produces 
more happiness, makes the laborer more temperate and just, and 
is the sine qua non for the independent life. This is a strong plea 
for industry, and is especially significant, since it refers primarily, 
to manufacture rather than to agriculture. The reference, how- 
ever, is to women workers, whose loss of leisure would not be an 
injury to the state. Each person is encouraged to provide for 
himself, and to do his work in the best possible manner,® and the 
maxim of Epicharmus, ‘‘For labor, the gods sell all goods to us,” 
is heartily approved.? All the foregoing passages are Hesiodic in 
their insistence upon the value of industry. But apart from his 
evident acceptance of the doctrine of Socrates, as quoted above, 
Xenophon exhibits a positive interest in labor. His attitude 

τ Ar. Pol. 125401 ff.; cf. infra on Aristotle (“Production”); pseudo-Ar. Econ. ii. 
1346014. 

2Plato Laws 742C; Dem. xxvii. 75. 

3 Lycurg., p. 150, 22: τοὺς ἐράνους διενεγκεῖν, Dem. xxi. 184 f.; cf. Dem. lix. 8 
for the interesting figurative use, τὸν αὐτὸν ἔρανον ἀποδοῦναι, “to pay him in his own 
coin”; also Lycurg., p. 168, 143. 

4 Mem. iii. 9. 14f.; cf. Brants, Xen. Econ., p. 10, for passages on Xenophon’s 
attitude to labor. 

5 Mem. ii. 7. 7 f. Guiraud (La Main-d’wuvrre indust., p. 46) thinks that this 
passage is a good commentary on Pericles’ oration (Thuc. ii). Both see in labor, not 


an inevitable evil, but a good. Guiraud holds that this was the general attitude in 
Athens. Cf. this chapter, pp. 36-59, on ‘‘ Opinions des Grecs sur le travail.” 


6 Mem. ii. 8. 1-5. 711: τ΄ 20. 
8 Cf. Déring, Die Lehre des Socrates als soziales Reform-System, pp. 387 fi. 


70 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


toward the advancement of industry and commerce is thoroughly 
modern, except that he does not contemplate the employment of 
free citizen labor.* He emphasizes labor almost as strongly as 
natural resources as an important factor in production. He believes 
also that industrial thrift and prosperity are the best means of 
realizing a more quiet and orderly state.’ 

Even the practical Xenophon, however, is not free from the 
moral-aristocratic prejudice against mechanical arts (Bavavovxat) 
for the better class of citizens. He admits that they are justly 
spoken against, and held in ill-repute, since they tend to weaken 
the laborer both in body and in soul. The artisans have no leisure 
to give either to their friends or to the state, and in a warlike state 
the citizens cannot be thus employed.* The artisan is also servile 
because of his ignorance of the higher moral sentiments (τὰ καλὰ 
καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια). All this sounds like Plato, but Xenophon 
differs, in that he is in no wise opposed to the unlimited develop- 
ment of industry and commerce, provided the drudgery of it may 
be done by non-citizens. 

The principle of the division of labor is clearly stated by him, 
but here again he differs from Plato in that his prime interest is 
practical and economic rather than moral. He presents it as the 
reason why royal dishes are superior in flavor to others, and makes 
the acute observation that the division of labor is not so fully 
applied in the small city, because there are not enough consumers 
to support a man in one trade. In the large city, on the other 
hand, the consumers are so numerous that even the trades them- 
selves are divided and subdivided. Thus much greater skill is 
developed, and better results realized, for he who spends his time 
in work of the narrowest compass (βραχυτάτῳ) must accomplish 
this in the best manner.® He does not specify the advantages of 
the division of labor to industry, except that it results in greater 

t Rev., especially i. 2 ff. and iv; Econ. v. 2; iii. 15; ii. 16; Kautz, op. cit., Ὁ. 126. 


But cf., on the other hand, Xen. Laced. Pol. on the restrictions in Sparta against 
acquisition of wealth by trade and arts; cf. also (Xen.). Rep. Ath. ii. 11 ff. 


2 Rev. iv. 51. 
3 Econ. iv. 2; vi. 5-7; agriculture and war are not included. 
DAKE 5 Mem. iv. 2. 22. 


ὁ Cyrop. viii. 2. 5 f.; cf. also ii. 1. 21, of military labor. 


XENOPHON 71 


skill, but he reveals especial insight in stating so clearly the rela- 
tion of the market to the development of the principle. In this, 
he is the forerunner of Adam Smith, who observes that a minute 
division of trades cannot exist except in the larger cities, especially 
in coast and river towns.? The assertion of Haney, that the 
Greeks referred only to a “simple separation of employments,” is 
certainly unwarranted in the light of this passage, for Xenophon 
expressly distinguishes here the simple from the more complex 
subdivision. He says that some are employed on men’s shoes, 
others on women’s; some do the sewing (νευρορραφῶν), others do 
the cutting (σχίζων), and that the same also is true in the manu- 
facture of clothing.4 This passage is also an evidence that the 
development of industry in fourth-century Athens must have been 
extensive. Xenophon also, like Plato, observed the fact that the 
diversity in the natures of men is the basis for the division of 
labor,’ though he did not follow him in his doctrine that men and 
women should have the same work.° 

Unlike Plato, the idealist, Xenophon, the practical man of 
affairs, takes the institution of slavery for granted, seemingly 
unconscious of any ethical or economic problems involved.7. How- 
ever, as a matter of common-sense, he advises that slaves be 
treated with consideration. He would give them a proper degree 
of liberty, and arouse them to do their best? by a fair system of 
rewards and punishments. In the case of those slaves who hold 
positions of trust, he advises that their affections should be won 
by kindly treatment, and even by making them sharers in the 
prosperity of the household.” Slavery is, of course, a condition 
most irksome to the free-born. The unfortunate Eutheros would 
almost prefer starvation." 


ΣΟΥ: 70: 2 Op. cit., I, iii. 


3Op. cit., p. 40; cf. also Diihring, Kritische Geschichte der Nationalokonomie und 
des Socialismus, p. 22. 


4 Cyrop. viii. 2. 5 f., cited above. 7 Econ. iii. 4; v. 16; ix. 11; xill; Rev. iv. 17 ff. 
5 Mem. iii. 9. 3. 8 Econ. iii. 4. 
6 Econ. viii. 9v, 16; xiii. 


19 Econ. ix. 11; cf. p. 38, 0. 4, on the actual status of slaves at Athens. 
τ Mem. ii. 8. 4. 


72 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


MONEY 


In his treatise on the Revenues of Athens, Xenophon shows some 
appreciation of the theory of money. He appears to take for 
granted that money must have intrinsic value. At least, he under- 
stands that silver is a commodity whose value is affected by its 
use as such, as well as by its employment for currency.’ He also 
apprehends the value of a silver currency for international com- 
merce.?, His naively enthusiastic argument for the indefinite, 
increase of the stock of silver, however, is suggestive of the mer- 
cantile fallacy, which identified money with wealth. But perhaps 
he is merely using for practical purposes of argument the fact that 
the Athenians were accustomed to look upon silver as the metal 
for fixed and constant value. In any event, he sees that the 
increase of silver must be attended by a corresponding increase in 
business activity, if its value is not to depreciate,’ and he cannot 
be accused of the error of the mercantilists, that a country is impov- 
erished by the export of money. He must also have understood 
clearly the importance of stability of value in a currency, since he 
deems it necessary to show that the increased output of silver will 
not decrease its value, and that silver is the least changeable of the 
monetary metals.? Despite his enthusiasm for his thesis, which 
causes him to exaggerate the stability of silver, he does not fail 
to grasp the direct effect of supply and demand upon it,’ just as 
upon gold? and other commodities.*° He shows also some under- 

τ Rev, iii. 2: ὅπου γὰρ ἂν πωλῶσιν αὐτὸ, πανταχοῦ πλεῖον τοῦ ἀρχαίου λαμβάνουσιν. 

3 Ibid.; cf. Souchon, op. cit., p. 114. 

3 Rev. iv, especially 7-12; Haney (op. cit., chap. iv) and Simey (“Economic 
Theory among the Greeks and Romans,” Economic Review, October, 1900, p. 472) 
point to Rev. iii. 2 as distinguishing between money and wealth, but this hardly 
balances the above passage. Econ. i. 12-14 means merely that silver is not wealth 
unless properly used. 

4So Brants, Xen. Econ., p. 21; cf. Lenormant ὁ La Monnaie dans V’antiquité, I, 
τ; {ΠῚ 3s 

5 Rev. iv. 8. 

ὁ Rev. ili. 4; v. 3; iii. 2; cf. Ingram, History of Political Economy, p. 15; Kautz, 
op. cit., p. 129; Roscher, p. 12. 

7 Rev. iv. 5-11. *iii. 2; andiv. The demand will increase with the supply. 

%iv. το: χρυσίον ὅταν πολὺ παραφανῇ, αὐτὸ μὲν ἀτιμότερον γίγνεται, τὸ δὲ ἀργύριον 
τιμιώτερον ποιεῖ, 


iv, 5-7, 


XENOPHON 73 


standing of the quantitative theory of the relation between gold 
and silver.* It need hardly be added that, in strong contrast to 
Plato, his attitude toward the precious metals, especially silver, 
is very favorable.’ 


EXCHANGE 


Xenophon presents no theory of exchange, though he is frankly 
interested in the advance of commerce and trade. In his opinion, 
the greater their development, the better it is for the city of Athens.‘ 
He is full of practical suggestions to stimulate commercial activity. 
So assured is he of the prime importance of extensive commerce to 
a nation, that, in the spirit of modern commercialism, he insists 
upon the necessity of peace for its sake.© To his mind, increased 
trade means not only material advantage, but social and political 
as well, in that greater prosperity, more labor, and a better distri- 
bution will mean greater satisfaction, and hence less danger of 
revolution in the state.’ He entertains none of the prejudice of 
the other Socratics against the money-makers’ art, a fact which 
may well be a warning against the too ready acceptance of their 
attitude as the usual verdict of the Athenian citizens.’ In his 
practical suggestions for the development of commerce there is 
a hint of the protective principle. He advises that certain advan- 
tages be granted to shipowners so as to induce them to increase their 
shipping But the purpose is not to limit the advantage to 
Athenian merchantmen, nor to restrict import trade. It is rather 
the opposite. He would enrich the city by tribute on both imports 
and exports, imposed for sumptuary and revenue purposes,” and 


tiv. 10. 

2iv, especially 7-9, 11; he has no word against them. Lac. Pol. vii shows that 
he favors their free use. 

3 Brants (Xen. Econ., pp. 17.) says that he grasped both bases of exchange, 
division of labor, and natural diversity of products, but he bases it on Rep. Ath. ii. 
12. 3. 

4 Rev. iii., especially 5; Hiero ix. 9; ἐμπόρια ὠφέλει πόλιν. 

Siii. 3. 4. 12 f. 6 iii. 4; v-vi. Ἴ01. 1: 

8 Econ. ii. 18: χρηματιστής;, cf. iii, where Socrates teaches the art. Cf. above, 
p. 17, on the Sophists’ attitude. 


9 Rev. 111. 4. 10 111. 5. 


74 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


would also develop a public merchant-marine for rent to merchants, 
as a further source of income.* 


POPULATION 


In antithesis to Plato and Aristotle, the problem of population 
has no difficulties for Xenophon. He does not deem it advisable 
to set a limit on the population of the state. On the contrary, he 
conceives it as one of the advantages of his plan in the Revenues, 
that thereby the city would become very populous, and thus land 
about the mines would soon be as valuable as that in the city 
itself.” 

DISTRIBUTION 

Xenophon is far less concerned about the problem of distri- 
bution than Plato. He has no suggestions as to wages, profits, or 
prices, no ideal state where an equitable distribution shall be real- 
ized, no yearnings after equality, or complaints against the evils of 
extreme wealth or poverty. Like Plato, he would avoid civic 
discord in the state,3 but by the increase of production and exchange 
rather than by their limitation. In Socrates’ parable of the dog 
and the sheep, he presents a suggestion of a theory of profits, but 
his plea is for the employer instead of the laborer. The right of 
the former to share in the profits of the business is based on his 
service as overseer of the work, and as protector of the workmen.4 

Our author does not definitely reveal his attitude toward the 
poorer masses, but it seems probable that he had little interest 
in them, except in so far as their condition might affect the fortunes 
of the state. He was, of course, opposed to giving them full 
political rights,’ and would probably have preferred a system such 
as that in Plato’s Laws, where all free citizens have sufficient 
income so that they can give their time largely to the state, and 

iil, 14. 2 iv. 50. 3 Rev. vi. τ. 

4 Mem. ii. 7. 12-14. Poehlmann’s attempt to turn the argument about, so as to 
favor the laborer, is strained (op. cit., I, 288), though the passage may be a sidelight 
on the economic conditions in early fourth-century Athens. Cf. Mem. ii. 8. 4-5, 


where, as Poehlmann (op. cit., I, 286 f.) points out, the free laborer was coming to feel 
himself to be on the same status with the slave. 


5 Cf. e.g., his opposition to the free democracy of Athens, for evidence of which 
we do not need to depend upon the Ath. Pol. 


XENOPHON 75 


where all laborers are slaves. He did not think of suggesting that 
the poorer citizens work in the mines, or even that aliens do so, 
but suggested rather that each citizen have the income from three 
state slaves." 

While Xenophon is not usually considered among the socialists 
of Greece, he approaches perhaps even nearer than Plato to one 
phase of modern socialism. Like Plato, he opposes the extreme 
individualism of the political and private life of his day.2_ He also 
reveals the Greek feeling of the social obligation of private property. 
Again, as do Plato and modern socialists, he magnifies the power 
of law to transform economic or social conditions.4 But in advo- 
cating the modern doctrine of the socialization of industry, with 
an economic, and not a moral or political, motive, he has advanced 
beyond either Plato or Aristotle, and approaches modern socialism.s 
As seen above, however, his economic motive is not interest in the 
welfare of the masses, for by his scheme they would all be slaves. 
He desires only to abolish poverty among the citizens.° He would 
have the state become entrepreneur, not merely in one, but in 
many branches of industry. State merchant shipping,’ public 
ownership of slaves,* public exploitation of the mines,’ public 
buildings near the mines, for rental to strangers,” are all in his plan. 
The rich must finance the scheme, but their profit will be 18, 36, 
or even 200 per cent.™ Companies are to be organized so as to 
obviate individual risk.2 Thus will poverty be no more, plenty 


t Rev. iv. 17; cf. p. 70; but p. 69 might point the other way. 

2 Mem. iv. 4. 16; ἄνευ δὲ ὁμονοίας ovr’ ἂν πόλις εὖ πολιτευθείη οὐτ᾽ οἶκος καλῶς, 
οἰκηθείη. 

3Ficon. xi. 9, 13. 

4 Οἵ, how naively he takes for granted the feasibility of his schemes in the Rev- 
enues. Cf. the opening sentence of the work, ‘“‘As are the governors [προστάται], so 
are the governments [πολιτείας] “cited by Poehlmann (op. cit., I, 299) as the illusion 
of socialism; but it might easily be expressed by a conservative. Plato (Rep. 544D) 
expresses a similar idea. 

5 Rev. 111 and iv. 

6iv.33. The mines were already publicly owned, for the most part, but they were 
privately worked. Cf. Ardaillon, Les Mines du Laurion dans Vantiquité (Paris, 1897). 

Till. 14. 9 iv. 1 iii. g ἴ. 


iv. τῇ. τὸ ἵν, 49. Ziv, 30-32. 


76 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


for all will reign, and there will be an era of prosperity and security 
for the state.* 

His thesis is, in a word, that what private capital can accomplish 
for the enrichment of itself alone, state capital can accomplish to 
better advantage for the enrichment of the whole citizenship,’ 
a doctrine which strikes a truly modern socialistic note. 

‘iv. 333 49-52; vi. 1. Cf.the excellent résumé of the whole plan by Poehlmann 
(op. cit., I, 299 ff.), though he reads into it too much of the modern socialistic spirit; 
e. g., 306-8, he makes it an example of the so-called psychological necessity by which 
socialism develops out of capitalism. 


2 Cf. especially iv. 14: τῆς μέντοι πόλεως πάνυ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τὸ αἰσθανομένην 
πολλοὺς πλουτιζομένους ἔξ αὐτῆς ἰδιώτας μὴ μιμεῖσθαι τούτους, 


CHAPTER V 
THE ORATORS—DEMOSTHENES, ISOCRATES 


Though the Attic orators constitute a very important source 
for our knowledge of economic conditions in Athens, they furnish 
but little definite material for a history of Greek economic thought. 
From the standpoint of theory, their chief value consists in the 
fact that they all reveal a positive interest in wealth and all the 
phenomena of practical economy. In this respect, they present 
a striking contrast to the negative attitude of the Socratics, and 
thus serve to correct our conception of the economic ideas of the 
average Athenian citizen. Specific consideration need be given 
only to Demosthenes and Isocrates. 

The positive interest of Demosthenes in commerce and finance 
has already been indicated by some passages,‘ and this fact is so 
evident throughout all his orations that further citations are 
unnecessary. Instead, we may note briefly some slight hints in 
him of the negative moral attitude of the philosophers. He 
emphasizes the dominating influence of money in warping the 
judgments of men.? He praises the simple life of the previous 
generation, and criticizes in contrast the private luxury of his own 
day.3 According to him, it is considered to be rare for a business 
man to be both diligent (φιλεργόν) and honest (χρηστόν). In his 
assertion that poverty compels freemen to turn to menial work 
(δουλικά) and that many freewomen (ἀσταί) have been driven by 
the stress of the times to such vocations,’ some aristocratic preju- 
dice against common labor seems to be implied. A similar attitude 
toward traders and money-dealers is at least suggested by his 
question as to what is the worst (πονηρότατον) element in the 

1 E.g., p. 106, ἢ. 3, citing Or. xxxvi. 44 on πίστις. 

2 Peace 12, though the emphasis is on bribery. 

3 Olynth. iii. 25 f.; Cont. Aristoc. xxiii. 207 f.; Or. xiii. 29 f. (Dem.), though the 
emphasis in all is upon patriotism. In these passages, he idealizes the past in the 
manner of Isocrates; cf. zufra, Ὁ. 143, n. 8. 

4 Or. xxxvi. 44, For Phormio. 5 Or. lvii. 45. 

77 


78 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


state. His scornful mention of Stephanus as one who loans money 
at interest, and takes advantage of another’s need,? is a slight 
reminder of the philosophic prejudice against interest, though here he 
is doubtless emphasizing loans for consumption merely, at an exorbi- 
tant rate. But these traces of the Socratic attitude toward wealth 
are of very little significance, in the face of the evident economic 
interest that characterizes all the orations of Demosthenes. 

Isocrates may, in a sense, be’ reckoned among the Socratics, 
and he exhibits more of their spirit in relation to wealth than do 
any of the other orators. He would have men strive for honest 
character rather than for wealth, since it is not always gain to 
acquire and loss to spend. The result depends rather upon the 
occasion and virtue. Noble character is of more value than great 
riches,5 for good reputation is not purchasable (ὠνητή) with money, 
but is itself the source of material possessions, and it is immortal, 
while wealth is only temporal. Material and spiritual wealth are 
thus contrasted in true Socratic manner;’ right use is emphasized, 
and the common insatiety and injustice of money-makers is 
opposed.2 Folly and license are named as the usual accompani- 
ments of wealth, in contrast to the moderation that characterizes 
the poor and lowly.”? But, like Plato, Isocrates considers neither 
luxury nor penury to be the ideal condition," and clearly appre- 
ciates the evil effect of poverty in arousing discontent and civic 
strife in the state.” 


τ Cont. Aristoc. 146; Cont. Aristog. xxv. 46, his scornful figurative use of the term 
κάπηλος. 

2 Cont. Steph. i. 70: ἀλλὰ τοκίζων καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συμφορὰς καὶ χρειὰς εὐτυχή- 
ματα σαυτοῦ νομίζων. 

3 Olynth. i. 15, referring to those who borrow money at high interest, and thus lose 
their property, may also be noted. Cf. pp. 105 f. and notes. 

4 Nicocl. 3. 50, against injustice in money-making. 5 Ibid. 59. 

6 Cont. Nicocl. (2). 32; Peace 32; cf. p. 26, n. 1, for Plato’s idea. 

7Cf. also Paneg. 76. 8 Cont. Nicocl. (2). 4. 

9 Peace 7; moderation in money-making is most difficult for most men; cf. also 
34 and 93 f.. 

10 Aveop. 4. 1 Cont. Nicocl. 2; Panath. 184. 

12 Areop. 51, 53, 83; νῦν δὲ πλείους εἰσὶν οἱ σπανίζοντες τῶν ἐχόντων, a striking 
commentary on the economic conditions in the Athens of his day. In 44, poverty is 
called a source of crime. All these passages idealize the past. 


THE ORATORS—DEMOSTHENES; ISOCRATES 79 


But despite this moralizing tendency, he agrees with the other 
orators in appreciating highly the economic importance of the 
manual arts.‘ He points also, with apparent pride, to the exten- 
sive commerce of Athens as compared with that of other states,? 
and one of his chief arguments for peace is that thereby the city 
will be filled with merchants and strangers and metics. This 
entire plea for peace, which he bases so largely on economic advan- 
tage, has a decidedly modern ring. He understood well the impor- 
tance of industrial development in the general prosperity of a 
democracy. In almost Aristotelian language, he pictures how in 
the good old days the rich were accustomed to give the poor a start 
in business (ἀφορμή), either in agriculture, trade, or the arts.‘ 
This positive economic interest is further evidenced by his emphasis 
upon the increased skill that results from the application of the 
division of labor.5 

Isocrates, like Plato, was especially opposed to civic strife 
and the extreme individualistic communism that demanded a 
redivision of lands and abolition of debts.° In the ideal past of 
his dreams, there were no extremes of wealth and poverty, private 
property was safe, and revolutions did not rend the state. Now, 
on the other hand, all is changed. Sparta is the only state that 
has not been torn by the bitter party strife? He contrasts the 
high regard in which the wealthy were held in his boyhood with the 
present jealous discontent. To be known as a wealthy man now is 
almost equivalent to being considered criminal and is a thing for 
which to apologizes This attitude toward the rich, of which 
Isocrates complains, is significant in the light of similar tendencies 
in our own democracy today. 

Again, in agreement with Plato and Aristotle, Isocrates opposes 


the doctrine of mere arithmetical equality, and insists that the true 

t Paneg. 29, 33, 40; Areop. 74. But cf. Panath. 29 for a hint of prejudice against 
them. 

2 Paneg. 42. 3 Peace 20 f. 

4 Areop. 32 {.; cf. infra, p. 97, n. 6, for a fuller interpretation of Aristotle’s pas- 
sage; cf. Letter to Timoth. 3; Areop. 44. 

5 Bousiris τό. 6 Arcop. 35. 

7 Panath. 259; Paneg. 79; cf. also citations on poverty, above. 


®Or. 15. 159 f. 


80 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


equality apportions to each what befits his capacity. But though 
he is hostile to the crasser type of communism, he makes the chief 
characteristic of the ideal past a noble community feeling and spirit 
of co-operation. In that happy time, the common weal was first 
in the thought of all, each had regard for others’ interests, the 
poor were not jealous of the rich, and the rich assisted the poor.’ 
At times, he even approaches the modern humanitarian sentiment 
for the submerged classes. He defines true national prosperity 
as a condition in which no citizen is lacking the means of livelihood,3 
and thinks the poor might well be pardoned for their indifference 
to public welfare, in their anxiety over the daily means of sub- 
sistence.* He also states the somewhat socialistic principle so 
emphasized by Plato, that the character of the state will be like 
that of the ruler.’ 


t Areop. 21 f. 


2 Areop. 35: αἱ δὲ χρήσεις κοιναί; 31 f., 51; for further mention of these ideal- 
izations of ancient Athens and Sparta, cf. infra, p. 143, n. 8. 


3 Areop. 53. 
4 7014. 83: ὁπόθεν τὴν del παροῦσαν ἡμέραν διάξουσιν. 
5 Cont. Nicocl. 31: ὅτι τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἦθος ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. 


CHAPTER VI 
ARISTOTLE 


In the writings of Aristotle, we find a much richer source for 
a history of Greek economic thought. Though no extant work of 
his is devoted to economics, he left a multitude of writings on 
diverse subjects, as a monument to his wonderful versatility and 
tireless industry. Of these, the Politics and the Ethics are espe- 
cially fruitful in economic ideas, though, as in the case of Plato, 
such material is incidental to the main discussion. His general 
attitude toward wealth and some of its problems, we shall find to 
be often substantially in agreement with that of Plato. His 
economic vision was prejudiced by the same ethico-aristocratic 
spirit. Yet his practical, scientific mind caused him to deal with 
many economic questions more extensively, more directly, and more 
incisively than is true of any other Greek thinker. Caution must 
be observed, however, against reading into his statements more 
meaning than he purposed to convey. He was not the creator of 
the science of political economy,’ though his apprehension of many 
of the chief concepts of economics was probably clearer than has 
often been admitted by modern economists. 

At the very threshold of economic speculation, Aristotle 
advanced beyond Plato and Xenophon, in that he perceived the 
fallacy in the confusion of household and public economy. He saw 

«Cf. infra for the Economica, which is generally recognized to be from a later 
member of the Peripatetic school, about 250-200 B.c.; cf. Susemihl, Economica, Intro. 
to the ed.; Croiset, op. cit., IV, 710; Zeller, op. cit., 11, 2, 944 ff. Moreover, it 
deals chiefly with the practical phase of economics. On the other hand, we shall cite 
Eud. Eth. and Mag. mor. under Aristotle, since, though later than him, they merely 
imitate his thought, in so far as they touch economics. For the numerous and 
diverse writings ascribed to Aristotle, cf. Christ, op. cit., IV [1905], 684 ff. 

2B. St. Hilaire (preface to his French translation of the Politics, pp. 4-11) calls 
him “16 créateur de l’économie politique.’””’ Zmave (Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos. 
[1899], pp. 407 ff.) also tends to overestimate him. 

3Zmavc (ibid. and also Zeitschr. f. d. gesammt. Staatswiss. [1902], pp. 48 ff.). 
emphasizes this fact. 

81 


(oe) 


2 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


that they differed, not only in size or numbers, but in essential 
type.t. In his later discussion of wealth, however, he overlooked 
his distinction, and fell into the old Greek confusion. 


VALUE 


The extent of Aristotle’s contribution to the theory of value has 
been very diversely estimated.?_ In a classic passage of the Politics, 
he distinguishes between the two uses of an object, the direct use 
for which it was produced, and the indirect as an article for 
exchanges This has often been heralded as an anticipation of 
Adam Smith’s distinctions between value in use and value in 
exchange.4 Such an interpretation, however, is hardly warranted. 
The entire emphasis of Aristotle in the passage is upon use rather 
than upon value. The exchange use is declared subordinate, and 
the context shows that the purport of the statement is to teach the 
uneconomic doctrine that exchange (μεταβλητική) is an artificial 
use, especially when pursued for gain. 

Moreover, the passage fails to develop the definition further 
by distinguishing between economic utilities that involve a cost 
of production, and other necessities that are devoid of exchange 
value because of their universality.© Need is recognized as an 
element in exchange value,’ but it is not differentiated from eco- 
nomic demand that has the means to purchase. All that can safely 

χ Pol. i. 1. 1252a7-13, cited on p. 9, n. 5, a criticism of Plato’s Politics 258E-259C; 


on the truth in this confusion, cf. p. το. Even Adam Smith said: ‘What is wise with 
a family can hardly be foolish with a great kingdom.” 

2 Besides St. Hilaire and Zmavc, cited above, among those favorable are Cossa, 
Hist. des doctrines economiques, p. 149; Blanqui, op. cit., 1, 49, 86. More reserved 
are Souchon, op. cit., p. 127; DuBois, op. cit., p. 50; Haney, op. cit., pp. 47 {.; unfair 
interpretation, Diihring, op. cit., pp. 20 f. 

3]. 9. 1257a6-9: ἑκάστου yap κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσίς ἐστιν ἀμφότεραι δὲ καθ᾽ 
αὑτὸ μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ’ αὑτό, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ᾽ οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος οἷον 
ὑποδήματος ἥ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. 

4 Wealth of Nations, I, chap. iv. 

5 Cf. Souchon, op. cit., Ὁ. 127; Haney, op. cit., p. 47. 

6 Unless this is implied in κτήματος, 125706, as ἔστι yap ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων 
(14 1.) might seem to indicate. Zmave (Archiv., etc., p. 410) points to 1253b33-39, 
on the automatic tripods of Hephaestus, as implying it, but if so it was unintended 
by Aristotle. But cf. infra., pp. 84 and 86, n. 4, where it is recognized. 

7 1257a11; 5-19, but not specifically stated, and the term χρεία does not occur here. 


ARISTOTLE 83 


be said of this statement of Aristotle, therefore, is that he acci- 
dentally hit upon a basal distinction, which, had it been his purpose, 
he might have used as starting-point for the development of the 
modern theory of value. 

Certain other passages from his writings reveal a clearer appre- 
hension of the distinction. In the Rhetoric, he states the principle 
that exchange value is measured by rarity, though this may not 
be a criterion of the actual value of the commodity to life. The 
latter is measured by its necessity or practical utility.? 

A paragraph from the Nicomachaean Ethics, though it does not 
treat the problem directly, is also an evidence of Aristotle’s insight 
into the elements of economic values It has been strangely 
slighted by most historians of economic thought, though its sig- 
nificance has been recognized by editors of the Ethics.4 It grows 
out of his discussion of fair exchange, which is a part of the larger 
subject of justice. He observes that a proportional equality 
(κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον) between diverse products must exist 
before exchange can take place,5 since the labor involved in their 
production is not equal.© This equality he obtains through a pro- 
portion, in which the objects of exchange stand in inverse ratio 
to the producers.? The equalization of the commodities is thus 
based, according to Aristotle, upon an estimate of the labor or 
cost of production in each case.’ Again, he points out that the 


Ti. 7. 14: καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου ἀχρηστότερος dy: 
ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τε ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις ὑπερέχει - τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ 
ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει + ὅθεν λέγεται ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ. Cf. Pind. Οἱ. i. 1 and Cope-Sandys 
ed. of Ar. Rhet. (I, pp. 130 f., 1877). 

2 Ibid. 3V, v. 8-14, 1133a5-1133b10 ff. 4¥E.g., Stewart. 

5 113305-12; 15 f.; 18; cf. Eud. Eth. vii. το. 1243b28-38. 

6N. Eth. 1133a5-12, etc., 12 f.: οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι το θατέρου ἔργον 
ἢ τὸ θατέρου. The emphasis seems to be on quality of labor, as suggested by κρεῖττον. 
Cf. both ὅσον and οἷον (15) and p. 84 n. 3. 

7 Ibid. 7-10; by joining means and extremes together, the proportionate exchange 
is effected. Cf. also 113364 ff.; 1133a32f. As observed by Ritchie (Palgrave’s 
Dictionary, art. “ Aristotle’) and H. Sewall (op. cit., p. 3, n. 2), the proportion is 
clearer to moderns if we make our standard one hour of labor of each workman 
instead of the men themselves. 

ὃ Stewart (Notes to N. Eth., 1, 449) suggests that this gives what the economists 
call “‘natural value,’’ but that the market value oscillates from this because of supply 
and demand. 


84 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


standard by which all products are measured is need or demand 
(χρεία) for reciprocal services,’ thereby making demand a social 
fact dependent upon organized society. It is, in his thought, the 
“common denominator of value’? which finally determines the 
actual basis on which all goods are exchanged or services rendered. 
Elsewhere Aristotle’s conception of value is more individualistic, 
like that of Xenophon and Plato, but Haney? overlooks this passage 
in asserting that his notion of value is “‘purely subjective.”’ It is 
not merely ‘‘equal wants” that are considered, as he states, but 
equal costs as wells This demand, or common measure of value, 
is expressed in terms of money (vomopa).4 

It is clear then, from this passage in the Ethics, that Aristotle 
understood that economic value is determined by demand, as meas- 
ured in money, and by labor invested or cost of production.s This 
latter element, of course, involves the condition that the product be 
limited in supply, though this is not expressly stated.® To be sure, 
the interest of the moral philosopher is also paramount here,’ as in 
the Politics passage. The thought is centered on fair exchange, as a 
phase of justice, rather than upon the problem of value. Neverthe- 
less, his discussion reveals a clear insight into demand and cost of 
production as the two most important elements in economic value.’ 


1 1133a25-27; 113306f. Cf. p. 34, n. 5, for Plato’s use of the term. 


2 Op. cit., pp. 47 f. 
3 Cf. the discussion and notes above; also 1133a15 f., where both elements seem 
to be recognized, though the meaning of the passage is disputed. Cf. infra, p. 108, n. 3. 


4 1133a109 ff.; 29; 1133b10 ff., cited infra, on money. It clearly distinguishes the 
quality of exchangeableness. Cf. iv. 1. 1119026 f., cited infra, n. 7. Cf. pp. 38 f. for 
Plato’s theory. 


580 Stewart, op. cit., in loc.; Zmavc, Archiv., etc., p. 415, who criticizes Karl 
Marx (Kapital, 4th ed., I, 26) for denying this. Barker (op. cit., p. 379) says that 
Aristotle did not recognize the “seller’s cost of production”; but cf. 384, where he 
implies the opposite. 


ὁ But cf. his definition of wealth, pp. 85 ἴ. 


7 Bonar (op. cit., p. 40) criticizes him for this. The words ἀξία and τίμη are not 
used in the passage, but for the former in a very clear economic sense, cf. iv. 1. 1119b26- 
27; χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. 


ὃ For further discussion of this Ethics passage, cf. infra on money, exchange, and 
distribution. Mag. mor. i. 33. 1193b19-1194b2 repeats the idea, citing Plato Rep. 
on the exchange of the four producers in his primitive state. 


ARISTOTLE 85 


WEALTH 


Since Aristotle had a better apprehension of the theory of value 
than other Greek thinkers, we may expect him also to define more 
clearly the concept of wealth. In the Politics, he names the 
following attributes of genuine (ἀληθινός) wealth (πλοῦτος): neces- 
sary to life; useful to persons associated in a household or a state; 
capable of accumulation (θησαυρισμός); limited in extent (οὐκ 
ἄπειρος). According to Mill? from the “economic” standpoint, 
wealth is “all useful and agreeable things” of a “‘material nature” 
possessing “exchange value”; and, to have exchange value, they 
must be “‘capable of accumulation.” 

In comparing these two definitions, it should be recognized at 
the outset that Aristotle’s term “genuine” does not mean “truly 
economic,” as it might in Mill, but rather “legitimate wealth” as 
distinguished from that gained from false finance (χρηματιστική);3 
also that his “‘necessary to life’ and “limited in extent’? are not 
used in the economic but in the moral sense, as opposed to luxury 
and extreme interest in money-making. Mill’s “all useful and 
agreeable things” presents a marked contrast to this in spirit. 
Aristotle’s “useful”? means “what subserves the final good”’ (πρὸς 
ἀγαθὴν ζωήν), while Mill’s means “things that give sensations of 
comfort or pleasure.” Thus Aristotle’s wealth is necessarily 
limited, while Mill’s is unlimited, since, as Barker observes, “only 
an infinity of wealth can satisfy an infinity of need.”* It will be 
seen from the following discussion, however, that Aristotle includes 
more than “‘necessary things” in his category of economic wealth. 
He does not specify ‘‘material things,” as does Mill, but it seems 
probable that this is his meaning.’ In all the passages where he 
enumerates the different kinds of wealth, only material things are 

ΤΊ, 8. 1256b28-32. The term ἄπειρος, as applied to wealth, is used by Plato and 
Aristotle of undue love of money (Rep. 373D, 591D; Laws 870A); for Aristotle, cf. 


passage above and infra. There is a sense, even from the economic standpoint, in 
which wealth is not unlimited. 


2 Prin. of Pol. Econ., preliminary remarks, and Book I, chap. iii, 3. 
3 On this term in Plato and Aristotle, cf. infra under exchange. 
4 Op. cit., p. 374; cf. infra on the moral attitude of Aristotle to wealth. 


5His unfair criticism of Plato seems to argue otherwise (Rep. 369C ff.; Pol. 
1291a12-19), but cf. infra. 


86 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


included, except slaves, who are counted as mere tools.' One of 
these passages specifically excludes intellectual wealth by defining 
property as a “separable instrument.”? The use of the term for 
value (ἀξία) probably implies the same limitation.3 Though 
Aristotle does not mention exchange value specifically, it is clearly 
implied in his definition. ‘Things useful for the association of a 
state’’ and things ‘‘capable of accumulation”? must have exchange 
value, thus excluding illimitable utilities such as air and light.4 
His use of κτῆμα, “possession,” and his recognition of cost of pro- 
duction and economic demand as the main factors in determining 
value,’ are further evidence of this. Moreover, as seen above, 
in the Ethics, he clearly makes exchange value an attribute of all 
wealth.® 

From our comparison of the two definitions, then, it is evident 
that, though Aristotle is antithetical to Mill in putting the ethical 
interest first, and though his definition is not so scientifically 
specific, yet the two agree in recognizing the qualities of materiality, 
exchange value, and possibility of accumulation as necessary 
attributes of wealth. We shall see below, also, that the Greek 
philosopher was the forerunner of the orthodox English economists 
in criticizing the common confusion of money with wealth.’ 

But, despite his grasp of the leading principles in the economics 
of wealth, he takes the same negative moral attitude toward wealth 
as does Plato, though his hostility is also directed primarily against 
the spirit that commercializes life and makes unlimited wealth the 
summum bonum. ‘To his mind, this idea that wealth is the sum of 

ii. 7. 1267b10 ff.; 1254016 f.; Rhet. i. 5. 1361012 ff. 

2 Pol. 1254a16ff.: κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν kal χωριστόν, similar to Walker’s 
term “‘transferability”’ (Pol. Econ., 3d ed.,p 5); cf. Mill, op. cit., preliminary remarks 
on the term. 

3 N. Eth. iv. 1. 1119626 f., cited on p. 84, n. 7. 

4 Cf. the discussion above on value; cf. Mill, op. cit., Book I, chap. iii, 3, on the 
quality of “‘storableness” as an attribute of wealth. Newman (Pol. of Ar., II, note 
to 1256626 ff.) asks if θησαυρισμός can be applied to slaves and cattle, and if the defi- 
nition can include land. These are all included; cf. n. 1, above. 

5S Pol. i. 9. 125706 and 14 f., and the discussion above of N. Eth. 1133a5 ff. 

Cin, 

; 7Cf. Smith, op. cit., IV, for criticism of this basal confusion of the mercantile 
theory. 


ARISTOTLE 87 


all goods is almost the necessary accompaniment of the possession 
of superfluous wealth, but it is especially characteristic of the new- 
rich (νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις). Yet Aristotle is too practical to be 
ascetic. He realizes that leisure (σχολή) is necessary for moral 
development and for good citizenship, and that this cannot be 
enjoyed except on a basis of sufficient wealth. A fair competency 
is therefore desirable for the best life,? for men should live not only 
temperately, but liberally.s Poverty produces civic strife and 
crime.* Wealth in the absolute sense (ἁπλῶς) is always good, 
though it may not always be fitted to a certain individual, or be 
properly used by him.’ Each, therefore, should choose what is 
good for himself, and use it accordingly.® All this sounds saner 
than the subjective notion of wealth taught by Plato. But right 
here is the secret of the difficulty as Aristotle sees it. Just because 
all external wealth is good in the absolute sense, the popular error 
has arisen that it is the final cause (αἰτία) of all happiness,’ whereas 
the actual relation of wealth to happiness is the same as that of the 
lyre to the tune. There can be no music without the intervention 
of the musician. External goods are therefore not of primary 
importance to life. The goods of the soul should be placed first,? 
for the virtues of life are not gained and preserved by material 
wealth, but vice versa, and the men of high character and 


t Rhet. B. 16. 1390-91. 

2 Pol. i. 8. 1256631 f.; N. Eth. i. 8. 1099a31-33, especially ἀδύνατον γὰρ 4 ov 
ῥάδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα; 110114 f., in the definition of the εὐδαίμων 
man. 

3 Pol. ili. 6. 1265a32f.: ἐλευθέρως: N. Eth. iii., chaps. 13-14 on σωφροσύνη, and 
iv, chaps. 1, 2, on ἐλευθεριότης and dowrla; but display of wealth is vulgar (iv. 2. 
1123¢19-22). Ruskin (Stones of Venice, VIII, 69 [ΝΟ]. X, 389]) refers to Aristotle on 
liberality. 

47 δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ Kal κακουργίαν. 

ὅν. I. 1129b3; so Mag. mor. B. 3. 1199b6-9, 14-35; cf. N. Eth. i. 8. 1098b31 fi. 
for a similar distinction between habit (és) and practice (χρῆσι) of virtue. 

Sy. τ, r129b4-6; cf. Pol. i. το. 1258a23-27 on the duty of the weaver or states- 
man; iv (vii). 15. 1334@36 f.; 13. 1332022 f. 

7 Pol. 1332025 f. 8 Pol. iv (vii). 13. 1332026 f. 

9N. Eth, i. 8. 1098b12-15; cf. Pol. 1323025 f.; Rhet. i. 5. 1360b25 ff.; also Mag. 
mor. A. 3. 1184b1-5 and Eud. Eth. ii. τ. 1218632. 

το Pol. 1323a40f.; cf. Jesus’ sentence, “Seek ye first,” etc.; cf. also 1323b19 f.; 
also pp. 24 ff., Plato. 


88 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


intelligence are most happy, even though their wealth is moderate." 
The common attitude of the money-maker that wealth is unlimited 
is contrary to nature.2 Genuine wealth cannot be unlimited,} since 
external goods are strictly defined by their utility for a certain 
thing. Excessive wealth thus either harms the owner, or is, at 
least, useless to him.* Neither can wealth be rightly made the 
summum bonum, for it is really not an end at all, but only a collec- 
tion of means to an end (ὀργάνων πλῆθος). δ The inevitable result 
of making it the end and measure of all is moral degeneration.® If 
the highest interests of life are to be preserved, it must always be 
kept subservient. First things must be placed first, both by the 
individual’ and by the state.’ 


PRODUCTION 


It is often asserted that Aristotle denied the very existence of 
a problem of production.? This statement has been based pri- 
marily on certain passages in the Politics. These passages, how- 
ever, are not a denial of the importance of production. Their 
purport is merely to show that the chief aim of life is not to produce 
or to provide wealth, but to use it for the advancement of life’s 
highest interest. From this standpoint, both acquisition (κτητική) 
and production (ποιητική) are subordinate arts. So far is Aris- 

t Pol. 13230, 1-6. 

2N.Eth.i. 5. τορόας f.: ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιος rls ἐστιν. Cf. also Pol. 1256b28- 
32, discussed above, and i, chaps. 8 and 9, discussed under exchange. 

3.0 Ὁ πὶ 2: 4 Pol. 1323b7-11, and discussion above. 

51256636; N. Eth. i. 5. 1906a6f.; χρήσιμον yap καὶ ἄλλου χάριν; 7. 1097027: 
δῆλον ws οὔκ ἐστι πάντα τέλεια. 

6 Pol. i. 9. 1258a2 ff.; cf. also Mag. mor. B. 3. τ2οοα-ὦ. 

7 1258a10-14, similar to Plato Rep. i on the arts and their function; cf. a similar 
passage from /socrates (Paneg. 76) on the virtues of the Persian War heroes. 

8 Pol. iii. 9. 1280a25-32; the chief ambition of a state is not τῶν κτημάτων χάριν, 
but εὖ ζῆν. Cf. above on the similar preachments of Plato, for their relation to 
modern economic ideas and conditions. Cf. Plato Crito 48B: οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου 
ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. 

9 Cf. Souchon, of. cit., p. 69; for Greek terms for production, cf. p. 66 and notes. 

10 ἢ 10. 1258a19-38; 4. 125407: ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησίς ἐστιν. 

™ το, 1258033 ff., THs ὑπερετικῆς, impossible for the economist, but true, for the 


moralist; cf. p. 69 for his distinction (1254a1 ff.) between ὄργανα ποιητικά and κτῆμα 
πρακτικόν. 


ARISTOTLE 89 


totle from giving no place to production, that a later chapter 
of the Politics is devoted to the consideration of the scheme of 
supply, including production. To be sure, he does not lay much 
emphasis on genuine production in his enumeration. Industry is 
barely mentioned, while agriculture is discussed in detail. His 
“free-holder’’ is a consumer of the gifts of nature, rather than a real 
producer.” He classifies the truly productive employments that 
work for themselves (αὐτόφυτον) as those of the nomad, the farmer, 
the brigand, the fisherman, and the hunter, and makes those that 
live by barter (ἀλλαγῆς) or trade (καπηλείας) parasitic. 

In another passage, finance, strictly defined (οἰκειατάτη), is 
limited to all forms of agriculture, and even the hired labor (μισ- 
θαρνία) of industry is included in unnatural finance.‘ Aristotle 
has thus often been compared to the physiocrats, who distinguished 
between creative and parasitic classes of workers, upheld the 
“natural”? order as the ideal, and eulogized agriculture and the 
“extractive” industries as the only productive ones. As Souchon’ 
has observed, however, the resemblance is only superficial. Yet 
the fact that he fails to see that exchange is productive of a time 
and place value, and the fact that he includes hired labor, skilled 
and unskilled, among the unnatural activities, are sufficient evi- 
dence that he had only a superficial grasp of the principles of pro- 
duction. But the frequent assertion that he includes brigandage 


tj, 2.; on both the above, cf. Newman, op. cit., in loc. 


2Cf. especially 1258034 ff.: μάλιστα δὲ, καθάπερ εἴρεται πρότερον, det φύσει τοῦτο 
ὑπάρχειν. Cf. Susemihl and Hicks, Pol. of Ar., I (1894), Intro., p. 30. 


31256040 ff., αὐτόφυτος, “self-existent,” with ἐργασία, as here, equals avroupyla, 
“agriculture.” 

4 1258b9-27. 

50}. cit., pp. 96, οὗ f., n. 1; cf. Haney, op. cit., p. 47; Kautz op. cit., p.138; 
Ingram, op. cit.,p. 18. The physiocrats thought that commerce and industry increased 
the value of raw materials only enough to pay for labor and capital expended. Com- 
merce was an expensive necessity, a tax on agriculture. For a good summary, cf. 
Haney, pp. 138 ff. Quesnay (Tableau Econ. [1776}) followed Xenophon (Econ. v. 17) 
ashis motto. But the motive of the physiocrats was economic, not moral and political, 
as was that of Aristotle. 

6 Pol. 1258b21 fi.; probably implied also in 1256a40 ff.; but cf. vi (iv). 4. τζοτα- 
1 ff., where the mechanic and hired laborer are counted among the necessary parts of 
the state. 


go GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


and war among the productive arts is unwarranted, for he classifies 
them only among the acquisitive means." 

Aristotle almost outdoes Plato in his subordination of all pro- 
duction to ethics, though he keeps their respective aims more 
distinct. According to him, the productive arts are not ends in 
themselves. They are means to the supreme end of the moral 
life, whose first interest is not in production, but in right action.? 
As seen in our discussion of Plato, such a doctrine is not fruitful, 
economically. If interpreted too rigidly, it stifles commerce and 
industry. Yet, at bottom, it holds a great truth which modern 
economists are emphasizing—the fact that wealth and production 
alike must be subordinated to the general individual and social 
good. Moreover, the philosopher should not be interpreted in too 
hard-and-fast a manner. Barker is extreme in his statement that 
the economic theory of Aristotle is a mere treatise on ‘‘the ethics 
of family life” and that “the fundamental characteristic of his idea 
of production is a reactionary archaism, which abolishes all the 
machinery of civilization in favor of the self-supporting farm and 
a modicum of barter.’ Bonar’s assertion is also unwarranted, 
that “Aristotle thinks it beneath the dignity” of his discourse to 
give the practical details of agriculture and industry “more than 
a cursory notice.’’4 Such details were not germane to the plan of 
his work, and would certainly be considered out of place in a modern 
general text on economics. Aristotle’s economic doctrine, as a 
whole, is certainly far broader in scope than the family, and, while 
based upon ethics, is something more than an ethical treatise. As 
seen above, he recognizes the necessity of a moderate acquisition 
of wealth, both for the prosperous state and for the virtuous man, 
and demands only that the human interest be put first.5 


* 125640 ff.; 1256b23f. To him, production is a branch of acquisition. Cf. 
p. 28, on Plato’s use of the terms. 

2 1258a19-38; 125407, cited on p. 88, n. το. 3 Op. cit., pp. 358, 375 f. 

4 Op. cit., p. 39, on the basis of Pol. 1258634 f.: τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι 
χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς Tas ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. φορτικόν may mean 
merely ‘‘tiresome,”’ not “vulgar.” 

sCf. Zmave, Archiv., etc., p. 431; cf. passages cited infra, on the attitude of 
Aristotle to labor; cf. vi (iv). 4. 1291a1 ff., especially ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας 
ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι. 


ARISTOTLE gt. 


Agriculture.—Of{ the factors that enter into production, Aris- 
totle is, like the other Socratics, most interested in natural resources. 
He emphasizes especially the agricultural life. To his mind, it is 
the only true foundation of ‘“‘natural finance,” since the financial 
means should be provided in nature herself. Natural finance 
(οἰκειατάτη) is made to include only a proper knowledge of the care 
of land, cattle, bees, fowl, and other natural resources.2 It is 
natural, since it does not earn at the expense of others, as do retail 
trade and other methods of false finance. Aristotle also reveals 
his interest in agriculture by giving a bibliography of the subject. 
He names Charetides of Paros, Apollodorus of Lemnos, ‘‘and 
others on other branches”’—a hint that many such works on practi- 
cal economics may be lost to τι5.: However, his interest, even in 
this primary industry, is not of a practical nature, like that of 
Xenophon. He relegates it to the non-citizen classes, along with 
commerce and the mechanical arts.4 

Capital—aAristotle is the only Greek thinker who has given 
a clear definition of capital. After defining the slave as an instru- 
ment (ὄργανον), in order to distinguish still more sharply, he differ- 
entiates between the two kinds of wealth—that which is used for 
consumption, and that which is employed for further production.‘ 
As an example of the former, he uses the bed and the dress, and of 
the latter the weaver’s comb (kepxis).° He points’ out that all 
wealth is produced for consumption, but that part of it is consumed 
indirectly in manufacture. Here is an approach to Adam Smith’s? 
definition of capital, as ‘‘that part of a man’s stock which he expects 
to afford him revenue.”’ Unfortunately, however, the Greek fails 
to pursue his distinction farther. The theme of his thought is, 
after all, not capital or production either, but the status of the slave, 
though, from his standpoint, the slave is capital. He proceeds 
with the very uneconomic assertion that life consists in action 


t Pol. 1258a34-38, cited on p. 80, n. 2. 2 1258b9-21. 

3 1014. 40 ff.; cf. Newman, op. cit., II, 204, on the statements of Varro De re 
rustica i. 1. 8 and Columella i. 1. 7 that Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote on agri- 
culture. Cf. also (Plato) Axiochus 368C. 

4 Pol. iv (vii). 9. 132921 f. 6 1254a2-4. 

5 y254a1 ff.; cf. pp. 68 and 88 for Greek terms. 7 Op. cit., ii, chap. i. 


92 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


(πρᾶξις), not in production (ποίησις), and concludes with the real 
goal of his argument, that the slave is an assistant (ὑπερέτης), or 
an animate instrument in the realm of action, not of production.’ 
The slave is therefore an instrument to increase the life or action 
of his master, who himself is not represented as a producer, but as 
a consumer of the present stock. Thus what bids fair to be a fruit- 
ful distinction ends in a denial of the primary importance of pro- 
duction. ‘The purpose of Aristotle is here similar to that in some 
passages of Ruskin’ and Adam Smith,‘ to emphasize consumption 
rather than production. 

In another passage, he repeats his definition of capital in differ- 
ent terms. Goods are classified as for ‘‘purposes of production” 
or for “‘mere enjoyment,”’> but here again no theory of capital is 
developed. Yet these two definitions are sufficient evidence that 
he advanced beyond his predecessors in his apprehension of the 
meaning of the term.® His division of production and finance, 
however, into the natural or limited, which deals only with natural 
resources,’? and the unnatural, which is unlimited, and includes 
commerce, usury, and even industry,’ reveals a mind neither greatly 
interested in capital, nor clear as to its true economic importance. 
His assertion in the Ethics® that the prodigal (ἄσωτος) benefits many 
by his reckless expenditures, and that parsimoniousness (ἀνελευ- 
Gepia) is a worse evil than prodigality also shows that he did not 
sufficiently emphasize the importance to society of economy, the 

τ Pol. 125407; cf. p. 88, n. το. 

2 Pol. 1254a8 ff. He thinks chiefly of the domestic slave. 

3 Unto This Last, p. 61, an unjust criticism of Mill; zbid., IV, 78: “ Production 
is primarily for the mouth, not for the granary.”’ 

40}. cit., IV, chap. viii: “Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all 
production; . . . . and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so 
far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.” 

5 For reference and Greek terms, cf. p. 68. 

6 For his term ἀφορμή, cf. p. 68,n. 8, and infra. It probably was a mere business 
word to him. DuBois (op. cit., p. 38) thinks that he had a very clear idea of its 
significance. 

7 Pol. 1258b12-21; cf. 1258437 1. 

ὃ Tbid. 21-27, and entire chaps., 8-11. For terms, cf. infra. 

9iv. 1121429; 1122a14f.; cf. the stress on δόσις and χρῆσις rather than on 
κτῆσις and λῆψις, 1120a8-13; b14-16, and Stewart’s notes, I, 323. 


ARISTOTLE 93 


mother of stored capital. On this point, Plato has the saner view,” 
and the extreme attitude of Aristotle is certainly not characteristic 
_ of the Greeks in general.? His failure to grasp the true theory of 
interest is a further evidence of his superficial apprehension of the 
function of money capital. He does not see, with Adam Smith, 
that money represents so much stored capital, potentially pro- 
ductive, and that “‘since something can everywhere be made by 
the use of money, something ought everywhere to be paid for the 
use of it.” In justice to him, however, it should be observed that, 
though he failed to see the importance of unlimited economic prog- 
ress through constant increase in the capitalistic stock, there is 
after all a sense in which he was right. There is a natural limit to 
just acquisition, and it is especially with the individual in relation 
to wealth that he is dealing. He is thus, with Plato, a forerunner of 
the present tendency in economics, which is inclined to set a limit to 
the amount that one can justly earn in a lifetime by his own work. 

Labor and industry.—Aristotle’s attitude to labor, the third 
factor in production, is similar to that of Plato, though he lays 
greater emphasis on the evil physical and moral effect of the 
“banausic”’ arts. They are defined as those that ‘‘render men 
unfit for the practice of virtue.’’> They not only cause the body 
to degenerate,° but, being ‘‘mercenary’’ employments, they also 

t Rep. 552B, discussed above. 

2 Souchon (oP. cit., p. 121) seems to think it was. 

3 Pol. 125868, but cf. p. 39 and znfra on this word τόκος, Cf. also Ar. Clouds 20; 
1285 ff.; A. Smith, op. cit., ΤΙ, chap. iv. 

4Souchon (0p. cit., p. 97) is hardly fair to Aristotle on this point, but cf. also 
p. 96, n. 1; cf. Ruskin, Time and Tide, XV, 81 (Vol. XVII, 388); Mun. Pul., Pref., 
21 (Vol. XVII, 144); ibid., VI, 139 (p. 264); ibid., 153 and note (p. 277), which cites 
Laws 743C, on the doctrine that the just are neither rich nor poor. 

5 Pol. v (viii). 2. 1337b8-11. The terms for mechanical labor are τέχνη, of ability 
through practice; δημιουργός, of one who works for the people, rather than for him- 
self or one other; βάναυσος, originally of work by the fire, but later the common term 
for mechanical labor, usually with a derogatory sense in the philosophers; cf. 
Bavavola, “vulgarity,” N. Eth. iv. 4. 1122031; βάναυσος, “vulgar man,” ibid. 1123019; 
Etymol. mag; Schol. to Plato Rep. 495E; Pollux i. 64. 50; Hesychius, 5.0. The 
Greeks did not clearly distinguish the finer from the mechanical arts; cf. Biichsen- 
schiitz, op. cit., p. 266; Pol. vi (iv). 4. 1291a1 ff., where all are included under 
βάναυσον. Cf. Cope-Sandys, Ar. Rhet., 2d ed., 1,9, 27, note. Cf. above, p. 33, ἢ. 7, 
for Ruskin’s attitude. 

6 Pol. 1337612; 1258b37. 


04 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


vulgarize the soul.t The occupations that require the most 
physical labor are the most “‘slavish.’? The life of artisans and 
laborers is mean (φαῦλος) and has no business with virtue. The 
citizen youth should be taught none of the illiberal pursuits of 
the tradesmen. No citizen should enter into industrial labor or 
retail trade, since they are ignoble (ἀγεννής) and hostile to virtue.S 
Even all the agricultural work must be performed by slaves, that 
the citizens may have leisure for personal development and for 
service to the state.® In addition to his other objections to retail 
trade and the arts, Aristotle considers them to be naturally unjust, 
since they take something from him with whom they deal.? Indeed, 
the productive classes have but slight recognition in his ideal state. 
They seem to be tolerated only as a necessary evil, and are in a 
state of limited slavery ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ δουλείαν. Virtue is 
even less possible for them than for slaves, and they lead a less 
tolerable life. All hired labor belongs to the category of ‘‘false 
finance”? which degrades individual and state alike. The state 
that produces a multitude of mechanics and but few hoplites can 
never be great.” 

Here we have the very antithesis of the modern commercial 
standpoint. However, the truth is not all with the moderns, for 
a highly developed commerce and industry and the general pros- 
perity of the mass of the people are not always necessarily coinci- 
dent. Moreover, it is hardly fair to interpret Aristotle too rigidly. 
He understood well the necessity of craftsmen and all other indus- 
trial workers to the state." The burden of his attack was directed 
against retail trade. Like Plato’s his prejudice had a moral and 
political root,” and was arrayed against the extreme application 


1 7337003ih. 4y (vill). 2. 1337b5-7. 
21258038 f. Siv (vil). 9. 1328b37-41; cf. iil. 5. 1277633 ff. 
3 vii (vi). 4. 1319@26-28. 6 1329a1; 1330025-31. 


71330a25-31; cf. also the pseudo-Econ. i. 2. 1343026 ff. 

8 i. 3. 1260a40 ff.; cf. infra for discussion of this idea. 

91258b25-27; Rhet.i. 9. 27, 1367a; ἐλευθέρου yap τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν. His 
entire argument for the slave as a mere “instrument” (cf. infra) shows the same 
attitude. Stewart (op. cit., II, 316) says that he failed to see that labor is “‘an essential 
function of the social organism, something καλόν and not merely dvayxaiov,”’ 

10 Pol, iv (vii). 4. 1326@22-24. 

τ 1328b19-23; vi (iv). 1291@1-3. 12132001; i. 11. 1258038 f. 


ARISTOTLE 95 


to labor, and against its false purpose, rather than against labor 
itself. He insisted that even intellectual work, when carried to an 
extreme, and pursued with the wrong aim, might become equally 
demoralizing.” 

Here is a doctrine which our modern age, that would place even 
education on a bread-and-butter basis, and that tends to kill 
initiative and vision by extreme specialization, might well con- 
sider. Even Latin literature, when taught as it too often is, merely 
as a syntactical grind to prepare teachers to pursue the same folly 
is no more one of the humanities than is industrial chemistry.’ 
Furthermore, Aristotle and Plato are doubtless right in their belief 
that a necessary extreme application to physical labor to earn the 
daily bread inevitably prevents mental and moral development 
and the proper performance of the duties of citizenship. And our 
modern democracies with their boasts of universal suffrage are 
still something of a farce, as long as economic conditions are such 
that the mass of the population has left no time to think of any- 
thing, except how to provide the bare physical necessities. Aris- 
totle’s insistence upon leisure for the life of the citizen is no demand 
for aristocratic indolence.s Neither is it Jowett’s “‘condition of 
a gentleman,” or merely the idealized notion of an “internal 
state” in which “‘the intellect, free from the cares of practical life, 
energizes or reposes in the consciousness of truth.” It is rather 
a demand for release from material cares, so as to insure the highest 
degree of activity in self-development and political service.‘ 

It may well be observed too, that Aristotle, the special champion 
of slavery, and reputed scorner of physical labor for freemen, 
exhibits a real interest in industry, in unguarded moments. One 


ty (viii). 2. 1337b15-22, especially 17 f.: ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος 
ἕνεκεν πράττει τις ἢ μανθάνει. 

2 The difference in employments and studies is largely one of method and aim. 
The most humanizing pursuit becomes ἀνελεύθερον and βάναυσον, if followed to an 
extreme or with a sordid purpose, merely. Cf. Plato Laws 918B-g19C, and the 
criticism of the superficial method and merely vocational motive in mathematical 
study (Rep. 525C ff.). Cf. above, p. 33, n. 7, for Ruskin’s idea on this point. 


3 Aristotle also has the aristocratic idea of labor as robbing a freeman of his 
independence, Pol. v (viii). 1337b15-22; Rhet. 13674, cited on p. 94, N. 9. 

4 Pol. iv (vii). 9. 1328b39 ff.; N. Eth. x. 7. 117764; cf. Jowett, Ar. Pol., I, 144, 
cited by Stewart, op. cit., 11, 446. 


96 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


of his arguments against communism is that it would take from the 
citizen the desire to work.t | He repudiates the life of indolence, 
and finds happiness in action.?. He considers a practical knowledge 
of agriculture as essential to the successful economist,3 and defines 
the just as those who live upon their own resources or labor, instead 
of making profit from others, especially the farmers, who live from 
the land which they cultivate.4 We have seen above also that he 
makes labor one of the prime factors that determine value, and 
thus the most important element in production.s Moreover, he 
shows that he has a practical grasp of the importance of productive 
employment for the citizens of a democracy. He advises the rich 
to furnish plots of land (γήδια) to the poor, from the public revenues, 
or else that they give the poor a start (ἀφορμή) in other business, 
and thus turn them to industry.® 

On the division of labor, Aristotle adds little to Plato’s and 
Xenophon’s theory. He agrees with Xenophon against Plato that 
it implies a necessary distinction between the work of men and 
women.’? He also applies the principle more extensively, so as to 
include all nature, whereas Plato seems to limit its application to 
man. Nature (ἡ φύσις) he observes, does not produce things like 
the Delphian knife, in a poverty-stricken manner (πενιχρῶς) to 
serve many purposes, but each for a single purpose (ἕν πρὸς ἕν) 
Like Plato, he makes the principle of reciprocity (τὸ ἴσον ἀντιπε- 
πονθός). out of which the division of labor arises, the saving element 
in the state.2 He is also fully as emphatic in his application of the 
law to politics and citizenship.” 


t Pol. il. 3. 1261b33-38. 2 1325a3 1-33. 3 1258b1 2-20. 

4 Rhet. ii. 4. 9. 1381a, where the word αὐτουργοί is used; cf. above on Euripides. 

5 Cf. above on value, and NV. Eth. v. 8-9. 1133a5-18. 

6 Pol. vii (vi). 6. 1320038 ff.; cf. p. 92, n. 6. 71. 12. 1259br fi. 

δ 125261 ff.; cf. Adam’s note to Rep. 370B; Susemihl and Hicks’s note to Pol. 


1252b3, for an exception to the rule (De part. Anim. iv. 6. 11. 683a22). ἀλλ᾽ ὅπου μὴ 
ἐνδέχεται καταχρῆται τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλείω ἔργα. 


9 Pol. ii. τλότα3ο ἴ.; N. Eth. v, 5. 

τὸ Pol. 1261437-39; 1328) ff. Fontpertuis (0p. cit., p. 359) accounts for the com- 
parative superficiality of the Greek theory of labor by the fact that their political 
constitution diminished its importance, but cf. our introduction. Capitalistic employ- 
ment of free labor was probably not extensive. 


ARISTOTLE 97 


SLAVERY 


We have seen that the references to slavery in Xenophon and 
Plato are incidental, and reveal a certain unconscious naiveté as 
to the actual social problem involved. By Aristotle’s day, how- 
ever, the criticisms of the Sophists had shaken the foundations of 
all traditional institutions, and their thesis that slavery is con- 
trary to nature had become through the Cynics a prominent social 
theory., The thought on the subject had crystallized into two 
leading doctrines—one including benevolence in justice, and hence 
denying the right of slavery; and the other identifying justice 
with the rule of the stronger, and hence upholding slavery as based 
on mere force. The practical Aristotle, an upholder of slavery, 
not from tradition, but through conscious belief in its economic 
necessity, thus takes his stand midway between the two opposing 
theories. He champions the old view of natural slavery, but 
rejects the basis of mere force for that of morality and benevolence. 
His thesis is that slavery is a natural and necessary relation in 
human society, not accidental or conventional. The slave, being 
property, which is a multitude of instruments (ὀργάνων πλῆθος), 
is an animate instrument (ὄργανον ἔμψυχον) conducive to life (πρὸς 
ζωήν). He is just as necessary to the best life of the citizen as are 
inanimate instruments, and will be, until all tools work auto- 
matically, like the mythical figures of Daedalus or the tripods of 
Hephaestus.5 The slave is a servant in the realm of action (rpaéts), 
not of production (ποίησις). He is not a producer of commodities 


«Cf. above, p. 16, ἢ. 6; p. 17,0. 1. 


20On the theory of the Sophists, cf. above, pp. 16f. On the Cynics, cf. infra; 
also Zeller, op. cit., ΤΙ, 2, 376; Ar. Pol. 1253b20-23. Barker (op. cit., p. 359), who has 
a very clear and discriminating criticism of Aristotle’s theory of slavery, also states 
that slavery had been attacked by the “logic of events’’—e.g., the enslavement of 
Athenians in Sicily, and the freeing of Messenian Helots, during the Theban suprem- 
acy, by which Greek freemen had become slaves and Greek slaves had become free. 
Cf. Pol. 12550 ff., especially 17 f. and 21-23, for the two theories. 


3The locus classicus for his theory is Pol. i. 4-7. 1253b14 ff.; 13. 1259b21 fi. 
For good criticisms, cf. Wallon, Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité, 2d ed., pp. 372 ff.; 
and Barker, op. cit., 1. Cf. also Newman, op. cit., I, 143 ff. 

4 Pol. 1: 8. 1256636; 1253532. 

5 Ibid. 33-39. Aristotle would have been satisfied with electricity. 


98 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


(ποιητικός), but of services (πρακτικός), and just as property is 
merely a part or member (μόριον) belonging wholly to something 
else, so the slave, as property, belongs entirely to his master, and 
has no true existence apart from him.? From these facts, the 
whole’ nature and power of the slave are evident. One who, 
though a human being, is merely property is a natural slave, since 
he is naturally not his own master, but belongs to another, in 
whom he finds his true being. As Barker has observed, this con- 
clusion of the first part of Aristotle’s argument is inevitable if we 
admit his premises of the identity of “instruments” and property, 
but this is an unreal identity.4 ‘‘Natural’”’ (φύσει) is the saving 
word in his argument, but “human” (ἄνθρωπος) refutes it, as the 
philosopher practically admits later. 

He now proceeds to ask the question whether this “natural” 
slave of his hypothesis actually exists, for whom such a relation 
is just, or whether all slavery is contrary to nature, as some allege. 
He answers in the affirmative. The principle of rule and subjec- 
tion he declares to be a foundation law of all life.’ Men are con- 
stituted for either condition from birth, and their development 
follows this natural bent.° This law may be observed in inanimate 
things,’ in the natural subordinate relation of the body to the soul, 
of domestic animals to man, of female to male, of child to parent, 
and of subjects to rulers.2 Thus all who are capable only of 
physical service hold the same relation to higher natures as the. 
body holds to the soul, and are slaves by nature.? This is the only 
relation for which the slave is naturally fitted, since he can appre- 
hend reason without himself possessing it, being midway between 
animals and truly rational men.?? Usually also nature differen- 

* 125408, cited on p.88,n. 10. This relieves the severity of the doctrine, since it 


shows that he thinks chiefly of domestic slavery. But in his proposed state, all indus- 
try is manned by slaves. Cf. iv (vii). 1330@25-31. 

2 Pol. 1254a9-13; cf. Eud. Eth. 1241b17-24. 

3 1254013-17. 4Op. cit., p. 362. 

5 12544¢28-31; 1254615. As Wallon (op. cit., p. 391) points out, his radical error 
is a constant confusion of hypothesis with reality. 

6 12544a23-24. 7 Ibid. 33 1. 

8 Ibid. 30-40; 1254b10-13; 125367; 18 f., cf. Eud. Eth. 1241617 ff. 

9 1254b16-109. τὸ Thid. 20-26. 


ARISTOTLE 99 


tiates both the bodies and the souls of freemen and slaves, suiting 
them to their respective spheres and functions.! 

This relation of slavery, Aristotle argues, is not only natural 
and necessary, but also beneficial for those who are so constituted.? 
Just as the body is benefited by the rule of the soul, and domestic 
animals by the rule of man, so it is distinctly to the advantage of 
the “natural slave” to be ruled by a rational master. This is 
universally true, wherever one class of persons is as inferior to 
another as is the body to the soul. 

The philosopher’s frank admissions, in which he opposes the 
doctrine that slavery is founded on mere force, are fatal to his 
first argument on the natural slave. He admits that nature does 
not always consummate her purpose; that the souls of freemen 
are sometimes found in the bodies of slaves, and vice versa;* that 
it is difficult to distinguish the quality of the soul, in any event;5 
that the claim that slavery is neither natural nor beneficial has 
in it a modicum of truth, as there are sometimes merely legal slaves, 
or slaves by convention;® that slavery based on mere might without 
virtue is unjust;’? that captives of war may be wrongly enslaved; 
that only those who actually deserve it, should meet this fate; 
that the accidents of life may bring even the noblest of mankind 
into slavery; and that only non-Greeks are ignoble and worthy 
of it.% He even insists that the terms “slave-master,” “freeman,” 
“slave,” when rightly used, imply a certain virtue or the lack of it, 
and therefore that to be justly a master, one must be morally 


t Ibid. 26 ff. 2 1254021 f. 

31254b6-10; 11f.; 16-20; 1255b6-15; a doctrine emphasized by Plato, Rep. 
590D; Laws 645B, 714A, 818A, 684C, as also by Carlyle and Ruskin; cf. Shorey, 
Class. Phil., YX (1914), 355 ff. Though Ruskin believed that natural slavery was the 
inevitable lot of many men, he did not uphold negro slavery, Mun. Pul., v, 133 
(Vol. XVII, 256 f.); Time and Tide, p. 149 (Vol. XVII, 438). But he pointed to the 
white economic slavery as equally bad, Stones of Venice, II (Vol. X, 193); Time and 
Tide, p. 105 (Vol. XVII, 403); Crown of Wild Olive, 119; Cestus Aglaia, p. 55. 

41254b32-34; 125505 ἢ. 

5 1254b38 1. 7 Ibid. 19-21 and next note. 

6 12550a3-7. 8 Thid. 24 f. 

9Tbid. 25 f.: καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι. 


το Ibid. 26-28. πὶ Ibid. 33 ff. 


100 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


superior.t The question of the possession of the higher virtues 
by slaves is recognized by him to be a difficult problem, for an 
affirmative answer breaks down his distinction of ‘‘natural’’ 
slave, yet it seems paradoxical to deny these virtues to him as a 
human being.? Nor can the difficulty be avoided by positing for 
the slave a mere difference in degree of virtue, for the distinction 
between ruler and subject must be one of kind.s In any event, 
temperance and justice are necessary even for good slave service.* 
Aristotle therefore evades the difficulty, and begs the question by 
concluding that both master and slave must share in virtue, but 
differently, in accord with their respective stations. 

With this admission, he places slaves on a higher plane than 
free artisans, in that he denies virtue to such classes, since it cannot 
be produced in them, except as they are brought into contact with 
a master.° He thus makes slavery a humanitarian institution, 
and the slave a real member of the family.? But the admission 
most fatal to his theory is in agreeing that the slave gua man may 
be a subject of friendship,’ and in advocating his manumission 
as a reward for good behavior. With this, the attempted dis- 
tinction between him, gua slave and qua man, utterly breaks down, 
and the existence of natural slaves is virtually denied.2 Thus the 
great champion of slavery in the ancient world, by his very defense 
of it, repudiates its right as a natural institution. His actual 
conception of the relation is, indeed, not far from the ideal of Plato, 
a union for the best mutual service of rulers and ruled, in which 

'1255b20-22. Barker (op. cit., p. 369, n. 1) well observes that this is a challenge 
of the right of slavery, not an argument for it, and that it may have impressed his 
contemporaries so. Cf. Ruskin: ‘‘So there is only one way to have good servants; 
that is to be worthy of being well served” (Letters on Servants and Houses, Vol. 
XVII, 5-18, App. V); cf. also pp. 520 ff. 

2 1259026-28. 3 Ibid. 36-38. 4 Tbid. 39-41. 

5 1260a2-4; 14-16; cf. 33 ff., which sets a limit on the slave’s virtue. 


6 1260a39-42; 1260b2f. Cf. Ruskin, Fors Clav., III, Letter 28, 14, on the virtue 
of the “menial” condition. 

7Cf. Barker, op. cit., p. 370. 

*N. Eth. 1161b1-10, especially 5: 3 μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὔκ ἐστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἣ δ᾽ 


ἄνθρωπος. 


9Cf. his reference to Cleisthenes’ gift of Athenian citizenship to many slaves; 
also his own emancipation, by will, of five of his own slaves (Diog. L. V. 1. 9). 


ARISTOTLE IOI 


the slave receives from his master a moral exchange value for his 
physical service." 

There is a certain economic and moral truth, also, in the attitude 
of Aristotle toward slavery, that, as Ruskin has observed,? higher 
civilization and culture must have a foundation of menial labor, 
and that the only justification of such a situation is in the assump- 
tion that some are naturally fitted for the higher, and some for the 
lower, sphere. Such modern laborers are not technically slaves, 
but Aristotle would insist that they are in a still worse condition, 
since they are deprived of the humanizing and moralizing influences 
of a rational master. The plausibility of such a contention would 
be well illustrated by the wretched condition of multitudes of 
negroes after the Civil War, as also by the hopeless life of a large 
portion of the modern industrial army. Moreover, the economic 
slavery of many of the common toilers today is less justifiable than 
the domestic slavery advocated by Aristotle, for it too often means 
a life of indolence and self-indulgence for the masters, instead of 
that Greek leisure which gave opportunity for higher activity.‘ 


MONEY 


To the theory of money Aristotle makes a substantial contri- 
bution. He agrees with Plato that money found its origin in the 
growth of necessary exchange, which in turn resulted from an 
increased division of labor. Unlike Plato, however, he gives 
a detailed history of the development of money.’ Before its 
invention, all exchange was by barter. But with the growth of 
commerce, barter became difficult, and a common medium of 


τ Cf. Barker, op. cit., p. 370. 

2 Sesame and Lilies, end of lecture on “‘Kings’ Treasuries”; cf. Fors Clav., VII, 9 
(Vol. XXIX, 230); Mun. Pul., 130, note; cf. Fors Clav., III (Vol. X XVII, 515 f.). 
Lett. 28, 13 ff., on the workman as a serf. 

3 Barker, op. cit., 368. 

4 On the servile condition of the modern laborer, cf. Ruskin as above; a common 
idea also of Carlyle and of many modern economic writings. 

5 Pol. 1257031 ff., praised for its exactness and insight. Cf. Poehlmann, op. 
cit., I, 585; Dihring (op. cit., p.23) belittles it. Newman (op. cit., II, 184) points 
to ξενικωτέρας as implying that the increased distance between buyers and sellers 
also caused the origin of money. 

6 N. Eth. v. 5.1133026-28. 


102 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


exchange was agreed upon. Something was chosen that was 
a commodity, having intrinsic value (ὁτῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὄν) and 
that was easy to handle (εὐμεταχείριστον) in the business of life 
such as iron, silver, or other metal.? It was first uncoined, defined 
merely by size and weight.3 Finally, to avoid the inconvenience, 
it was given a stamp (χαρακτήρ) representative of the quantity 
(σημεῖον τοῦ πόσου). Thus arose the use of money as a convenience 
in necessary exchange, but once having arisen, it became the 
foundation of false finance and retail trade, which are pursued as 
a science of gain. All this accords well with the facts as now 
accepted, yet how utterly different is Aristotle’s standpoint from 
that of the modern historian of economic institutions is revealed 
by his last statement, and indeed by the setting of the entire passage. 
His history of money is merely incidental to his purpose of showing 
that money is the parent and the very life of the false finance 
which he decries. 

He is also more explicit than the other Greek theorists on the 
function of money. He clearly recognizes the two functions noted 
by Plato,® but he deals with them in a much more detailed manner. 
His discussion grows out of his theory of distributive justice pre- 
sented in the Ethics.7_ Money was introduced as the exchangeable 
representative of demand (ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας), since diverse 
products must be reduced to some common denominator.? It is 
thus a medium of exchange, acting as a measure of all inferior and 
superior values, by making them all commensurable (συμβλητάλ)." 

« Pol. 1257a31-36; ξενικωτέρας yap γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰςἄγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς 
καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης 7 τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις, etc. 

2 7014. 36-38; εὐμεταχείριστον could mean “malleability,” but probably not, 
since he considers coinage to be an afterthought. 

3 7014. 38 1. 4 Ibid. 39-41. 5 1257b1-5. 

6 As a symbol of exchange (ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆϑ) it is a medium of exchange 
and a measure of value (Rep. 371B; Laws 742A-B, 918B). 

Tv. 8. 1133a18-1133028. 8 1133020. 9 Ibid. 5-19; 25; 27 Ἐν 1133b10, etc. 

© 1133d19-22, 25 f.; 1133016; 22; ix. 1164a1f.; Pol. 1258b1-5, μεταβολῆς χάριν; 
1257430 ff. Stewart (op. cit., I, 416 ff.) thinks that the author meant to apply the 
corrective (διορθωτικόν) function of justice also to money, in that it makes exchange 
more fair and uniform. As evidence, he points to N. Eth. 1131018 ff. and 1133a19-22, 
where the functions of justice and money are defined in similar terms. Cf. also his 
interesting remarks on the dianemetic function, which prompts exchange and dis- 
tribution. 


ARISTOTLE 103 


The other important function of money recognized is as a guar- 
anty (ἐγγυητής) of future exchange. It represents the abiding, 
rather than the temporary, need, and is thus a standard of deferred 
payments.t The importance of money in the fulfilment of these 
functions is great, in the opinion of Aristotle. The possibility of 
fair exchange, or indeed the very existence of organized society 
depends upon it.’ 

He is also clearer than Plato and Xenophon in his definition 
of the relation between money and wealth. He severely criticizes 
the current mercantilistic theory of his day, which identified 
wealth with a quantity of current coin (νομίσματος πλῆθος). He 
immediately follows this, however, with a more extended pres- 
entation of the opposite error of the Cynics, that money is mere 
trash (λῆρος), depending for its value entirely upon convention 
(νόμῳ). This theory, he points out, is based on the fact that, if 
money ceased to be recognized as legal tender, it would be useless; 
that it satisfies no direct necessity; and that one might starve 
like Midas, though possessed of it in superabundance.* 

Aristotle is here somewhat ambiguous as to his own attitude 
toward this doctrine. He fails to object that money does not 
necessarily become valueless when it ceases to be legal tender, and 
that a similar argument might be used to prove that clothing is 
not wealth. Instead, he uses the idea as a means of refuting the 
opposite error, which is more obnoxious to him, and on the basis 
of it he plunges into his discussion of the true and false finance.’ 
This, together with a passage in the Ethics, might point to the con- 
clusion that he agreed with the doctrine of the Cynics on money. 
He states that it was introduced by agreement (κατὰ συνθήκην); 
that, owing to this, it is called νόμισμα, because its value is not 
natural but legal; and that it may, at any time, be changed or made 

1 1133b10-13. 

2[bid. 15-18: οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, etc. 

3 Pol. 125708 f. 

41257b10-18; for the theory of the Cynics, ct. infra, especially on Eryxias. Cf. 
Newman, of. cit., II, 188, note, and his reference to Macaulay’s note on the margin 
of his edition of the Politics. 

5 1257b19 ff.; cf. the transitional sentence, 18, a slight hint that he accepts the 
theory. 


104 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


useless.t In the light of other evidence, however, it seems probable 
that he here meant to emphasize merely the fact that the general 
agreement of a community is necessary before anything can be 
used as a symbol of demand. In stating that it may be made 
useless, he probably referred to money itself, rather than the 
material of it, which is, of course, true. His determined oppo- 
sition to the mercantile theory of money, as the basis of false 
finance, caused him to appear to subscribe to the opposite error. 
That, in actual fact, he did recognize the necessity of intrinsic 
value as an attribute of money is clearly evidenced by another 
passage, where he specifies it. He says that the material chosen 
as money was a commodity and easy to handle. This can mean 
only that it is subject to demand and supply, like any other object 
of exchange. This inference is substantiated by another passage, 
which declares that the value of money fluctuates, like that of other 
things, only not in the same degree. Moreover, in his enumeration 
of the diverse kinds of wealth, money is regularly included.* It 
seems evident, therefore, that he did not fall a victim of either 
error, but recognized that, though money is only representative 
wealth, yet it is itself a commodity, whose value changes with 
supply and demand, like other goods.’ Since he understood the 
use of money as a standard of deferred payments, he also saw 
clearly the necessity of a stable monetary standard.® 

Though Aristotle defines money as representative wealth, like 
Plato, he fails to apprehend its meaning as representative, and 
therefore productive capital.? In his eyes, such a use of money is 

tN. Eth. v. 5. 1133a29-31; cf. 1133b20f., ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. cf. infra, where the 
pseudo-Economica takes it for granted. 

2 Pol. 1257436 f., cited on p. 102. 

3.N. Eth. v. 5. 1133b13 f.: οὐ yap ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται - ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον, 

4 Cf. p. 86, ἢ. 1, for passages. 

5 Blanqui (op. cit., pp. 36, 88), Ingram (op. cit., p. 18), DuBois (op. cit., p. 51 and 
n. 1), Zmave (Zeitschr. f. d. ges. Staatswiss. [1902], pp. 761.), Palgrave’s Dictionary 
(art. ‘‘Aristotle,’’ p. 54), all admit this conclusion. Barker (op. cit., p. 380) says that 
the idea is hinted at. Souchon (op. czt., pp. 110 f.) accepts the other view, stating that 


this was his purpose, to show the folly of making merely imaginary goods the goal of 
all life. 


CONE ΕΝ: 5: τι 3013. 
7 Pol. 1257b5-8, and the whole of τ257ῦ; 1258b1-5. 


ARISTOTLE 105 


unjust and contrary to nature. He counts usury (τοκισμός) to be 
a large part of that false finance, which turns money from its true 
function to be made an object of traffic.1 Those who lend small 
sums at a high rate of interest are contemptible.?» and petty 
usury (ἡ ὀβολοστατική) is the most unnatural and violent form of 
chrematistik, since it makes money reproduce money.’ It is to be 
observed, however, that his criticism is directed chiefly against 
petty interest, and that he does not appear to be thinking of 
“heavy loans on the security of a whole cargo, but of petty 
lendings to the necessitous poor, at heavy interest.’”* Though 
his entire account of false finance exhibits an animus against 
the precious metals, as its basal cause, and as the source of indi- 
vidual and national degeneration,’ yet he clearly appreciates their 
necessary function in the state, and his hostility is actually 
directed against the spirit of commercialism. Money, the means, 
has usurped the place of the end, until domestic and public 
economy alike have come to mean only the vulgar art of 
acquisition.® 

The usual explanation of the fact that the Greek theorists 
failed to grasp the fact of the productive power of money is that 
loans were almost entirely for consumption, and hence seemed like 
an oppression of the poor.?’ This explanation, however, does not 
accord with the facts of Athenian life, at least for Aristotle’s day. 
It is clear from the Private Orations of Demosthenes that there 
did exist an extensive banking and credit system for productive 


17258025. 
2N. Eth. 1121b34: καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. Cf. Zell’s translation. 


3 Pol. 1258b1-8; but cf. p. 39 on this point. The etymology should not be taken 
seriously. Ruskin cites Aristotle on this point. Cf. above, p. 39, n. Io. 

4Cf. Barker, of. cit., p. 385 and n. 2, where he criticizes Poehlmann for his idea 
that Aristotle “is attacking a great credit system,’ and “is enunciating a gospel of 
socialism.” But cf. infra. 

5 Pol. 1257b5 ff. 

6 Ibid. 33 ff.; for further discussion of chrematistik, cf. infra. 

7 Cf. Haney, of. cil., p. 49: ‘In Athens, the circulation of capital was inconsider- 
able, and money was not lent for productive purposes as often as for the purpose of 
relieving distress’’; Souchon, op. cil., p. 93, though (pp. τοῦ f.) he recognizes the other 
side. 


106 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


purposes in the Athens of his time.* Moreover, the hostility to 
interest and credit was not the rule, but the exception, for Demos- 
thenes and not the philosophers should be accepted as voicing 
public opinion on this point. He considered credit to be of as 
much importance as money itself in the business world,? and 
declared one who ignored this elementary fact to be a mere know- 
nothing.’ Indeed, the money-lenders were, to him, the very 
foundation of the prosperity of the state.4 The prejudice of Plato 
and Aristotle represent merely the exceptional attitude of the 
pure moralist, who because of the questionable tactics of money- 
lenders, and the injustice and greed in some phases of contemporary 
business life, became critics of all money-making operations.$ 


EXCHANGE 


Aristotle, in both the Politics and the Ethics, deals at con- 
siderable length with the subject of exchange.® He states that it 
arose out of the natural situation (κατὰ φύσιν) and defines this 
as “the fact that men had more of some commodities and less of 
others than they needed.” At first, all exchange was by barter 
(ἀλλαγή) and there was no trading except for specific need. The 
development of an international commerce of import and export 
was made possible by the invention of money. It is this significant 
fact that furnishes the line of division between the old natural 


Cf. Paley and Sandys ed., especially Or. xxxvi; Isoc. Trapeziticus; Boeckh, 
op. cit., I, 160 ff.; V. Brants, ‘‘Les operations de banque dans la Gréce antique,” 
Le Muséon, I, 2, 196-203; Koutorga, Le trapézites, (Paris, 1859); cf. also E. Meyer, 
Kleine Schriften. 

2 On Ἀπ᾿ 25: 

3 Or. xxxvi, 44: εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι πίστις ἀφορμὴ τῶν πασῶν ἐστὶ μεγίστη πρὸς 
χρηματισμόν, πᾶν ἂν ἀγνοήσειας. 

4 Ibid. 57 ff. 

5 Cf. p. 105, n. 7, on Souchon; E. Boehm von Bawerk (Capital und Capitalzins, 
[1900] I, 17 f. says: “Die Geschiaftsleute und Praktiker standen sicher auf der zins- 
freundlichen Seite.”” He accounts for the fact that almost the only passages against 
interest are in the philosophers by the inference that to uphold interest was super- 
fluous, and to oppose it was useless. Poehlmann exaggerates both the degree of 
credit operations, and the prejudice of Aristotle. 

6 For the Greek terms, cf. p. 40. 

7 Pol. 1257a15-17 8 1014. 22-28; N. Eth. v. 5. 1133b26-28. 


ARISTOTLE 107 


economy and the era of commerce and finance, when exchange 
and money have become the tools for unlimited individual enrich- 
ment.* 

His theory of exchange and just price grows out of his appli- 
cation to exchange of his definition of corrective justice, as a mean 
between two extremes of injustice. Trade is just when each party 
to it has the exact equivalent (ἴσον) in value with which he began. 
Exchange is a mean between profit and.loss, which themselves 
have no proper relation to its true purpose. This does not mean 
that the traders must receive the same in return (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς 
κατ᾽ ἰσότητα), but an equivalent, or proportional requital (τὸ ἀντι- 
πεπονθὸς kar’ ἀναλογίαν). It is this fact of proportional requital 
that makes exchange, and indeed human society, possible.’ The 
meaning is illustrated by a proportion in which the producers bear 
the same relation to each other as their products. By joining 
means and extremes, the exchangers are brought to a basis of pro- 
portional equality (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον). Thus is deter- 
mined how many shoes, the shoemaker’s product, must be given for 
a house, the builder’s product, and the prices of the two commodi- 
ties are justly settled, with relation to each other.® It is very 
necessary for just exchange, that such proportional equality be 
effected before the requital or actual transfer takes place. Other- 
wise one will gain both superiorities (ἀμφοτέρας τὰς brepoxas), and 

t Pol. 1257030 ff. These two periods of οἰκονομική and χρηματιστικὴ correspond 
well to the German terms Naturalwirtschaft and Geldwirtschaft. Kautz (op. cit., p. 137, 
n. 4) says that this antithesis was about as clear to Aristotle as it is to moderns. For 
the terms, cf. infra. 

2N. Eth. v. 4. 1132b11-1133628; cf. also under value and money, above; cf. 


Mag. mor. i. 33. 1193b109 ff. 

3 1132b11-20; cf. Rep. 369B-C; 3708, for a similar idea of Plato. 

41132633. 

5 Ibid. 32-34, especially τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. 113306; τγῖ.; 
Stewart, op. cit., I, 440. 

6 1133a5-10, cited on p. 83, nn. 2-7; cf. Eud. Eth. vii. το. 1243628-38. 

7 1133a10 f. 

8 Cf. p. 83, n.7. The less valuable product must make up in quantity what 
it lacks in quality. The proportion thus becomes, γεωργός : σκυτοτόμος : : x pairs 
of shoes : a quantity of grain of equal value (1133a32f.). Cf. other methods of 
statement, 11334 f., 22 f.; Stewart, op. cit., I, 453 f. 


108 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


equality becomes impossible,’ since the cost of production of things 
is very diverse.2. Indeed, the arts themselves could not exist, 
unless the advantage to the consumer were similar in quantity 
and quality to the cost to the producer. , 

The common element in diverse products that makes them 
commensurable is need, or demand (ἡ χρεία), for reciprocal services.* 
But on the basis of the need of the moment, or under the régime of 
barter, just exchange would be practically impossible, since the 
concrete needs of A and B, at any given moment, are not likely to 
correspond. In such a case, exchange would be a gross disregard 
of the cost of production. This has been avoided by the intro- 
duction of money as a substitute for demand,5 a symbol of general, 
rather than specific need. Thus just exchange becomes possible, 
for money, as the representative of general need, is always equally 
in demand by all, and, as the common denominator of value, it 
alone renders it possible for proportional amounts of each product 
to be exchanged.°® 

Aristotle’s basal premise in this theory of fair exchange, that 
unless an equal quantum of value is received by each party, one 
must lose what the other gains, has been severely criticized by 
Menger.? He objects that the determining consideration in 
exchange is not the equal value of exchanged goods. On the con- 

 113301-4. 

21133011 f.; 16-18: ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων. Cf. Rep. 369C, 370B; Ar. Pol. 1261022 
for a similar idea. Stewart (op. cit., I, 464 1.), following Jackson, interprets, on the 
basis of 1132a33, the buyer’s two advantages to be, if he buys too cheaply, the part 
of the article still unpaid for, and the money he should have paid for it. Cf. zbid. 
pp. 455-67 for other interpretations. 

31133015 f.: ἀνῃροῦντο yap ἄν, εἰ μὴ <d> ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ 
πάσχειν ἔπασχε τοῦτο και τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. I follow Jackson, note, pp. 97 f.; Rassow, 
Forsch., p. τὸ (Peters’ trans., p. 154, n. 2), in accepting this difficult passage as an 
integral part of its context, and in interpreting it as above, though aside from the 
context, it would hardly bear this meaning. Stewart (op. cit., I, 455 ff.) thinks it is 


an interpolation or note, referring merely to the mechanical fact in the arts that 
material is receptive to the impression. 


41133018 f.; 25-28; 1133b6-8; 19 f.; cf. Rep. 369C. 

5 1133a19-29; cf. Stewart’s excellent comments, op. cit., I, 450 ff. 

ὁ 1133b14-16; 20-22: Τοῦτο yap πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα: e.g., if a house is equal 
to five minae and a bed is worth one, five beds equal one house (23-26). 

7 Handworterbuch der Staatswwissenschaft, art. “Geld,” 2d ed., Bd. IV, 82 f. 


ARISTOTLE 109 


trary, men trade only when they expect to better their economic 
condition. ‘‘Um ihres economischen Vortheils willen, nicht um 
gleiches gegen gleiches hinzugeben; sondern um ihre Bediirfnisse 
so vollstandig als unter den gegebenen Verhiltnissen dies zulassig 
ist zu befriedigen.” Each gives the other only so much of his own 
goods as is necessary to secure this end, and it is this competition 
in open market that fixes prices. Barker' also criticizes Aristotle 
on the ground that he takes no account of demand in his theory of 
just price. He states that if the cost of production were the only 
element to be considered, the doctrine might be correct, but with 
the entrance of demand, one may buy at a low price and sell at an 
advance without injustice. 

Of course, the bald theory that, in exchange, one necessarily 
loses what the other gains, is untenable. Yet there is still some- 
thing to be said for Aristotle. He recognized, as well as Menger, 
that exchange, as pursued by the retailers, did not square with his 
idea of just price. This is the very reason why he objects to retail 
trade. He is presenting exchange, not as it is, but as he believes 
it should be pursued. His doctrine, in a nutshell, is that the pri- 
mary purpose of exchange is profit, defined as economic satisfaction 
of mutual needs, not profit in dollars and cents. The equality that 
he seeks, too, is not so much an equality of value in obols and 
drachmas, but that each shall receive an equal quantum of eco- 
nomic satisfaction. This is the true standpoint at bottom, and 
when, as is common, the mere purpose of money-making domi- 
nates in the pursuit of exchange, the profit is too often at the 
expense of the other party. Such exchange certainly does not 
mean economic advance or general prosperity. It merely makes 
possible an increase in the inequalities of wealth and poverty. 
There is much of fallacy in the prevalent idea that business neces- 
sarily increases the wealth of a state. Ruskin, though like Aris- 
totle extreme and one-sided in his view, struck at the root of this 
error. He also declared that the result of exchange should be 
advantage, not profit, and repudiated the idea that the mere fact 
that goods change hands necessarily means general enrichment.’ 

* Op. cit., Ὁ. 384. 

2 Cf. citations above, p. 42, n. 7, and p. 44, n. 2. Cf. DuBois, op. cit., p. 46. 


IIo GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


The central truth in their protest needed to be spoken, though both 
erred in not sufficiently recognizing that the labor involved in 
exchange creates an added time and place value, and therefore 
has a right to be called productive. They also failed to observe 
the fact of the necessary risk involved in the business of exchange, 
which should be repaid with a fair additional profit. For the 
cornering of markets and the manipulation of prices, for the sake 
of individual enrichment, modern economists and statesmen, with 
Aristotle and Ruskin, are fast coming to have only words of protest. 

Moreover, contrary to Barker’s assertion, demand, as an ele- 
ment of price, is prominent throughout this discussion of Aristotle. 
He objects, however, to allowing the effect of demand to overcome 
unduly the cost of production, thus causing inequality and injustice. 
According to his idea, each receives the equivalent in value of what 
he gives, in the sense that it is a resultant of the proportionate 
influence of both cost and need.t We may, nevertheless, observe 
an excellent example of inconsistency in the fact that, despite his 
insistence upon just exchange, he appears to treat monopoly as 
a legitimate principle of finance for both men and states,? though 
his intention in the passage may have been to discuss actual con- 
ditions, rather than to idealize. 

Naturally, the philosopher shows no concern for a tax on 
imports as a means of building up the industry and commerce of 
his state, since he is especially desirous of limiting both. How- 
ever, he is not blind to the advantages of export and import trade 
for a nation,’ but would regulate them with an ethical, rather than 
an economic purpose. His doctrine of exchange as a form of 
production has been discussed above,’ and will be touched upon 
further in the following pages. His general criticism of what he 
terms ‘‘false finance” or “‘chrematistik”’ (χρηματιστική) remains 
for more extended treatment. 

We have seen that he recognizes the necessity of a limited form 
of exchange, free from the purpose of gain, and considers such 


τ Cf. Haney, op. cit., p. 48. 2 Pol. 1259a2 {.; 33-35. 3iv (vil). 6. 1327025-30. 

4 Rhet. i. 4. 7: wept τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων, as among the subjects for 
a statesman’s consideration; cf. also 11. 

5 Pp. 89 and notes. 


ARISTOTLE Tit 


trading to be natural and in accord with that interdependence 
which nature demands." He calls it the very bond of the social 
organization,? and even considers international commerce to be 
necessary for the prosperity of a state.3 We have also seen that 
he goes so far as to advise the rich in a democracy to give the poor 
a start in business,‘ but that exchange, in its prevalent form, is 
to him a method of cheatery, in which one gains what the other 
loses.5 

On the basis of this prejudice, he builds his argument for 
domestic economy (οἰκονομικὴ) as opposed to false finance.£ We 
will therefore consider his entire theory of this relation at this 
point, for the term ‘‘chrematistik,’’ though more inclusive than 
exchange (μεταβλητική), has trade in either goods or money (καπη- 
λική) as its predominating element, and the two terms are often 
used by him as synonyms. He employs the word χρηματιστική 
in several significations—usually of unnatural finance, or the art 
of money-making by exchange of goods or money; sometimes as 
synonymous with κτητική, the general term for the entire business 
of acquisition, including both natural and unnatural finance;’ 
again, of the natural finance, which is a part of domestic economy. 
His confusion results partly from his futile attempt to separate 
landed property from general industry and commerce. 

His main contention is that there is a vital distinction between 
domestic economy, whether of householder (οἰκονόμος) or states- 
man, and the art of acquisition or finance, as usually pursued. 

t Pol. 1257a28-30; vi (iv). 4. 1291a4-6; 1291b19 f.; vii (vi).7. 13216, all seem 
to take retail and wholesale trade in the state for granted. But it is not named in the 
list of necessary callings in the ideal state, 1328624 ff.; 5 ff.; cf. also 1329a40 ff. Of 
course the citizens are not to engage in it (1328b37 ff.). 

2 ΓΝ. Eth. v. 8. 1132b4 f.; 1133027; all of chap. 8; cf. above, on just exchange. 

3 Pol. iv (vii). 6. 1327@25-28. 

4 vii (vi). 5. 1320039: ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας. Cf. p. οὔ. 

5 Cf. discussion above of just exchange. 

6 Pol. i. chaps. 8-11. Ruskin does not seem to have used the term “chrematistik,’? 
and he has no reference to this passage, though, as seen above, he has much to say in 
the same general spirit. 

7 Pol. 1256a11 f.; cf. p. 400n Plato’s terms for trade. For the word X PNUAT LOT LK, 


cf. Rep. 415E, contrasted to soldiers; Gorg. 477E, the art that frees from poverty; 
452C; Euthyd. 3946, of the Sophists; Xen. Econ. ii. 18, where no prejudice is implied. 


rT? GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


The primary function of the art of finance is to provide, while that 
of domestic economy is to use what is provided.t There are, 
however, many methods of acquisition (κτητική; χρηματιστική), 
some of which truly belong to the sphere of domestic economy.? 
The provision of all that is furnished by nature herself, as neces- 
sary to human existence, then, if not already at hand (ὑπάρχειν), 
belongs properly to domestic economy.’ It both uses and pro- 
vides genuine wealth, such as is limited in amount (οὐκ ἄπειρος) 
yet sufficient for independence (αὐτάρκεια) and the good life.‘ 
But the use of such wealth is its chief business.’ The other kind 
of acquisition, which is unlimited, or chrematistik, is contrary to 
nature, and is not in the province of domestic economy.’ This 
unnatural finance, since it deals chiefly in the exchange of money 
and other commodities, may be termed retail trade (καπηλική) 1 
Though itself false, it is a logical outgrowth (κατὰ λόγον) of the 
true form of exchange that is limited to actual needs? as a result of 
the invention of money.’ But the real reason for its pursuit is to 
satisfy an evil and unlimited desire for material things.” It 
produces money merely through the exchange of money (διὰ 
χρημάτων μεταβολῆς," and its beginning and end is unlimited 
currency.” 


τ Pol. i. 8. 1256a10-12; but cf. NV. Eth. i. τ. τορ4αρ: τέλος οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος; 
and Pol. iii. 4. 1277624 f.: ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός: τοῦ μὲν yap 
κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν. An American economist would hardly make 
the latter distinction. Newman (op. cit., II, 166) thinks that in these two passages he 
states the actual condition, but cf. infra, where Aristotle admits a degree of acquisition 
in domestic economy. 

2 7256a15 fi. 3 1256) 26-39. 

4 Ibid. 30-37; cf. above on the definition of wealth. 

5 1258a19 ff. He would combat the common idea that the first business of eco- 
nomics is to provide unlimited revenue (1259a35; 12541 f.) 

ὁ 1256b40-42; 125704 f.; 17 f.; cf. Eud. Eth. iii. 4. 1232a6-9. 

25 70 Tits ΟἿ: 8 1257018 f., 28-30; 125719 f.; 31 ff. 

91257031 ff. Poehlmann (op. cit., I, 5909) cites Schaefle, Bau und Leben des 
sozialen Kérpers, 1, 256, that this analysis of the change from natural to capitalistic 
economy holds ‘‘im Kern die ganze moderne Kritik des Kapitals,” but the standpoint 
of the two is essentially different. 

 1258a1-14. Extreme desire demands superfluity (ὑπερβολή). 

SLIT 257020) he 12 7074: 22 ihe 


ARISTOTLE 113 


This false form of acquisition is often confused with necessary 
exchange, because both deal with money.t Their aims, however, 
are quite diverse. The latter treats the accumulation of money 
(αὔξησις) as a means, while the former treats it as the supreme end 
of life? In fine, then, Aristotle teaches that necessary chrematis- 
tik has to do with the supply and use of life’s necessities, is natural 
(κατὰ φύσιν or οἰκειοτάτη) and limited, its prime function being 
the proper disposal of products. It is an honorable pursuit, 
dependent chiefly upon fruits and animals,° and involves a practical 
knowledge of stock (κτηνή), farming, bee-culture, trees, fish, and 
fowl.?7 The false finance, on the other hand, is unnatural, dis- 
honorable, and enriches at the expense of another.’ Its chief 
business is commerce (ἐμπορία), including sea-trade (ναυκληρία), 
inland trade (doprnyia), and shop-trade, (παράστασις). It also 
comprises usury (τοκισμός) and hired labor, both skilled and 
unskilled (μισθαρνία ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τέχνων ἡ δὲ arexvGr).” 

Aristotle also distinguishes a third type of finance (χρημα- 
τιστική) which shares in the nature of both those above described. 
It deals with natural resources and their products, but with things 


t Ibid. 35 f. The two uses overlap (ἐπαλλάττει). 


2 Ibid. 36-39. 3 1258a16-18. 
4 1014. 19 ff. The other function is secondary (ὑπερετική). 
5 Ibid. 39 f. 6 [bid. 37 f. 7 1258b12-21. 


8 Ibid. τ f.; cf. 1256040 ff., where καπηλεία is opposed to αὐτόφυτον ἔχουσι τὴν 
ἐργασίαν. 

9 1258b20-23. 

το 7 ϊ]4. 25-27. This contrasted yet overlapping relation between the two kinds 
of finance is well represented by Haney, of. cit., 46, by two circles, as follows: 


consumption 


natural economy 


money-making 
by exc 





Cf. also Ashley, of. cit., p. 340, for a synopsis of the divisions of κτητική. 


114 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


which, though useful, are not fruits (ἀκάρπιμα), such as wood- 
cutting (ὑλοτομία) and mining in all its branches (ueraddevriKn).7 
The meaning may be best apprehended if, with Ashley,? we observe 
that οἰκονομική is characterized, not only by direct acquisition of 
nature’s products, but also by a personal use of the same, while the 
unnatural finance has neither of these qualities. The medium 
kind, then, is like the former, in that it involves direct acquisition 
of natural resources, but like the latter, in that it does not acquire 
for directly personal use, but for exchange. It consists, therefore, 
not so much in the arts themselves, as in the exchange that is based 
on them. 

In the discussion of the so-called false finance, Aristotle thus 
reveals a markedly hostile attitude to any extensive development 
of exchange. The middleman is considered to be a parasite and 
necessarily degenerate by the very fact of his business. As seen 
above, his criticism was doubtless directed chiefly against the mean 
and dishonest spirit in the actual retail trade and money-loaning ἡ 
of his day.4 Yet here also, just as in the Ethics passage above 
discussed, his prejudice blinds him to the fact that exchangers may 
be real producers, and that, after all, even the alleged false finance 
is not unlimited, but that it is distinctly bounded by economic 
demand.’ Still worse, he includes hired labor of every kind under 
unlimited acquisition, merely because it has some of the other 
qualities of that type of economy, though it certainly does not 
tend to unlimited enrichment even as much as agriculture.© How- 
ever, he should be given credit of being a forerunner of the modern 

1 1258b27-33. 

2 Op. cit., pp. 333 ff., more satisfactory than Jowett’s idea that the intermediate- 
ness consists either in exchange for money of the direct products of the earth, or else 
that wood-cutting and mining are themselves the intermediate form; or than New- 
man’s (op. cit., II, 202 f.) theory that it consists in the fact that in this type wealth is 
sought, not from fruits or animals, but from things, just as exchange seeks wealth from 
other men or from money, as Ashley shows. However, two questions still remain 
unanswered: why Aristotle has three forms in chap. 11 and only two elsewhere; and 


why the terms, ἀκάρπων, wood-cutting, and mining are so prominent, if their relation 
to the thought is only incidental. 


3 Pol. iv (vii). 1328639 ff.; 1327a29-31. 

4 This was a common Greek feeling (Dem. xxv. 46). 

5 But he seems to recognize it elsewhere (N. Eth. v. 8). 
6 Cf. DuBois, op. cit., Ὁ. 48. 


ARISTOTLE 115 


humanitarian economy, which insists that the final goal of all 
economics should be proper consumption, and that acquisition 


must be relegated to its true place as a means, the supreme end 
being human welfare.t 


POPULATION 


Aristotle exhibits an interest in the problem of population in 
relation to subsistence in his criticism of Plato for limiting the 
amount of property and making it indivisible, while failing to 
provide against a too high birth-rate2 He states the principle 
that, if property is to be limited, there must be a corresponding 
limitation on the increase of population,? and that the let-alone 
policy must be followed by increased poverty.‘ He therefore 
criticizes the Spartan law, for encouraging the largest possible 
families. It is evident, however, that, as in the case of Plato, his 
interest in the problem is prompted chiefly by a moral and political 
motive. It arises. merely from his desire to limit individual 
acquisition, in a small state, artificially constructed, and is to him 
in no sense a question of world food-supply.° 


DISTRIBUTION 


In the Ethics passage discussed above,’ Aristotle approaches 
a scientific theory of distribution. He observes that just distri- 
bution will be a mean between two extremes of unfairness.’ Unlike 
some moderns, however, he realizes that this will not mean 
equal shares for all. There must be the same ratio between the 
persons, or services, and the things.? In the ‘“‘mutual exchange of 


1 Cf. the entire criticism of chrematistik, and especially 1257b40-42, the contrast 
between ζῆν and εὖ ζῆν. On this point, cf. above, pp. τος f. and 87 ff. Zmave (Zeit- 
schrift, etc., p. 52), rightly states that even Adam Smith made his economic theory a 
subordinate part of his practical philosophy. 

2 An unfair criticism, as seen above. 4 1265b6-12. 

3 Pol. 1266b8-14; iv (vii). 1335022 ff. 5 1270040 ff. 

6 Cf. iv (vii). 4. 1326a25-30, especially, τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς 
οὐδεμίαν ὁρῶμεν οὖσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος, Cf. entire chapter. 

711300 ff.; cf. under value, money, and exchange. The terms are διανομή or 
ἡ τῶν κοινῶν διανομή. 

δ ΤΩΤΙ. 

9Tbid. 21: καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς. *Cf. above, pp. 55 f. and 6of., on 
Plato’s idea of equality; cf. infra for further comments on Aristotle. 


116 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


services,” the law must be proportional requital.t_ In other words, 
each should receive an equivalent to what he contributes.? Dis- 
tribution must thus proceed according to a certain standard of 
worth or desert (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν rwa).s Τί the individuals are unequal, 
their shares cannot be equal, and it is a prolific source of dispute, 
whenever equals receive unequal shares, or unequals receive equal.‘ 
On the other hand, Aristotle recognizes that it is a difficult matter 
to determine this standard, by which just distribution is to proceed.’ 
At this point, again, he shows clearly that his paramount interest 
in the problem is not economic. He names four possible stand- 
ards—freedom, wealth, noble birth, and general excellence—all 
of which are distinctly political in their reference.® 

Though he insists on a fair distribution of wealth to the citizens, 
he can hardly be said to exhibit as much interest in the welfare 
of the common people as does Plato. He had not a very ideal 
conception of human nature in general. He would have thought 
it not only impracticable, but undesirable to give his doctrine of 
leisure any extensive application. As seen above, he includes all 
hired labor under false finance, and relegates all industry, including 
agriculture, to the slaves and strangers. The life of mechanic 
and commercial alike is to him ignoble.? He advises that measures 
be taken to hold the workers in submission and obedience.’ His 
unfair criticism of Plato’s Republic, however, on the ground that 
it fails to emphasize sufficiently the welfare of the parts of the state, 
and that it does not distinguish clearly enough the status of the 
commons, reveals a spirit that does not entirely disregard the 
masses.2 His demand that no citizen shall lack subsistence,” his 

1 1132032 f.; cf. pp. 107 ff. and notes for a more detailed discussion, and for 
Greek expressions. 

2 1131b27-32: 7 διανομὴ ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα 
τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα. Cf. Mag. mor. i. 33. 1193036 ff. Stewart (op. cit., I, 432) says that 
the expression 7 τῶν κοινῶν διανομή, must mean more than distribution by some cen- 


tral authority, for the most important form of it is the distribution of wealth, oper- 
ating under economic laws that regulate wages and profits. 


3 1131a24-26. 6 [bid.; Pol. 111. 128007 ff.; 1282623 ff. 

4 1014. 22-24. For Plato, cf. pp. 55 f. 7Cf. above, pp. 113, and 93 ff. on labor. 
5 1014. 26-29. 8 Pol. li. 4. 126202 ΤῈ 

9 1264a11-17; 36-38; 1264b11~-13, all discussed above under Plato. 

iv (vil). 1329641 ff. 


ARISTOTLE 117 


provision of the swssitia for all, his insistence that, in the market, 
mere economic self-interest shall not rule,? and his emphasis on the 
importance of a strong middle class in the state,3 all show that, in 
the interest of the perpetuity of the state at least, he had some 
regard for the economic well-being of all classes. It would be 
wrong to infer from his suggestions for the aid of the masses in 
a democracy, that he would offer similar advice for the ideal state. 
Moreover, his chief emphasis in the passage is upon the idea of 
Mill, that mere hand-to-mouth help of the poor is wasteful, and 
that what is needed is to aid them to become economically inde- 
pendent. Nevertheless his suggestion does show that he saw 
clearly the relation that exists in a democracy between the eco- 
nomic condition of the masses and the stability of the states He 
says that the genuine friend of the people (ἀληθινῶς δημοτικός) will 
see that the masses are not very poor, for the best assurance of the 
abiding welfare of the state is the solid prosperity of the great 
majority of the population. He therefore advises the rich to con- 
tribute money for furnishing plots of land or capital for small 
business enterprises to the needy poor.® However, while the 
advice seems, on the surface, to favor the commons, it is really 
a prudent suggestion to the upper classes, appealing to their selfish 
interest to avoid by this method the danger of a discontented pro- 
letariat.’ Nevertheless, the general economic attitude of Aristotle 
would warrant including him, with the other Greek thinkers, in 
the statement of Roscher: ‘‘Die hellenische Volkswirtschaftslehre 
hat niemals den grossen Fehler begangen, tiber dem Reichtume die 
Menschen zu vergessen, und iiber der Vermehrung der Men- 
schenzahl, der Wohlstand der einzelnen gering zu achten.’* 

ΤΥ 20. 373 1272012—21. 

2N. Eth. v. chaps. 4-ς, discussed above. 3 Pol. vi (iv). 1295635 ff. 

4v (vi). 1320033 ff.; cf. pp. 95 f.; cf. especially 35: τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἃν 
εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος, and 126753 ff. on the insatiety of the masses. He believed 
hat the state doles for mere consumption aggravated the evil—a very sane doctrinet 
which our city charity organizations are prone to overlook. 

5 Cf. Poehlmann, oP. cit., II, 339 f., on this passage. 

6 Cf. above, n. 4 above, and pp. 95 f. 

71320036: ἐπεὶ δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, and 34, τοῦτο yap αἴτιον τοῦ 
μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν; viz., undue poverty of the masses. 


8 Op. cit.,p. 7; cf. Poehlmann, op. cit., I, 600, on this point. 


118 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Aristotle makes clear his attitude toward the institution of 
private property and other related questions, both in his criticism 
of other thinkers, and in his own positive suggestions for the ideal 
state. Through his objections to the systems of Phaleas and 
Plato, he has acquired the reputation of being the great defender 
of private property in Greece. We shall see the extent to which 
this interpretation of him is correct. Our consideration of his 
theory may be summarized under certain topics which are funda- 
mental to the problem of distribution. 

He admits that the doctrine of economic equality may have 
some wisdom in it.t The attempt to equalize possessions may 
tend slightly to prevent civic discord.? Yet it is liable to arouse 
sedition on the part of the exploited classes,3 and such relief meas- 
ures will satisfy the masses only for a time, for they are notoriously 
insatiate.4 In his opinion, therefore, the saner remedy is equalization 
of desires rather than of property,’ which must be realized by proper 
education and a right constitution, whereby the upper classes 
shall not oppress, and the masses shall be held in check. We have 
here still a valid argument against the more radical type of social- 
ism. It is suggestive of the modern doctrine of private property 
as a public trust,° and presents clearly the antithesis between the 
attitude of Greek thinkers and that of the modern social democracy.’ 

Aristotle argues further that equalization of property would be 
powerless to prevent anything more than the merely petty crimes, 
for the grossest ones are the result of inordinate desire, rather than 
of inability to provide life’s necessities.’ Moreover, there are 
many other natural inequalities of life what would remain to arouse 
discontent. This is a sensible observation that has often been 

Pol. ii. 7. 1266b14-25, as advocated by Phaleas; cf. above. Cf. infra for Aris- 
totle’s advocacy of equality in landed property. 

2 1267037-39. 3 Ibid. 39-41. 


41267b1-4; vii (vi). 1320@31; cf. p. 117 on this idea. He does not consider 
the rise in the cost of living. 


5 1266b28-30. 6 Cf. Bonar, op. cit., p. 45. 


7 Aristotle, like Plato, strongly emphasizes education as a great cure for the ills 
of the state (1310a@15 ff.). It should be common to all citizens, and be publicly 
supervised (1336022 ff.). 


8 1267a13-17. 9 1266b38-1267a2. 


ARISTOTLE 110 


overlooked by modern radical socialists, though its author might 
have objected further that such personal diversities would also 
render an abiding equality of property impossible. His previous 
argument, however, that immorality and crimes are the result of 
inordinate desire, rather than of economic need, might be answered 
today by the results of investigations upon the relation of wages 
to morality. 

The doctrine of communistic equality, as preached by some 
theorists in fifth- and fourth-century Greece, and as satirized by 
Aristophanes,’ had no appeal for Aristotle. It was, to him, merely 
a thinly veiled individualism. He saw through the selfish parti- 
sanship of both oligarchs and democrats, and recognized that all 
men are poor judges in matters that concern themselves.? The 
excessive individualism of the radical democrat of his day, which 
permitted the majority to confiscate the property of the minority 
in the name of a false equality, was as hateful to him as it was to 
Plato. As seen above, he insisted that economic or political 
equality should not be demanded, except on the basis of equality 
of service.4 Exploitation by the radical democracy was, in his 
eyes, as bad as the rule of a tyrant,’ and the ruthless individualism 
of the classes was no better.® Like Plato, he would oppose to both 
of these the common interest, and would unite both masses and 
classes in the aim to realize the highest moral life for the individual 
through the state.? He refuted the Sophist’s theory of social con- 
tract and of justice asa mere convention.’ As Stewart has observed 
he realized that “‘more powerful causes than the mere perception 

τ Ecclesiazusae. Poehlmann (op. cit., I, 403) argues that such ideas were wide- 
spread in Greece. 

2 Pol. iii. g. 1280a14-21: σχεδὸν δ᾽ of πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. Cf. 
7-31, his discriminating remarks on equality in general. 

3 vii (vi). 5; iii. 10; cf. Haney of. cit., p. 45. 

4 Cf. above on fair exchange; also p. 116 and notes. 5 vi (iv). 4. 1292a4-38. 

6 vii (vi). 3. 1318b1-5, especially of δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν; cf. iil. 9. 
1280a, especially 22-30, on the false idea of equality on both sides. 

Τὶ, 1: ζῷον πολιτικόν; 1280031 ff.; 1252b30f.; cf. all of chap. 9 to 1281a10. 


8 r280br10-12, against Lycophron; cf., above, p. 16; καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καὶ 
ta ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς Kal δικαίους τοὺς 
πολίτας. 


120 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


of materia] advantage brought men into social union and keep 
them in it.” Each citizen, he held, is not his own master, but all 
belong to the state. Each is a member (μόριον) of the social body, 
and the concern of each is naturally relative to the good of the 
whole.” 

Aristotle’s further criticisms, of minor significance, on the sugges- 
tions of Phaleas and Plato for equality of possessions are as follows: 
They have taken no precautions to regulate population accordingly.3 
They set no proper limit between luxury and penury for individual 
possessions.4, Plato’s system is not thoroughgoing, since it allows 
inequalities in personal property, a criticism also valid against his 
own proposals.s Phaleas failed to include personal property in his 
system of equality. Such strictures seem to proceed from his 
pedantic desire to criticize inconsistency. However, he may have 
apprehended more clearly than did Plato the danger of the press 
of poverty that must eventually result from a system like that of 
the Laws.7 

Our author is also strong in his denial of either the wisdom or 
feasibility of the communism in the Republic.’ He argues that 
Plato’s proposed family communism is based upon the false prin- 
ciple that a state must be composed of like elements,? and shows 
that it must fail to accomplish its end of harmony, for Plato’s 
‘fall’? must mean all collectively.*? But this must result, if real- 
ized, in a decrease of devotion,™ and thus in a lack of the very har- 
mony sought,” since one of the chief sources of attachment in the 
world is exclusive ownership.*3 He would deem such a measure, 


t Op. cit., II, 304. 

2 Pol. v (viii). 1. 1337427-30, a remarkable passage, suggestive of Plato and of 
St. Paul’s analogy of the body. Aristotle paints vividly the antithesis between 
political and economic equality, whereby there grows up a state within a state (12950- 
13 ff.), for he believes with the author of Eud. Eth. vii. 10. 1242a, that man is not only 
a πολιτικόν, but also an οἰκονομικόν ζῷον. Cf. Poehlmann, op. cit., I, 276 fi. 

3 1266b8-14; 1265a38-42; unfair to Plato, as seen above. 

41266b24-28; 12654a28-38. 5 1265022 ff. 6 1267b9-13. 

7 Cf. his criticism of the Spartan system, 1270 640 ff. 

δ On its wisdom, cf. infra; on its feasibility, cf. 1263b29: πάμπαν ἀδύνατος. 

9 7261a16-1261615. It 20-215, 

10 1261b30-32; 24-28. 12 7262b4-24. 1322-94, 


ARISTOTLE ἘΖ21 


therefore, more fitting for the third class, since a weakening of 
their ties of affection might result in greater submission to the 
rulers,’ another striking evidence of the gulf that separates the 
ideal of Greek political thought from the spirit of modern democracy. 

Moreover, he considers Plato’s assumption that a state, to be 
a unity, must be devoid of all private interests, to be gratuitous,” 
and argues that the common possession of anything is more likely 
to cause strife than harmony.’ In his opinion, the present system 
of private property, if accompanied by a right moral tone and 
proper laws, combines the advantages of both common and indi- 
vidual ownership.* The tenure of property should therefore be 
private, but there should be a certain friendly community in its 
actual use. Thus will be avoided the double evil of strife and 
neglect, which must result from dissatisfaction and lack of per- 
sonal interest under communism.’ He offers as a substitute for 
the Platonic doctrine, then, his own ideal of reciprocal equality 
(τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός) as the real cement of society.7 In any 
event, he asserts, the present evils do not result. from private 
property, but from the depravity of human nature (μοχθηρίαν) ἡ 
_and the aim should be to improve this by moral and intellectual 
culture, rather than to attempt amelioration by the establishment 
of an entirely new system.’ The latter method would result, even 
if successful, not only in escape from some of the present evils, but 
also in the loss of the present advantages of private tenure.” 

The foregoing arguments all show remarkable practical insight, 
and have been common in the modern criticism of socialism. The 
objection that individual effort and industry would be paralyzed 
if bereft of the stimulus of personal interest and ownership, while 
a general fact of human nature, need not be valid against a system 
where each has opportunity to develop up to his capacity. There 

τ 1262a40-1262)3. 3 1263a11-10. 

2 1263630 ff., and preceding note. 422-26; 30. 

5 26-30, citing the proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, Cf. 1329b14 ff. N. Eth. viii. 8 f. on 
φιλία: Pol. 1252b29; 1280025; cf. Xen. Laced. Pol. vi. 3-4. 

6 Cf. preceding note, and 1261632 ff. 8 72630622 f. 

71261030 f. N. Eth. v. 5. 937-42. But Plato used both methods. 

τὸ 1263b27-29; 6.5.» besides the personal satisfaction (1263240 f.), the opportunity 
for liberality (1263b11-13). 


122 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


is certainly little to impel the great mass of people to industry 
under an individualistic system, except the proverbial wolf at the 
door. But Aristotle is not thinking of the masses. The objection 
that the evils result from human nature, not from the economic 
system, may well be pondered by modern socialists and doctrinaire 
reformers, yet this very fact is an additional reason why the system 
should be reformed so as to curb such wrong tendencies. The 
emphasis upon education as a cure for the existing ills is wise, and 
it might well be more fully recognized by modern socialists, though 
both Aristotle and later critics of proposed social reforms are wrong 
in implying that the two methods are mutually exclusive. The 
warning that, by giving up the régime of private property, we 
should not only be rid of its evils, but also lose its advantages, 
should be pondered by agitators against the existing economic 
system. Modern socialists might also learn much from Aristotle 
and the other Greek thinkers in regard to the true social ideal, as 
not primarily materialistic and selfish, but moral and social. On 
the whole, it may be observed that Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s 
alleged communism in the Republic would be far more applicable 
against modern socialism. 

As to the sussitia, Aristotle proposes a system similar to that of 
Plato’s Laws.t He harshly criticizes the Spartan method, which 
required every citizen, rich and poor alike, to contribute to the 
common meals on pain of loss of citizenship.?, He praises, on the 
other hand, the Cretan system, which permitted the entire citizen- 
ship, including women and children, to be nourished at the common 
table, at public expense.* 

We have seen that Plato, in the Laws, while apparently granting 
private property in land, really denies this, since he makes the 
product of the land practically public property.* Aristotle, despite 
his strictures against communism, advocates a system of land 
tenure quite similar. His limitation of the freedom of donation 
or testament, purchase or sale; his demands that the lot shall 


tiv (vii). το. 133005 ff. He would make part of the land public. In the Laws, 
the expense is met by making the product public. 

2 1271029-37. 

3 Ibid. 28 f.; 1272a12-21. 4 Cf. above on socialism in the Laws. 


ARISTOTLE 123 


never leave the family, that it shall always be handed down by 
legitimate succession, and that no citizen shall ever be allowed to 
hold more than one allotment, are all Platonic, and make him 
unquestionably an advocate of family, rather than of private 
ownership of land.‘ His collectivism is more direct than that of 
the Laws, since he makes part of the land entirely public, to defray 
the expense of worship and the common meals.?_ The assignment 
of lots to the citizens is on the same terms as in the Laws, with the 
exception that the owners are masters of the product of their lots.3 
Despite his criticism of Plato’s division of homesteads, he has the 
same plan.* Asin the Laws, only citizens are landowners, and this 
includes only the governing and military classes,’ while all hus- 
bandmen are to be public or private slaves. Unlike Plato, how- 
ever, Aristotle does not attempt to avoid undue inequalities in 
personal property.?. He sets no maximum above which limit goods 
must be confiscated, nor does he, as Plato, establish a rigorous 
system of laws to hamper trade and to make money-making oper- 
ations practically impossible. He recognizes that such regulations 
are not feasible, and his legislation is therefore more considerate of 
human nature, despite the fact that his hostility to the ideal of 
commercialism is even more pronounced than is that of Plato.’ 

It is evident from the preceding outline of Aristotle’s negative 
and positive doctrine on the matter of private property that his 
system is in substantial agreement with that of Plato’s second state.’ 
Besides the points of similarity noted above, he agrees with his 
predecessor in emphasizing strongly the power of the state over 
the life of the citizens. Both insist that the citizen belongs, not 

τ Pol. ii. 1270a21 f.; viii (v). 1309¢23-25, though rather a measure for an oli- 
garchy; vii (vi). 1319@8-13, for a democracy, also against mortgage on land; οἵ. 
Guiraud, La Prop. fonc., p. 591. Like Plato, he opposes free disposal of dowries 
(1270423-25). 

21Ci py 122, 0. 1. 3 133009-23. 4 1265b24-26. Siv (vii). 1329@18-21. 

6 1330025-31; 1328b40; 1329@2; cf. Souchon, op. cit., pp. 169 f., on his system 
as compared with that of the Laws. 

7Cf. p. 120, n. 5; but cf. viii (v). 1308616-19 for a recognition of the desirability 
of such a regulation. 

8 Cf. above, his criticism of chrematistik, Pol. 7. chaps. 8-10. 

9So Souchon, of. cit., p. 167; cf. above for differences in detail. 


124 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


to himself, but to the state, and can realize his best life only through 
the state." Thus Aristotle is far from being a defender of private 
property in the absolute sense. On the other hand, his emphasis 
upon the social obligation of individual possession is, if not social- 
istic, at least very modern. He is certainly a much better socialist 
than the alleged communist of the Republic, whom he criticizes 
so severely. Like the Plato of the Laws, he is a semi-collectivist. 
As Barker has observed,’ Aristotle thought in terms of land, while 
modern socialism thinks in terms of capital and labor. Both 
standpoints involve social ownership and the limitation of the indi- 
vidual, and in this respect the Greek thinker was socialistic in 
tendency. But despite their social spirit and their trend toward 
nationalism, which is so strong in all progressive countries today, 
neither he nor Plato was a socialist, in the modern sense, in spirit or 
in aim Any attempts at direct comparison with modern social- 
ism, therefore, are likely to be fanciful and confusing. Whatever 
analogy there is between them is of a very general nature and 
should not be pressed.* 


1 Cf. pp. 119 f.; 1280035 ff. He does not overlook the complement of this prin- 
ciple, that the prosperity of the whole involves that of the parts (iv [vii].1328537 ff.; 
1329a18-21), his unjust criticism of Plato on this point. Zmave (Zeitschrift, etc., 
p. 56, n. 3) rightly observes that there is more truth in this Greek doctrine of the 
relation of the individual to the state than moderns are prone to recognize. 


20}. cit., p. 391. 

3 Francotte (L’Industrie, II, 250) strongly emphasizes their extreme limitation 
of the individual. Souchon (op. cit., p. 170) refers to them as precursors of Marx, 
though he recognizes the difference in their aim. 

4 Poehlmann is an example of such exaggerated analogy. Cf. I, 599, where he 
makes Aristotle’s theory of interest the source of the Marxian theory of value, and 
unduly presses the analogy between his chapter on chrematistik and modern criti- 
cisms of capital. For further Greek communistic theories after Aristotle, cf. infra. 


CHAPTER VII 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS, CONTEMPORARIES OR SUCCESSORS OF 
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 


The minor philosophers, contemporaries or successors of the 
Socratics, present in their extant fragments some ideas on wealth 
and other economic problems that are worthy of note. For pur- 
poses of convenience, we shall group them all here, though some of 
them would chronologically precede one or both of the greater 
philosophers. The successors of Plato in the Academy, Speusippus, 
Xenocrates, and Crantor," carried forward the teaching of the 
Socratics on wealth, as opposed to the more extreme doctrine of the 
Cynics and Stoics.?_ There was, however, probably less emphasis 
on matters economic in their writings, since their prime interest 
was in practical individual ethics rather than in the political moral- 
ity of Plato and Aristotle, though Xenocrates is known to have 
written an Economicus 3 

Theophrastus,’ the first and greatest successor of Aristotle in 
the Peripatetic school, was the author of a treatise on wealth, of 
which we know only the name. He also probably dealt somewhat 
with economic subjects in his Ethics and Politics, but only slight 
fragments of either work are extant. He reveals slightly greater 
regard for the importance of external goods than Aristotle, perhaps 
because of his special love for the quiet and leisure of the scholar’s 
life.© There is, however, no evidence that he went so far as to 

* Third century B.c.; cf. Zeller, op. cit., II, 1, 986 ff. 

2 Cic. De fin., iv. 18. 49; Plut. Adv. Sioicos, Ὁ. τοῦς: οἱ τοῦ Ξενοκράτους καὶ Σπευ- 
σίππου κατηγοροῦντες ἐτὶ τῷ μὴ THY ὑγείαν ἀδιάφοραν ἡγεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀνω- 
φελές, On Crantor, cf. Ap. Sext. Emp. (Bekker, p. 538, ll. 4 ff.); on the above, cf. 
Heidel, Pseudo-Platonica (dissertation, Chicago, 1896), p. 60, n. 5; cf. also Def. 140, 
of Speusippus (Mullach, op. cit., 111, 80): πλοῦτος κτῆσις σύμμετρος πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. 

3 For discussion of all the Economica, cf. infra. 

4 Born ca. 370 B.c. (Zeller, op. cit., II, 2, 807, n. 1), a voluminous writer, from 
whom a substantial amount is extant, notably his Characters. 

5 περὶ πλούτου (Aspas. in Eth. 451; and Cic. De offciis ii. τό. 56). 

6 Cf. Zeller, op. cit., II, 2, 856. 

125 


126 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


ascribe a positive value to wealth as such. On the contrary, he 
advises that one render himself independent of it by living a simple 
life! and urges against vulgar display. Like Aristotle, he prefers 
moderate wealth, and finds its chief value in the fact that it 
enables one to have the distinction of giving splendid gifts to the 
people. He approaches the cosmopolitan spirit of the Stoics in 
his emphasis upon the natural relationship of all men,5 a result of 
the broadening vision due to the unification of Greece under the 
Macedonian Empire. There is nothing of interest from other 
members of the Peripatetic school, except the Eudemian Ethics 
and Magna moralia, which were included in our discussion of Aris- 
totle, and the pseudo-Aristotelian Economica, which will be dis- 
cussed in the following pages. 


THE ECONOMICA 


Economica were one of the characteristic types of Greek litera- 
ture, after the Economicus of Xenophon.® They discussed wealth 
from the ethical standpoint, dealt largely with domestic, rather 
than public, economy, and considered questions of human relations, 
such as slavery and the married life. They are, in general, imi- 
tations of Xenophon and of Aristotle’s Politics, and add very little 
of interest to the economic theory of the Socratics. Aside from the 
work, falsely ascribed to Aristotle, to be discussed below, Eco- 
nomica were written by Antisthenes,’? Xenocrates,® Philodemus,? 


«Stob. Flor. iv. 283, No. 202, ed. Mein.: ὁ αὐτὸς (Theophrastus) ἔλεγεν ὀφείλομεν 
ἑαυτοὺς ἐθίζειν ἀπὸ ὀλίγων ζῆν, etc. 

2 Theophrasti Opera, ed. Wimmer, iii. 231. fr. 86 f.; Plut. Lycurg. το. 

3 Theoph. Op. iii. 182. fr. 78: οὐδὲν πλέον ἔχουσιν of πλούσιοι τῶν μέτρια κεκτη- 
μένων, etc. (Plut. Cupid. Divit. 527). 

4Cic. De officiis ii. 16. 56. 

5 Porph. De abstin. iii. 25. 

6 Cf. above on Xenophon. 

7 Cf. infra on Cynics; Diog. L. vi. 1. 16; not extant. 

8 Diog. L. iv. 12; not extant. 

9 περὶ οἰκονομίας: for fragments, cf. ed. Jensen (Teubner). He was an Epi- 
curean; οἷ. M. Hoderman, ‘“‘Quaestionum Oeconomicarum Specimen,’ Berliner 
Studien f. Class. Phil., XVI, 4 (1896), 38{., for a summary statement of his 
teaching. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 127 


Metrodorus of Lampsacus,? Hierocles,? Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, 
and the New-Pythagoreans,’ Bryson,° Callicratidas,’ Periktione,’ 
and Phintys.? 


The pseudo-Aristotelian Economica’ require no extended dis- 
cussion, since most of the material that is of interest in them is an 
imitation of Aristotle’s Politics and Xenophon’s Economics. Book i 


1 Diog. L. x. 11. 24: περὶ πλούτου: probably opposed to the Cynic ideas on wealth. 
Cf. Hoderman, op. cit., 37 and note. 
2For the few fragments, cf. Stob. Ixxxv. 21 (Vol. III, p. 150, ed. Mein.), of 


Stoic tendency. Cf. F. Wilhelm, “Die Oeconomica der Neupythagoreer,” Rhein. 
Mus., XVII, 2 (1915), 162. 


3 For frag., cf. Stob. Flor. xlii. 12 (Vol. II, p. 78, ed. Mein.); 46 (Vol. 11, p. 366); 
Ixxiv. 59 (Vol. III, p. 362); Ixxxv. 12 (Vol. III, Ὁ. 138); of Stoic tendency, though the 
fragments may not be from him. Cf. Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 162; Hoderman, op. cit., 
pp. 40 f. 

4 Cf. his Conjugalia moralia, which, though it does not bear the name Economica, 
is similar in content to them. Cf. Hoderman, oP. cit., p. 43; cf. also his essay, Περὲ 
Φιλοπλουτίας, which moralizes on the folly of inordinate desire for wealth, in the Stoic 
vein, e.g., ed. Bern., Vol. III, 524D, p. 357: πενία γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἀπληστία τὸ 
πάθος αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλοπλουτία. 


5 Jamblichus (Vit. Pyth. 72. 80. 169 f.) says that among the followers of Pythag- 
oras were those who were called οἰκονομικοί. They date from about the middle to 
the end of the second century B.c. Cf. Wilhelm, op. cit., pp. 161-224. 


6 Cf. Stob. v. 28. 15 (p. 680, 7 ff., ed. Wachs.; called οἰκονομικός, Wilhelm (0p. 
cit., p. 164, n. 3) thinks that the entire essay may be extant in a Hebrew translation. 
Bryson was Peripatetic in tendency. He makes a third division of slaves, in addition 
to κατὰ φύσιν and κατὰ νόμον: νἱΖ., κατὰ τρόπον τᾶς ψυχᾶς. He also gives a catalogue 
of vocations, similar to that of Xen. Econ. i. 1-4, and raises the question as to the 
function of economics. 


7 Cf. Stob. v. 28. τό (p. 681, 15 ff.); iv. 22. 101 (p. 534, 10 ff.); v. 28. 17 (Ὁ. 684, 
16 ff.); v. 28. 18 (p. 686, τό ff., ed. Wachs.): περὶ τᾶς τῶν οἰκήιων εὐδαιμονίας; composed 
largely of negative utterances on the rich, and of observations on the relations of the 
sexes; Platonic and Stoic in tendency. Cf. Wilhelm, op. cit., pp. 177, 222. 


8 Cf. Stob. iv. 25. 50; v. 28. 19 (ed. Wachs.): περὶ γυναικὸς ἁρμονίας and περὶ 
γυναικὸς σωφροσύνας; similar to Stoics. 


9 Cf. Stob. iv. 23. 61 f. (p. 588, 17 ff., ed. Wachs.); Stoic-Peripatetic in tendency. 
The two latter deal chiefly with the marriage relation. On the general subject of 
Economica, cf. Hoderman and Wilhelm, as above. 


το Book iii, in Latin, is of later origin, and is of no economic interest. Book i is 
perhaps from Eudemus of Rhodes, a pupil of Aristotle and Theophrastus (Zeller, II, 
2, 869 ff.), but Philodemus (De vita ix) assigns it to Theophrastus (Zeller, II, 2, 944); 
cf. Susemihl, introduction to his edition of the Economica, 1887. Book ii is later, 
but from the Peripatetic school (Zeller, II, 2, 945). 


128 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


is largely a repetition of some of Aristotle’s theories of domestic 
economy, the marriage relation, and slavery, with a few unim- 
portant additions and slight differences. Book ii is almost entirely 
composed of practical examples of how necessary funds have been 
provided by states and rulers. 

The most distinctive point about the doctrine of the first book 
is its separation of οἰκονομική from πολιτική as a special science. 
The author agrees with Aristotle, however, that it is the function 
of economics both to acquire and to use, though without his specific 
limitations upon acquisition. He distinguishes four forms of 
economy—acquiring, guarding, using, and arranging in proper 
order.4 Elsewhere, he makes a different classification on another 
basis—imperial, provincial, public, and private.’ These are each 
further subdivided, the first including finance, export and import 
commerce, and expenditures.°® 

Agriculture is especially eulogized by the author, in the spirit 
of Xenophon and Aristotle. It is the primary means of natural 
acquisition, the others being mining and allied arts whose source 
of wealth is the land.” It is the most just acquisition, since it is not 
gained from men, either by trade, hired labor, or war,’ and it con- 
tributes most to manly strength.2 Retail trade and the banausic 
arts, on the other hand, are both contrary to nature," since they 
render the body weak and inefficient (ἀχρεῖα) .": 

The work agrees with Aristotle, against Plato, in his doctrine 
that men and women are essentially different in nature, and hence 
that their work should be distinct.” No attempt is made to justify 


* Cf. Susemihl, of. cit., p. v, n. 1, for a list of parallel passages from Xenophon 
and Aristotle. 

7 1343d1-4, especially ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ ἐκ πολλῶν ἀρχόντων ἐστίν, ἡ οἰκονομικὴ δὲ 
μοναρχία. Cf. also 14f. Cf. Aristotle, above. Zeller (II, 2, 181, π. 6) points out 
that Eud. Eth. makes a similar distinction, in that he places economics between ethics 
and politics. 


5134308 f., though 25 ff. implies the limitation, κτήσεως δὲ πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια ἡ 
κατὰ φύσιν. 


4 τη44022 ff. 6 Ibid. 20 ff.: νόμισμα, ἐξαγώγιμα, εἰσαγώγιμα, and ἀναλώματα. 
Sil. 1345613 fi. 7 1343a25-27. 

δ Ibid. 28-30. Cf. Aristotle, who makes war a natural pursuit. 

9 134302 [. Cf. preceding n. 8. 1 134303 1. τ [bid. 26 ff. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 120 


slavery, though Aristotle is followed in his advice to grant eman- 
cipation, as a special reward for faithfulness! The author of 
Book ii seems to have taken for granted the Cynic theory that 
money need have no intrinsic value, at least for local purposes. 
Coinage of iron,” tin,’ bronze,‘ the arbitrary stamping of drachmas 
with a double value, are all offered apparently as a proper means 
of escape from financial difficulty. Like Aristotle, he accepts 
monopoly as a shrewd and legitimate principle of finance.® Else- 
where, however, in striking contrast to such uneconomic sugges- 
tions, the author states the important economic principle that 
expenditures should not exceed income.? In accord with Greek 
usage, he is familiar with a tax on exports for revenue and as a 
means of guarding against depletion of supply.’ 


CYRENAICS 


The Cyrenaics were the forerunners of the Epicureans in their 
more liberal attitude toward wealth. Aristippus,’ the founder of 
the school, was a man of the world, who believed in enjoying life 
as it came.” He held that pleasure was always a good, and that 
all else was of value only as a means of realizing this end.* If con- 
sistent, therefore, he must have valued highly moderate wealth. 
His principle that one should aim to realize the highest degree of 
pleasure with the least economic expenditure is somewhat analo- 
gous to the modern economic doctrine of the smallest means.” 
Bion of Borysthenes became a Cyrenaic in his later life, but his 
satires are almost entirely lost. 

11344615 f.; 1344023-1344)11. 3 1349033 ff. 

2 1348b17 ff. 41350023 ff. 

5 1349b31 ff. Debasement of the currency was common in the time of the author. 

6 1346624 ff.; 134763 ff.; cf. Ar. Pol. 1259a6-35. 

71346a14-16: τὸ τἀναλώματα μὴ μείζω τῶν προσόδων γίνεσθαι. 

8 1352016 ff.; cf. above on the Socratics, under exchange. 

9 Of Cyrene (435 Β.0.), a pupil of Socrates. No genuine fragments of his writings 
are extant. Cf. Zeller, II, 1, 346 ff. 

το Cf. Horace Ep. i. 17, 23. 

τ Cf. Zeller, II, 1, 346, n. 2, and Xen. Mem. ii. τ. 9. 

τῷ Zeller II, 1, 346, n. 2; cf. Oncken, of. cit., p. 47, a basal principle of hedonism. 

τό Cf. Hor. Ep. ii. 2. 60. 


130 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


EPICURUS AND HIS SCHOOL 


Epicurus, though the apostle of hedonism, and heir of the 
Cyrenaics, taught a doctrine of wealth somewhat similar to that of 
the Stoics.. His ‘happiness’ consisted in living a simple and 
prudent life. He taught that spiritual wealth is unlimited, and 
that the wise are contented with things easy to acquire (ebmopiora) ? 
that external wealth, on the other hand, is limited,’ and that it is 
not increase of possessions but limitation of desires that makes 
truly rich.! He believed the simplest food to be best,5 both for 
pleasure and for health, that many wealthy find no escape from ills,° 
that he who is not satisfied with little will not be satisfied with all,’ 
and that contented poverty is the greatest wealth.’ In accord 
with his teaching, he seems to have lived very simply.” However, 
he did not go to the extreme of the Cynics and Stoics, but taught 
that the wise will have a care to gain property, and not live as 
beggars.” He exhibits no tendency toward communism, but 
rather toward the extreme individualism of the Sophists, and was 
in sympathy with their social contract theory." Later Epicurean- 
ism degenerated by taking the hedonistic principle of its founder too 
literally. Like the Sophists, the school has influenced modern 
economic thought through its conception of justice, as a mere 
convention for mutual advantage.” 


™ 342-270 B.c. His theory was far different than the Cyrenaic doctrine of the 
pleasure of the moment. 


2 Diog. L. x. 130, 144, 146; Stob. Flor. xvii. 23. 

3 Usener, Epicurea (1887), pp. 300-304, ὥρισται. 

4 Ibid., Ὁ. 302, fr. 473; Pp. 303, fr. 476. 

5 Diog. L. x. 130 f. 

6 Usener, p. 304, fr. 470. 

7 Ibid., p. 302, fr. 473 £.; cf. Stob. Flor. xvii. 30. 

ὃ Usener, p. 303, and fragments. 

9 Stob. xvii. 34; Seneca Ep. 25. 4 f.; Οἷς, Tusc. disp. v. 31. 
το Diog. L. x. 119; Philod. De vit. ix. cols. 12 ff., 27, 40. 


"Cf, Barker, op. cit., p. 37; cf. above on Sophists; also Dunning, Political 
Theories Ancient and Mediaeval (1913), pp. 103 f. 


τῷ Cf. Hasbach, Allgemeine philosophische Grundlagen der Pol. Econ. (1890), pp. 76 
and 36 f.; Dunning, as above. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 131 


CYNICS 


The Cynics developed the negative attitude of the Socratics 
toward wealth to its extreme in asceticism. Their doctrine was sub- 
versive of all economic interest. Antisthenes, the founder of the 
school, was a contemporary of Plato, a Sophist in his youth, but 
Jater associated with the Socratic circle. He appears prominently 
in the Symposium of Xenophon. He urged a return to nature 
in the literal sense. His book on the nature of animals περὶ ζώων 
φύσεως) probably presented examples from the animal world as 
models for natural human living. Like many writers of his time 
and later, he idealized the life of primitive and barbarous peoples. 
In utter antithesis to Aristotle,t he declared city life and civil- 
ization to be the source of all injustice, luxury, and corruption. 
In his opinion, Zeus punished Prometheus, not because he envied 
men any good, but because the discovery of fire was the source 
(ἀφορμή) of all effeminacy and luxury for men.’ Material wealth 
was, to him, if not an absolute evil, something about which men 
should be entirely indifferent, for in essence, good and evil could have 
only a moral reference.° The craving for wealth or power was a 
vain illusion. Nothing was good for a man except what was actually 
his own,’ and this was to be found only in the soul. Wealth without 
virtue was not only worthless, but a fruitful source of evil,’ and no 
lover of money could be either virtuous or free. He thus advanced 

For his life, cf. Zeller, II, 1, 280 ff., and Diog. L. vi. A few fragments of his 
philosophical dialogues are extant. Cf. above, p. 126, n. 7. for his Economicus. He 


and Diogenes are discussed at this point, since the Cynic movement as a whole is 
logically post-Aristotelian. 


2 Diog. L. vi. 1. 15; cf. Gomperz, of. cit., II, 117 and note, with citations from 
Dio of Prusa; also Zeller, op. cit., II, 1, 325 f. and note, who thinks Plato’s ironical 
“city of pigs” (Rep. ii) may well have been a reference to the ideas of Antisthenes. 

3 Cf. preceding note, and infra, on later ideal states. 

4 Pol. i. 1253a1-4: ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, etc. 

5 Dionis Prus. Opera (ed. Arnim, 1893, or vi. 25 f.), ascribed to Diogenes, but 
it was also the idea of Antisthenes. Cf. Gomperz, op. cit., II, 118; compare Rousseau. 

6 Diog. L. vi. 104. 7 Ibid. vi. 12; cf. chap. 9, 105. 

8 Xen. Symp. iv. 34, 34-43, on the advantages and disadvantages of the two kinds 
of wealth; iii. 8; Econ.i. 7 1.; ii. 2 1. 

9 Xen. Symp. iv. 35 f. 

τὸ Mullach, op. cit., II, Ὁ. 280, fr. 86: φιλάργυρος. 


132 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


beyond the Socratic doctrine of ability to use as the criterion of 
value. 

However, though despising wealth, Antisthenes upheld the 
dignity of free labor. He believed it to be a good by which alone 
virtue is gained, the source of independence." Like the rest of the 
Cynics, he was thus doubtless opposed to slavery. The Cynic 
principle that all diversities in men, except differences in moral 
character, were merely accidental was a direct argument against 
slavery.? It is also probable that he held the Cynic doctrine that 
intrinsic value in money is unnecessary. 

Diogenes of Sinope, ‘‘the philosopher of the proletariat, “‘became 
more famous than Antisthenes, owing to his eccentric personality.‘ 
He carried the Cynic doctrine of wealth to its reductio ad absurdum 
by applying it literally in his own life. His repudiation of wealth 
and civilization was even more emphatic than that of his predeces- 
sor. He taught that wealth without virtue is worse than poverty.’ 
Lovers of wealth are like men afflicted with the dropsy, always 
athirst for more. The desire for money is the very source and 
center (μητρόπολιν) of all ills.? Virtue cannot dwell either in a 
wealthy state or in a wealthy house.’ Poverty better accords with 
it, and is no real cause of suffering.2 Truly noble men despise 
wealth and are above being troubled by poverty and other so-called 
1115 τὸ 


t Diog. L. vi. 2, καὶ ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Ἡρακλέους καὶ 
τοῦ κύρου. Heracles, the toiler, was their patron saint. Antisthenes is said to have 
written two dialogues called Heracles (Diog. L. vi. 2. 18), but Zeller, (op. cit., II, 1, 
307, n. 4) thinks only one was genuine. ; 

2 Cf. infra on Diogenes. Ar. Pol. 1253b20-22 probably refers to the Cynics, as 
holding it to be κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ δίκαιον, and βίαιον. Cf. Newman, op. cit., I, 140, 
n. 2,on this. He cites Strabo, p. 15; 110, on the opposition of the Cynic Onesicritus 
to slavery. Cf. above, pp. 97 ff.; Zeller, op. cit., II, 1, 280 ff., 323 f. 

3 Cf. infra on Diogenes and Eryxias; Ar. Pol. 1257b10, probably Cynic. 

4 412-323 B.C.; cf. Zeller, op. ezt., II, 1, 280 ff. 

5 Mullach, F.Ph.G., II, 326, fr. 276; cf. Diog. L. vi. 47: τὸν πλούσιον ἀμαθῆ, 
πρόβατον εἶπε χρυσόμαλλον. 

6 Mullach, II, 302, fr. 27; 327, fr. 285; cf. infra on Teles, for like idea. 

7Mullach, II, 316, fr. 168; Chrysost. Homil. lxiv in Matthew points to Paul’s 
parallel, 1 Tim. 6:10: ῥίζα yap πάντων τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ φιλαργυρία. 


8 Mullach, ITI, 3ος, fr. 63. 9 Ibid. fr. 66; 65. 10 7074. fr. 61; p. 327, fr. 285. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 133 


Diogenes was doubtless opposed to slavery and taught that 
under proper conditions of the simple life there would be no reason 
for it." In his opinion, the truly free were not slaves, even though 
they might be in a state of servitude, but the mean-spirited were 
slavish even though free. He wrote a Republic in which he seems 
to have advocated fiat money to take the place of the hated gold 
and silver’ and to prevent the extensive accumulation of movable 
wealth. He also advocated the community of wives and children,! 
and perhaps some system of land tenure other than private owner- 
ship.' Crates, the poet of the Cynics,° expresses similar sentiments 
of scorn for wealth, supreme regard for virtue,’ and glorification of 
poverty,® Menippus and Monimus left little of economic interest. 


“ERYXIAS”’ 


The pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Eryxias, is of special interest 
for our study, since it is the only extant work in Greek literature 
which deals directly and exclusively with the problem of wealth. 
The work presents nothing new, however, which had not already 
been observed by the Socratics. The statement of Heidel,’ that 
it is “distinctly the most valuable contribution of antiquity to 
the science of political economy,” is therefore an exaggeration. 

t Gomperz, op. cit., II, 133; Zeller (op. cit., II, 1, 323 1.) is not sure that the 
Cynics taught a positive anti-slavery doctrine, but cf. p. 132, n. 2. 

2 Diog. L. vi. 66, 74 f.; cf. Epict. Dissert. iii. 24. 67. 

3 Athen. iv. τορος: Διογένης δ᾽ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ νόμισμα εἶναι νομοθετεῖ ἀστραγάλους. 

4Diog. L. vi. 72: ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας, etc. Aristotle 
(Pol. ii. 7. τ266α34) names Plato as its sole advocate, but cf. Zeller, op. cit., II, 1, 
321 f., ἢ. 4, and Gomperz, op. cit., II, 132, though they think that he did not hold 
it in the extreme form stated by Diogenes Laertius. 

5 There is no specific evidence, though it would accord well with his other teach- 
ings. Cf. Gomperz, op. cit., II, 132. 

6 Called ‘‘Thebaios’’; flor. ca. 328 B.c.; cf. Diog. L. vi. 87. 

7Mullach, F. Ph. G., ΤΙ, 334, fr. 6; 338, frs. 38, 39; cf. also Diog. L. vi. 86. 

8 Cf. The Beggar’s Wallet, an amusing parody of the Odyssey (von Arnim, Leben 
und Werke des Dio von Prusa [1898], 255 ff. Gomperz (op. cit., II, n. 545 to p. 125) 
doubts its genuineness for Crates, but thinks it is from a Cynic source; cf. also infra 
on Teles. 

9 The pseudo-Aristotelian Economics is a possible exception. The Economics of 
Xenophon has a broader theme, and the Revenues is for practical purposes. 


το Pseudo-Platonica, p. 59. 


134 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Nevertheless, the essay is worthy of more notice than it has usually 
received in histories of ancient economic thought.! Whatever 
consideration has been given to it has been largely devoted to the 
question of its origin. It reveals points of contact with Plato, the 
later Socratics, and especially with Antisthenes, the Cynic, with 
whom the author seems to have been most in sympathy.? 

The two theses that form the goal of the Eryxias are that the 
wisest men are in reality the wealthiest, and that material wealth 
is an evil, since they who possess most of it are the most needy of 
all, and hence most depraved. The keynote of the dialogue is the 
question of Socrates concerning the wealthy Sicilian, ‘‘What sort 
of a man was he reputed to be in Sicily ?’’4 The double thesis is 
illustrated concretely by Socrates, the wisest, and the Sicilian, 
the richest but worst of men. The first idea is prominent in 
Euthydemus,5 and elsewhere in Plato and Xenophon. The second 
is a favorite doctrine of the Cynics and Stoics,’? though the general 
thought may be traced back to Socrates.8 

Some insight is exhibited by the author into the problem of 
value. Like Xenophon, he defines property (χρήματα) as that which 
is useful, and thus recognizes this element in value.? He also dis- 
tinguishes general from economic utility.%° In answer to the ques- 
tion in respect to what particular use wealth possesses utility, he 


"It is given mere passing mention in Boeckh, op. cit., I, 693; Hoderman, op. cit., 
p. 9; Francotte, L’Industrie, II, 310, ἢ. 1; Cossa, op. cit., p. 146; Oncken, op. cit., 
p. 37; Bonar, op. cit., Ὁ. 11, n. 1; Kautz, op. cit., p. 121; Simey, op. cit., p. 4745 
Hagen, Observationum oec. pol. in Aesch. dialog., qui Eryx. inscribitur (dissertation, 
1822). The latter has not been examined. 


2 On its origin, cf. Otto Schrohl, De Eryx. qui fertur Platonis (dissertation, 1901) 
which gives a full bibliography, pp. 5 ff.; Heidel (Pseudo-Platonica, p. 61), following 
Steinhart (Mueller, VII, 14), attributes it to a later Socratic, in sympathy with 
Antisthenes; p. 69, n. 3, he thinks it grew out of Euthyd. 288E ff.; for other points of 
contact, cf. Schrohl, 10 ff. 

3 On the first, cf. 393A-394E, 402E-403C; on the second, cf. 396E-397D, 405C- 
406B. 

4 Cf. preceding n. 3. 5 278E-282. 6 Cf. above, in loc. 7 For Stoics, cf. infra. 

*Xen. Mem. i. 6, especially end: ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, 
etc.; cf. Schrohl, of. cit., pp. 26--28. 

9 400K, 4orA. 

© 401A: ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ τῶν χρησίμων, ἐπειδή ye οὐπάντα. Cf. also 4008. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 135 


states tentatively that it is with respect to bodily needs,’ an idea 
suggestive of the organon theory of Aristotle. By this, he doubtless 
means food, clothing, and shelter, which have the quality of rarity. 
This, however, is only a step in the argument, which has for its 
goal the thesis that intellectual attainments constitute the most 
important part of one’s wealth, and possess a very real economic 
value.*? The author thus agrees with Plato, Xenophon, the Cynics, 
and the Stoics, in his emphasis upon spiritual goods. The dis- 
tinction between value in use and value in exchange and the neces- 
sary dependence of the latter upon the former are also suggested 
in the statement that nothing can have economic value except as 
there is a demand for it. The money that passes current in one 
state may be valueless in another, as also would be the mansion of 
the wealthy Polytion to Scythian nomads, since there would be 
no demand for them.’ 

The Eryxias has no clear or satisfactory definition of wealth. 
It is recognized that wealth must be defined before its character 
as good or evil can be determined, but the final answer nowhere 
appears. In this vagueness of result, one is strongly reminded of 
some of Plato’s minor dialogues. There is also a certain ambiguity 
throughout the work, similar to that observed in Plato,’ between 
wealth in its strict economic sense and excessive wealth. We may 
gather from the course of the argument, however, that the author 
would define wealth as consisting of things that possess utility, and 
are subjects of economic demand, whether external, physical, or 
intellectual goods. 

The attitude of the Eryxtas toward wealth is an extreme ver- 
sion of that with which we have become familiar in the Socratics, 
and is best characterized as Cynic. As seen above, the author 
considers external wealth to be an absolute second to wisdom,° 


t 4o1B, 401K. 

2 402E, 393E-3904E, and the general thesis that the wisest are richest. 

3 400A-E, 394D, arguing that economic demand might make a man’s wisdom 
more valuable than another’s house. 

4 300E. 

5 Cf. 399E, where Eristratos defines πλοῦτος as τὰ χρήματα πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι. 


6 393A, 393D-394A; cf. above, pp. 24 ff. and notes for Plato and others. 


136 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


since wisdom is not only itself a means of providing material needs,* 
but also and especially because through it alone does any material 
wealth become truly valuable.2, When the latter is made the 
summum bonum, it becomes the greatest evil. Like Plato, Jesus, 
and Ruskin, he insists that the kingdom of wisdom be given the 
first place,’ for things derive their good or evil quality from the 
character or knowledge of the user.4 The ironical account of how 
the Greek fathers, even of the best classes (τῶν μεγίστων δοκούντων) 
urge their boys to seek wealth, since without this they are of no 
account, is almost in the language of Pastor Wagner’s condemna- 
tion of the extreme commercialism of this age.’ Material goods, 
when unwisely used, are a fruitful source of ills,° and excessive 
wealth is always evil.? However, the political motive, which 
prompted the hostility of Plato and Aristotle to excessive wealth, 
is absent from the Eryxzas. 

Thus far the attitude of the author does not differ very essen- 
tially from that of the Socratics, but toward the end of the dialogue 
the doctrine is distinctly taught that wealth is an evil per se. He 
argues that one’s needs are most numerous in a state of sickness, 
when he is in his worst condition.’ One is at his best, on the other 
hand, when he has fewest and simplest needs.2 But those who 
have most property are sure to need the largest provision for the 
service of the body.” Thus the richest, as being the most needy, 
are the most depraved (μοχθηρότατα διακείμενοι) and the most 
unhappy, and therefore external wealth is essentially evil.% Such 
a characteristically Cynic doctrine is essentially ascetic, and sub- 
versive of the very foundations of economics. 

1 394D-E, 402E. 

2 393E, 396E-397E, 403E, the insistence upon ability to use, so common in Plato, 
Xenophon, and Ruskin. 

3 394D-E, which reads like a passage from the New Testament. 4307E. 

5306C: ἂν μέν τι ἔχῃς, ἄξιός του, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὐδενός, Cf. The Simple Life: “He 
who has nothing is nothing.” Cf. Eurip. fr. 228, Danae (Nauck): κακὸς δ᾽ ὁ μὴ 
ἔχων, ol δ᾽ ἔχοντες ὄλβιοι. 

6 396E-397E; cf. infra, the Stoic doctrine of “indifferents”; but they included 
health and wealth in the same class, while the Eryxias does not. Cf. Diog. L. vii. 
103; cf. a similar passage in the Euthydemus; cf. Schrohl, op. cit., p. 34. 

7 396E-397E, as above; 393A. 8.405}. 9 405E. 10 406B. 

1 [bid., but cf. 134, n. 8, where Socrates approaches this asceticism. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 137 


The Eryxias hints at a definition of capital in the distinction 
between the direct consumption of wealth and its use for further 
production.’ But it is far from the author’s purpose to define 
capital, and he makes nothing of the distinction. The relation of 
money to wealth is also dealt with incidentally. Like Aristotle, 
he criticizes the definition of wealth as “the possession of much 
money,” on the ground that the money of one country may not 
pass current in another, and hence cannot be true wealth. This is 
suggestive of the Cynic theory of fiat money, since the examples 
used are those of the worthless currency of Carthage, Sparta, and 
Ethiopia.4 But the argument proves too much, since it would be 
equally as effective against counting the house of Polytion as true 
wealth. There is, moreover, a peculiar shift in this part of the 
dialogue between money and property. The theory of the author 
is further upheld by the argument that a condition can be conceived 
in which our bodily needs might be supplied without silver or gold, 
in which case these metals would be worthless.s However, the 
necessity of intrinsic value for international currency is recognized,° 
and it seems hardly probable that the purpose of the dialogue was 
to contend that money is never wealth, since the very implication 
of the argument is that current money is wealth.’ 


TELES 


The fragments of Teles exhibit the same extreme asceticism of 
the Cynics in relation to wealth. His main thesis is that the pos- 
session of money does not free from want and need.? Many who 

1 403E, distinguishing the materials of a house, the tools by which they are pro- 
vided, and the tools for building. Cf. Plato and Aristotle, 7m /oc., for a like distinction. 

2 300E. 3 400A-E. 

4400A-B. Heidel (0p. cit., p. 61) points to his “ostentatious display of learning” 
here. 

5 402B-C, 404A-B. 6 AooE. 

7 400C-E, especially ὅσα μέν dpa τυγχάνει χρήσιμα ὄντα ἡμῖν ταῦτα χρήματα, 
though at this point the term has been made to include all wealth; cf. also 4026: 
ἀλλὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη (χρήματα) ols τὰ χρήσιμα οἷοί τ᾿ ἐσμὲν ἐκπορίζεσθαι. 

8 ΟἹ, Teletis Reliquiae, ed. Hense, Freiburg, 1889. The ancient source is Sto- 
baeus. Teles, a Cynic of Megara, wrote about 240 B.c. Cf. Hense, op. cit., XXI- 
XXXV; Gomperz, op. cit., II, 129 ff. Fr. iv. A, pp. 24 ff., and iv. B, p. 34, are of 
special economic interest. 

9 Fr. IV, A, pp. 24 ff. 


138 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


have great possessions do not use them, because of stinginess and 
sordidness.* But if wealth is not used, it is useless, and cannot 
free from need or want.? Here we meet a different application of 
the criterion of “use” from that with which we have become 
familiar in the Socratics, the Eryxias, and Ruskin. It is based on 
refusal, rather than inability to use, though the other idea is in the 
background. ‘The author argues further that wealth does not free 
from need, because the wealthy life is always insatiate (ἄπληστος), 
and wealth does not change the disposition,’ by which change alone 
the life can be freed from need and slavery. To try to accomplish 
this by wealth is like attempting to cure a patient of dropsy by stuf- 
fing him with water until he bursts.° Counsel is given, therefore, not 
to turn one’s sons to the acquisition of wealth, but to study under 
Crates, who can set them free from the vice of insatiety.7 

Poverty, on the other hand, does not change the disposition of 
the temperate man for the worse.’ There is nothing distressing or 
painful about it,? for Crates and Diogenes were poor and yet passed 
their life in ease.*? It is no harder to endure old age in poverty 
than in wealth, but all depends upon the disposition.* Poverty 
deprives the life of no positive good, but furnishes the opportunity 
of gaining good,” since it is conducive to the contemplative life of 
philosophy, while wealth is an obstacle to this. It is the poor, 
rather than the wealthy, who have leisure. They are also obliged 
to be strong (καρτερεῖν), while the wealthy become effeminate, 

t Fr. IV, A, p. 24: δι᾽ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ ῥυπαρίαν. 

2 Ibid. 27; cf. the example of the Φορκίδες, who have an eye, but do not use it; 
cf. also the quotation from the “ancients” on the distinction between χρήματα, “used 
wealth,” and κτήματα, “wealth merely possessed” (ll. 13 f.). 

3 P. 32, the unsated life will not be satisfied even with immortality, since it cannot 
become Zeus. L. 13 ff., kings are always in want, σπανίζουσιν. Cf. Xen. Symp. iv.36. 

4B. 26,1) 4. 1. 65:2. Ip. 3a. SRE 2oullsontn. 

5Ρ, 28, ll. 13-29. ΤΡ. 20; cf. pp: 30 {55 Ῥ- 26; 11. mits θ᾿ 26: 

9Fr.; Περὶ αὐταρκείας; p.g: καὶ τί ἔχει δυσχερὲς ἢ ἐπίπονον ἡ πενία. 

το 7074. Ibid. Cephalus in Rep. i gives a more balanced judgment. 

τ Ibid., pp. 6 f., citing Bion on the answer of poverty to her accusers. Cf. Aris- 
toph. Plutus 558 f. on the power of poverty, cited by Ruskin, Aratra Pentel., IV, 139 
(Vol. XX, 296). 

13 Fr. iv. B, p. 34, he attacks the opposite thesis. 

4 Ibid., ll. 5 f.; p. 35, good doctrine for a tramp; p. 34. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 139 


since they have no impetus to work.t Thus poverty, when accom- 
panied with justice, should be more highly honored than wealth? 
The author concludes that it is therefore best to despise wealth 
and turn to the life of philosophy, for this develops generosity 
instead of stinginess, and contentment instead of insatiety. Such 
a life uses what is on hand, and lives content with present 
blessings (τοῖς παροῦσι). The marked contrast between this 
ascetic philosophy of poverty and the saner teaching of Plato, 
who was as much opposed to poverty as to excessive wealth, is 
patent. 
STOICS 


The Stoics were the natural descendants in thought of the 
Cynics, whom they resemble closely in their attitude toward 
external goods. According to their definition, a good must have an 
unconditioned value (absolutum, abredés). Whatever exists merely 
for the sake of something else, or is of value only in comparison 
to something else, is not a good. A similar doctrine was held 
concerning evil. Thus spiritual goods were counted to be the 
only true wealth,’ and he who had the right attitude toward 
all,° and used all rightly, was thought to be the spiritual owner 
of all.7 

Zeno, the founder of the school,’ classified both wealth and 
poverty among the so-called ‘‘indifferents” (aévagopa),? as neither 
good nor evil per se. Like the Cynics, he eulogized poverty, 
though not to such an extreme degree. He went with them only 


t [bid., ll. 13 ff. 

2 Ibid., pp. 36 f., a comparison of Aristides and Callias. 

3 Fr. iv. A, p. 28, purporting to be the answer of Crates as to what he would gain 
by being a philosopher. 

4Cf. infra; also Cic. De fin. iii. το. 33 f.; Zeller, op. cit., III, 1, 214. 

5 Cic. Paradox. 6, on the thesis that only the wise are rich. 

6 Seneca Benef. vii. 3. 2 ἴ.; 6. 3; 8. 1. 

7 Diog. L. vii. 125. On both the citations above, cf. Zeller, III, 1, 251. 

8 Called Citieus, born 320 B.c., of Semitic desvent. 

9 Stoic Vet. Fr., ed. Arnim, 1905, I, 47, fr. 190 (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5, pp. 57 £., ed. 
Wachs.); Diog. L. vii. 101 f., 103-5. 

το Von Arnim, op. cit., p. 53, fr. 220; Cic. De fin. v. 84: “At Zeno eum (mendi- 
cum) non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est.” 


140 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


so far as to insist that wealth and poverty have no value, except 
in relation to the proper spiritual attitude.* 

In his argument that temples are not especially holy places, 
since they are the work of artisans (βαναύσων), Zeno exhibits the 
common negative attitude of the philosophers toward manual 
labor.2. His doctrine on money and exchange was also the negative 
teaching of the moralist, though his statements on these matters 
have special reference to an ideal future. His attitude on the 
problem of distribution is not altogether clear, though he wrote 
a Republic,’ in which he seems to have presented some communistic 
ideas. Like his followers, he looked to the time when the whole 
world should be one state, where artificial differences were no more, 
and all men were brothers.5 His state is utopian and anarchistic, 
without temple, court, gymnasium, money, or exchange. All are 
to wear the same clothing, and there shall be no artificial modesty.® 
Community of wives, at least for the wise, was also probably 
among his utopian schemes,’ though it is very unlikely that he held 
the doctrine in the crass form as reported.§ His state is some- 
what suggestive of the Christian ideal, as a unitary whole, a world- 
cosmos, united by love.° 

There is a peculiar mixture of individualistic and social con- 
ceptions in the philosophy of the Stoics. In their pictures of an 
ideal future world-state, they advanced beyond Plato and other 
thinkers, who limited their communities to the small city-state. 
In calling their state a “‘cosmos”’ also, they gave a positive social 

τ Von Arnim (p. 52, fr. 216 [Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11g, pp. 99 f., ed. Wachs.]) cites Zeno 


as placing among the goods of the σπουδαῖος man the fact that he is οἰκονομικός and 
χρηματιστικός, while the φαῦλοι are opposite; cf. also p. 100. 

2 Von Arnim, p. 61, fr. 264 (Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 12. 76, p. 691). 

3Von Arnim, p. 62, fr. 268 (Diog. L. vii. 33): νόμισμα δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν 
οἴεσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὔτ᾽ ἀποδημίας ἕνεκεν. Oncken (op. cit., p. 48) thinks that 
the Stoics were forerunners of the physiocrats. 

4Plut. De Alex. Fort. i. 6: ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ. . . . Zhvovos. He 
says that it agreed in principle with the states of Plato and Lycurgus. Cf. Poehl- 
mann, op. cit., ΤΙ, 341 ff., but cf. infra, p.140 f. Cf.n.2,above. Ar. Pol. ii. 4. 1266a: 
εἰσὶ δέ τινες πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄλλαι, etc., shows that a series of ideal states had preceded 
his, though he says Plato’s was the most radical. 

5 Plut. De Alex. Fort. i. 6. 

6 Diog. L. vii. 33, 131; cf. nn. 3 and 5 above. 8 Poehlmann, op. cit., II, 342, n. I. 

7Diog. L. vii. 131; 33. 9 Cf. above, ἢ. 5; Athen. xiii. 561¢. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 141 


content to the narrow individualism of the Cynics.t Moreover, as 
seen above, their ideal undoubtedly contained some communistic 
elements. However, according to the fundamental tenet of Stoi- 
cism, as expressed by Zeno, that only the wise can be free and 
citizens, we are still faced with the cld duality and anti-socialistic 
ideal. ‘The Stoics, like the Cynics, were after all essentially indi- 
vidualistic, and were probably believers in private ownership, 
though they dreamed of a future golden age of altruism, when pri- 
vate property would be no longer necessary. 

Chrysippus, the greatest of the Stoics,4 continued and expanded 
the principle that virtue is the only absolute good, and that all 
other things are indifferents, depending for their worth upon right 
use.5 But since the wise alone are capable of right use of externals, 
they alone are truly wealthy.° They are wealthy, even though beg- 
gars, and noble though slaves.?. They are not eager for wealth® yet 
they are good economists, since they know the proper source,’ time, 
method, and extent of money-making. The worthless, on the other 
hand, are most needy, even though wealthy.” Chrysippus seems to 
have advanced still farther, in teaching the negative doctrine that 
wealth is an evil, since it may come from an evil source,” an idea sug- 
gestive of the modern theory of “tainted money. ‘‘Naturally, he with 
the other Stoics, was in sympathy with the Socratics, in objecting 
to the use of one’s knowledge for purposes of money-making.” 

Cf. Poehlmann, of. cit., I, 11, n. 8; also 346. 2 Diog. L. vii. 33. 

3On this double tendency in the Stoics, and reasons therefor, cf. Souchon (op. 
cit., pp. 173 f.); Poehlmann (op. cit., II, 342 f., and I, 111) and Wolf (op. cit., 
pp. 116 ff.) exaggerate their socialistic tendency. For further discussion, cf. infra. 
Cf. L. Stein, Soc. Frage, pp. 171-80. 

4 280-206 B.c. Aristo and Cleanthes, successors of Zeno, also emphasized similar 
doctrines in relation to wealth. Cf. von Arnim, I, p. 89, frs. 396, 397, 398, from 
Aristo; ibid., p. 137, fr. 617, from Cleanthes. 

5 Jbid., II, 70, fr. 240; III, 28, fr. 117; p. 29, frs. 122, 1233 p. 32, fr. 135. 

6 Thid., III, 156, fr. 598; p. 159, fr. 618; p. 155, fr. 593. 7 Ibid., p. 155, fr. 597. 

8 Ibid., Ὁ. 160, fr. 629, “‘Lucro autem numquam sapiens studet.” 


9 Ibid., p. 169, fr. 623: μόνον δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα χρηματιστικὸν εἶναι, γινώσ- 
κοντα ἀφ᾽ ὧν, χρηματιστέον, καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ μέχρι πότε. 

το Von Arnim, III, 168, fr. 674. - 

τὶ Thid., Ὁ. 36, frs. 151, 152, “ Bonum ex malo non fit: divitiae fiunt: fiunt autem 
ex avaritia divitiae ergo non sunt bonum’’ (Seneca Ep. 87. 22). 

2 Von Armim, p. 172, fr. 686 (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, p. 109, 10): . . . . λόγους καπη- 
λεύειν, οὐ φαμένων δεῖν ἀπὸ παιδείας παρὰ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων χρηματίζεσθαι. 


142 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


The cosmopolitan attitude of the Stoics caused them to be 
opposed to the theory of slavery as a natural institution. They 
taught that enforced service is no evidence of slavery,? but that 
the real slaves are the ignoble and foolish. The wise, on the other 
hand, alone are free, though they are slaves to countless masters.4 

Chrysippus, like Zeno, probably had dreams of a future ideal 
state, where the highest eternal law would rule and individual 
strivings would be lost in the care for the common weal.5 If he 
taught family communism, it was doubtless in a Platonic form.® 

Utopian social theories after the time of Aristotle were by no 
means limited to those of Zeno and Chrysippus. As Souchon has 
observed,’ the period between the end of the fourth and the begin- 
ning of the second centuries was especially favorable to such specu- 
lation. The skeptical criticism of the Sophists had prepared the 
following generations to call in question the most elementary social 
principles. Ideal states, such as those of Phaleas and Plato, had 
opened the way for future imitations. The conquests of Alexander 
had broadened the vision of the Greek, so that he no longer thought 
in terms of Plato’s circumscribed city, but rather in terms of a world- 
state. Moreover, the utter political confusion and unstable 
economic conditions of the time aroused the more serious-minded 
to dream of an ideal past or golden age; to idealize the simple, 
“natural” life of the so-called “pious” barbarian nomads,® or 
even of the animal world, as opposed to the “artificial’’ conditions 
of civilization; and to exaggerate the virtues and communistic 

τ Von Arnim, p. 86, fr. 352: ἄνθρωπος yap ἐκ φύσεως δοῦλος οὐδείς. p. 87, fr. 358; 
cf. p. 141, n. 7, above. 

bid. tr. 357. 3 [bid., 89, fr. 365; p. 86, frs. 356, 354. 

4 Ibid., p. 86, fr. 355; p. 88, fr. 362; p. 89, 364. Cf. Espinas, Hist. des doctrines 
économiques, 56 ἴ., on the Stoics’ attitude toward labor and slavery: “Ni les 


Cyniques ni les Stoiciens ne méprisaient le travail’; “La seule servitude déshono- 
rante est celle des passions et du vice.” 

‘Poehlmann (op. cit., ΤΙ, 342 f. and notes), citing von Arnim, III, 77, fr. 314, 
ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεύς, etc., thinks Chrysippus’ principle of the law of reason 
as king of all is anti-individualistic. He cites also Cic. De fin. iii. 19 (64), where the 
individual seems to be made to exist for the sake of the whole. But cf. above, p. 140 f. 
and notes. 

6 Cf. Diog. L. vii. 131, and above, p. 140, nn, 7 f. ΤΟ. Cus Duele 

δ Cf. above, on Cynics and Stoics, and infra; cf. even in Plato, Laws 679A-B. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 143 


character of the old Spartan constitution. The social theories 
were largely Stoic in tendency, and thus present a strange com- 
bination of individualistic and communistic ideas. 

Dichaearchus of Messana, a pupil of Aristotle, described an 
original paradise, when men lived in accord with nature. In that 
golden age, they did not depend upon animals for food, but sub- 
sisted on fruits. Neither did they have any possessions to arouse 
hate and strife, until the evil of private property developed, and 
caused the degeneration of human society.3 

Ephorus,‘ a disciple of Isocrates, represented the second tend- 
ency. He eulogized the life of the ‘milk-fed’’ (γαλακτόφαγοι), 
barbarian nomads of the north as true to nature and righteous.5 
Their piety and simple life precluded the social ills that arise from 
individual ownership,® for their communism even extended to the 
family, and all composed one brotherhood.’ 

The third tendency is evident in the writings of Isocrates,* 
Ephorus,? Polybius,” Plutarch, and was probably common to 


τ The Socratics were the pioneers in this regard also. On the unhistorical char- 
acter of the alleged early communism in Sparta, cf. Poehlmann, oP. cit., I, 75 fi. and 
roo f.; on this triple tendency in the post-Aristotelian social thought, cf. ibid., 
pp. 99 ff., on “Der Sozialstaat der Legende und das sozialistische Naturrecht”’; also 
Souchon, p. 172. 

2 Cf. above, p. 140. 

3 Cf. Porphyry De abstin. iv. 1. 2; Mueller, F.H.G., II, 233. His Blos Ἑλλάδος 
was a history of the degeneration of Greek civilization from the primitive ideal. Cf. 
Poehlmann, oP. cit., I, 109 and ἢ. 1, on his influence on Rousseau, who refers to him. 
Cf. ibid., τι. 2, for a similar idea of a golden age in Theoc. xil. 15. 

4 On his social ideas, cf. Poehlmann, I, 113 ff. 

5 Strabo vii, p. 463 (F.H.G., I, 256, fr. 76). 

6 Nic. Damasc. (F.H.G., III, fr. 123): διὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινότητα Kal δικαιοσύνην. 
Cf. also zbid., I, 257, fr. 78, Ephorus. 

7 Ibid.; also fr. 76: πρός Te ἀλλήλους εὐνομοῦνται κοινὰ πάντα ἔχοντες τά τε ἄλλα 
καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τέκνα καὶ τὴν ὅλην συγγένειαν. 

8 Panathen. 178: ἀλλὰ παρὰ σφίσι μὲν αὐτοῖς ἰσονομίαν καταστῆσαι καὶ δημοκρατίαν 
τοιαύτην, οἵαν περ χρὴ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ὁμονοήσειν; also 153; for an 
idealized picture of early Athenian life, cf. Paneg. 79; Areop. 31; 32, 35, 44, 83; 
cited by Poehlmann, op. cit., I, 136 f. 

9 Cf. Polybius vi. 45, and Poehlmann’s note (I, 122). 

0 Book vi. 10; 48; etc.; cf. Poehlmann, as above. 


1 Cf. his Lycurgus, especially 8, 9, 10, 3, 25, 30, 31. 


144 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


many other thinkers whose works are no longer extant.t They 
idealized the ancient Spartan society, as a model of complete com- 
munism, which provided full equality and freedom for the citizens. 
It was free from the evils of luxury, excessive wealth, poverty, 
civic strife, commerce, and money-greed, a condition where all the 
citizens were wise, and where the Stoic ideal of independence 
(αὐτάρκεια) was fully realized.? 

It was but a step from this to the projection of these bizarre 
idealizations of the past and of primitive life into the present and 
future. They took the form of ideal utopias such as that of Zeno,3 
or of romantic descriptions, purporting to portray ideal conditions 
as actually existing, such as found their model in Plato’s Adlantis.4 
For a full discussion of this type of literature, the reader may consult 
Poehlmann’s work.s We need give it only cursory notice here. 

Theopompus, a pupil of Socrates, described a ““Meropian” 
land.® His aim, however, was probably the entertainment of the 
reader, rather than social reform, as is evidenced by the fantastic 
nature of his stories. They picture not only ideal communistic 
conditions, but also a state of the wicked (πονηρόπολις), and 
crassly emphasize the alleged free-love of the Etruscans.7 

The Cimmerian state of Hecataeus, an idealization of the king- 
dom of the Pharaohs, had a more serious social purpose? It 
describes a state in which all conquered lands are equally divided 
among the citizens, and where landed property cannot be sold. 
The people are free from greed of gain, civic strife, and all the ills 
that follow it. The ideal is not the greatest increase of wealth, but 
the development of the citizens to the highest social ideal. 

Euhemerus wrote a ‘‘Sacred Chronicle” (iepa ἀναγραφή)" of 
an ideal society on an island near India, ruled by a priestly aris- 


* Cf. Poehlmann, I, 122 and n. 3. 3 Cf. above, p. 140. 

? Cf. above, notes p. 143, nn. 4-6. especially 6. 4 Cf. above, p. 62, n. 6. 

5 Op. cit., ΤΙ, 359 ff., though he has been too ready to see in them a direct analogy 
to modern socialism. 

° Book viii of his Philipp. Histories (Athen. xii. 517d ff.). 

7 Cf. Poehlmann, I, 362 ff. 

δ᾿ Mueller, F.H.G., II, 392, fr. 13; cf. 386 ff. 

9 Diod. i. 6. 93; 4, a platonic ideal. 0 7574. v. 45. 3 ff. 


MINOR PHILOSOPHERS 145 


tocracy. Here, labor was held in high regard. The artisans were 
in the priestly class, the farmers were second, and the herdsmen 
were on an equality with the soldiers.‘ All land and other means 
of production were common, except the house and garden (kjmov).? 
The land was not worked collectively, but farmers and herdsmen 
alike brought their products to a common storehouse for common 
consumption. Thus neither money nor commercial class was 
necessary. 

Jambulus, in his “Sun State,’’* outdoes even Euhemerus in 
his communistic ideas. He describes a sort of paradise of sun- 
worshipers at the equator. Here the trees never fail of ripe fruit, 
and the citizens never lose their strength and beauty. The whole 
social and economic life is under communistic régime. There is 
collective ownership of all the means of production, and each must 
take his turn at each kind of work.’ The communism extends 
also to the family.© Thus Greek economic and social speculation, 
which always contained socialistic elements, ends in a communism 
for the whole citizenship, so thorough as to include both products 
and means of production, and to demand a leveling even of the 
natural inequalities that result from the different kinds of work. 

τ 1014. 45. 3. 

2 Diod. v. 45. 5; 46. 1 shows that the artisans were included in the communism. 

3 Ibid. 45. 4: τοὺς κάρπους ἀναφέρουσιν els τὸ κοινόν, etc.; though prizes were given 
for excellence in farming. 

4 [bid. 11. 55-60. 

5 Ibid. 59.6: ἐναλλὰξ δὲ αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀλλήλοις διακονεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἁλιεύειν, τοὺς δὲ 
περὶ τὰς τέχνας εἶναι, ἄλλους δὲ περὶ ἄλλα τῶν χρησίμων ἀσχολεῖσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐκ περιόδου 
κυκλικῆς λειτουργεῖν, πλὴν τῶν ἤδη γεγηρακότων. Cf. p. 34, n. 1, above, on Ruskin’s 
idea that all should do some head and some hand work. Poehlmann (II, 391, n. 2) 
compares it to the socialism of Bebel. The implication that Plato’s state is distin- 
guished from this, as a society of citizens who do not work (402 f.), is hardly fair 
The proper distinction is rather that Plato insists that each citizen do the particular 
kind of work for which he is best fitted. It is needless to ask which had the saner 
view, from the economic or any other standpoint. Jambulus’ repudiation of the 


division of labor in the interest of equality is certainly one of the most radical meas- 
ures ever suggested in the history of communism. 


6 Diod. v. 58.1. 


CHAPTER VIII 


GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE AND 
INFLUENCE OF GREEK ECONOMICS 


Our conclusions as to the importance and influence of Greek 
economic thought have been fully presented in the previous dis- 
cussion. A brief summary of the results, however, may be of 
advantage now, at the close of our survey. As seen above, despite 
the fact that Greek thought in this field was incidental to moral 
and political speculation, and despite a certain philosophic prejudice 
and limited economic vision, the contribution is by no means merely 
negative. We have seen that it included a recognition by one or 
more Greek thinkers of such important principles as the following: 
that society finds its origin in mutual need, and in the natural 
development of clan and family, not in the artificial social contract; 
that the state is a great business association, in which about the 
same economic laws apply as in private economy; that the final 
goal of economics is not property but human welfare; that the 
criteria of economic value are intrinsic utility, economic demand, 
and cost of production; that wealth must possess the quality of 
storableness; that true wealth consists only of commodities that 
minister to human welfare; that the three factors in production 
are land, labor and capital; that money originated in necessary 
exchange; that it serves as a medium of exchange, a standard of 
value, and a ticket of deferred payments; that it should possess 
intrinsic value, which is more stable than that of other commodi- 
ties; that it should not be confused with wealth, but should be 
understood in its true function as representative wealth; that 
credit must play an exceedingly important part in business opera- 
tions as representative capital; that agriculture is the basal indus- 
try, on which all others must depend; that the division of labor is 
the fundamental principle at the foundation of all exchange; that 
it results in certain important economic advantages, and that its 
extensive application depends upon large commercial develop- 
ment; that reciprocity is the fundamental principle in exchange, 

146 


GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 147 


as also in the social structure; that exchange performs a legitimate 
social function in creating time and place values; that industrial 
expansion is limited by a law of diminishing returns; that the pri- 
mary purpose of exchange should not be profit, but satisfaction 
of economic need; that commerce merely for its own sake does not 
necessarily increase the national store, but may produce only 
economic inequalities; that extremes of wealth and poverty cause 
industrial inefficiency, social strife, and crime; that excessive 
individual wealth is not usually compatible with just acquisition 
or just expenditure; that it also necessarily implies corresponding 
extremes of poverty; that the commercial spirit in nations is the 
chief cause of international differences; that the goal of economics 
is consumption rather than production, and that foolish consump- 
tion results in great economic waste; that all economic problems 
are moral problems; that private property is not a natural right, 
but a gift of society, and therefore that society may properly con- 
trol its activities; that there is a certain unity in human nature, 
which is opposed to the doctrine of natural slavery; that the 
individual should have opportunity for personal development in 
accord with his capacities, aside from the mere struggle for physical 
existence; that true economic equality does not demand equal 
shares for all, but shares proportioned to capacities and services; 
and that gifts of charity merely for consumption are fruitful causes 
of poverty and indolence. 

Besides the recognition of such principles, we have seen that 
many practical suggestions for the amelioration of economic and 
social conditions, which are being seriously presented today, were 
first proposed by Greek thinkers. Measures for the divorce of 
government from big business, state control of natural monopolies, 
conservation of natural resources, state supervision of trade and 
commerce, including regulation of prices and rates, publicity in 
business, pure food laws, and the socialization of industry and its 
products were all first proposed by Greeks. On the other hand, 
we have seen that practically all the modern stock arguments 
against socialism were long ago presented by Aristotle, and that 
the ideal of the Greek socialist was not primarily materialistic and 
selfish, as the modern, but moral and social. 


148 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Such a list of positive economic principles and practical sug- 
gestions should surely give the Greeks some claim to recognition 
in the field of economic thought. But they should be judged 
primarily, not by their positive contribution to economic theory 
or by the practical nature of their suggestions for legislation, but 
rather by the extent to which they realized the existence of the 
great economic and social problems, which are still crying for a 
solution. From this standpoint, we have seen that Plato and 
Aristotle especially reveal remarkable economic insight. More- 
over, there still remains the outstanding fact that the Greeks were 
the forerunners of the moral, humanitarian, and social emphasis 
in present-day economy. This alone should give to them a distinct 
place in the evolution of economic thought, and should make it 
impossible for Souchon to conclude: ‘‘Ces mépris [of G. B. Say] 
sont pour nous apparaitre plus justifiés que les admirations de 
Roscher.””! 

The influence of Greek thought upon later economic theory, 
however, seems not to have been very direct or extensive, probably 
owing to the incidental nature of their speculation. To be sure, 
mediaeval economic thought presents, in many respects, an 
unbroken continuity with the Greek. In their emphasis on the 
moral, in their doctrines on usury, just price, importance of agri- 
culture, exchange for profit, and in their general conservative atti- 
tude toward money and commercial development, mediaeval 
thinkers are very similar to the Socratics.2, Doubtless much of 
this similarity may be traced to the direct influence of Aristotle, as 
is especially evident in the work of Thomas Aquinas and Nicholas 
Oresme.3 To a considerable extent, however, the economic ideas 
cf the Middle Ages were a direct outgrowth of the economic and 
religious conditions under which the writers lived.4 In the following 

‘Op. cit., p. 195; Roscher is, of course, extreme in his appreciation. 

2 Cf. Brants, Les théories écon. au XIII? et XIV® siécle; Espinas, Histoire des doc- 
trines Economiques, pp. 72 ff.; Haney, op. cit., pp. 69 ff. 

3In his De origine, natura, jure, et mutationibus monetarum (fourteenth century). 
On their dependence upon Aristotle, cf. Zmavec, Zeitschr. f. d. gesammt. Staatswiss., 
1902, pp. 54 and 77 f.; and Archiv f. d. Gesch. der Phil., 1899, 407 ff. 

4 Cf. Souchon, pp. 199 f., who observes that the Greek moral goal was perfection 
of the individual through the state, while that of the Middle Ages was individual 
salvation to another world. 


GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 149 


centuries, some Greek influence may be traced in Adam Smith, in 
the physiocrats,* in utopian writers such as More, and in eighteenth- 
century thinkers like Rosseau. 

It is usually asserted that the economic thought of the past 
century has been practically unaffected by Greek ideas. But our 
previous discussion has clearly shown that Plato and Xenophon, 
at least, dominated the economic thinking of Ruskin. If further 
evidence is needed, it is necessary only to turn to the names of 
Greek thinkers in the index to the monumental new edition of his 
works, which we have frequently cited above. He frankly and 
enthusiastically presents himself as an apostle of a “Greek theory 
of economics.”? But despite some of his utopian and extravagant 
ideas, he is being ever more recognized by authorities in economics 
as having been one of the chief factors in the development of 
political economy to its present moral and humanitarian emphasis. 
His repudiation of the abstract “economic man,’’ his insistence 
upon human, moral, and social ideals in economics, his attempt to 
broaden the definition of economic value and wealth by emphasizing 
true utility, his constant stress upon proper consumption rather 
than upon production, his demand that all have opportunity up to 
their capacity, his opposition to the laisses-faire policy in economics 


t Cf. Oncken, op. cit., p. 38. 


2He calls Plato the “master of economy” (Fors Clav. [Vol. XXVIII, 717]); 
cf. also Vol. XXXVIII, 112 on his Platonic discipleship. He says (Arrows of the 
Chace, Vol. XXXIV, 547): ‘‘The economy I teach is Xenophon’s’’; cf. also Vol. 
XXXVII, 550, Letter to Professor Blackie, II: ‘‘My own political economy is literally 
only the expansion and explanation of Xenophon’s.” Cf. Vol. XXXI, Intro., pp. 
xv ff.; Vol. XVII, pp. xlix and 18; cf. his preface to his translation of the Economicus; 
cf. also E. Barker, Pol. Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day 
(“Home University Library”), pp. 191-96, who emphasizes this Greek influence. 
Cf. above, p. 23, n. 5; 64, n. 3. 


3 Barker, cited above, in n. 2, also emphasizes this fact. Cf. the edition of 
Ruskin above cited, Introduction to Vol. XVII, an excellent discussion of Ruskin’s 
economic ideas and their influence, for a bibliography (p. cxii) and citations from 
many modern economists on the subject; e.g., the notable address in 1885, in recog- 
nition of his work, signed by a number of leading English economists; the striking 
citations from Ingram; from Stimson (Quarterly Journal of Economics, II [1888], 445), 
that the future political economy will make its bricks for building “from Ruskin’s 
earth rather than from Ricardo’s straw’’; from the late regius professor of modern 
history at Oxford, “The political economy of today is the political economy of John 
Ruskin, and not that of John Bright or even of John Stewart Mill.” 


150 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


and politics, his emphasis upon right education, all have borne 
rich and abiding fruit in the last few decades, and these are all dis- 
tinctively Greek ideas, as we have seen above. Thus indirectly, 
through Ruskin, Greek economic thought has exerted a potent 
influence upon the evolution of nineteenth-century economics, and 
thus there is much truth in the words of Wagner, as quoted by 
Oncken,’ not merely for German, but for all modern economy: 
‘Es ist im Grunde uralter wahrhaft classischer Boden, auf den 
jetzt die deutsche 6konomische und soziale Theorie und Praxis sich 
bewusst wieder stellen.’”’ Souchon’s characterization of Greek 
economy as “morale étatisme’’? could well be applied to much in 
the economic thought of today. 


τ᾽ 46, n. 3 (Wagner, Die Akad. Nat.-oek. und der Socialismus, 1895). 
2 Op. cit., p. 201. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


The following bibliography includes: (a) histories of economic 
thought; almost all of these have only a cursory chapter on Greek 
theory, and several of them deal largely with economic conditions; 
(Ὁ) histories of socialism and social theory, to which the foregoing 
statement applies to a large extent; (c) chapters in works on differ- 
ent phases of Greek economic history; (d) other works of a more 
general type, which deal more or less extensively with Greek eco- 
nomic or social ideas; (6) articles and dissertations; (f) editions of 
Greek authors that are of special interest for our subject. It is 
manifestly impossible to name many of these latter, and we shall 
content ourselves with the mention of a few that have proved 
especially helpful. The works are listed in alphabetical order, for 
greater convenience in reference, and those of chief interest are 
starred. 


Adam, James (The Republic of Plato, 1902). 

Adler, G. Geschichte des Socialismus und Kommunismus von Plato bis zur 
Gegenwart (1899), pp. 6-52. On Greek. 

Alesio. ‘‘Alcune reflessione intorno ai concetti del valore nell’ antichita 
classica,”’ Archivio Giuridico, 1889. 

Ashley, W. J. ‘‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of Barter,’ Quarterly Journal of Econ- 
omy, 1895. An interpretation of Ar. Pol. i. 1258627 fi. 

Barker, E. Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (1906), pp. 357-404.* 

Blanqui, M. Histoire de l'économie politique en Europe (1842; 4th ed., 1860), 
I, 33-92. Somewhat indiscriminate in appreciation of Greek thinkers. 

Bonar. Philosophy and Political Economy (1893).* 

Brants, V. Xenophon Economiste, reprint from Revue Catholique de Louvain, 
1881.* 

Bussy, M. Histoire et Réfutation du Socialisme depuis Vantiquité, jusquw ἃ 
nos jours (1859). Superficial and prejudiced. 

Cossa, L. Histoire des doctrines économiques (1899) (trans. from the Italian 
of 1876), pp. 144--5ο. ἢ 

“Ti alcuni studii storici sulle teoiie economiche dei Greci,”’ Saggi 
di Economia Politica, 1878, pp. 3-14. 

De Sam-Cognazzi. Analisi dell economia publica e privata degli antichi (1830). 

Du Mesnill-Marigny. Histoire de l'économie politique des anciens peuples 
(1878, 3 vols.). Superficial. 





Ι51 


152 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


De Villeneuve-Bargemont. Histoire de l'économie politique (Paris, 1841, 2d 
ed.), I. Chiefly on the facts. 

Dietzel. ‘‘Beitriige zur Geschichte des Socialismus und des Kommunismus,” 
Zeitschrift fiir Literatur und Geschichte der Staatswissenschaften, I (1893), 
973. ΠΠο 

Doring, A. Die Lehre des Socrates αἷς soziales Reform-System (1895). 

DuBois, A. Précis de Vhistoire des doctrines économiques dans leurs rapports 
avec les faits et avec les institutions (1903), pp. 23-53. A good partial 
bibliography.* 

Diihring, E. Kritische Geschichte der Nationalékonomie und des Socialismus 
(3d ed., 1879), pp- 19-25. 

Dunning, W. A. Political Theories Ancient and Mediaeval (New York, 191 3). 
Economic material only incidental. 

Eisenhart, H. Geschichte der Nationalékonomie (2d ed., 1891). Mostly 
on economic history. 

Espinas. Histoire des doctrines économiques (1891), chap. τ 

“Tart économique dans Platon,”’ Revue des Etudes Grecques, XXVI 
(1914), 105-29, 236-65.* 

Ferrara, J. ‘‘L’economica politica degli antichi,” Journal de Statis. de Palerme, 
1836. 

Fontpertuis, F. de. “‘Filiation des ideés économiques, dans lantiquité,”’ 
Journal des écon., September, 1871 ff.* 

Francotte, H. L’Industrie dans la Gréce ancienne (Brussels, 1900). Sec- 
tions on Greek theories of labor and socialism.* 

Glaser. ‘De Aristotelis doctrina de divitiis” (dissertation, 1850), Jahrb. 
fiir Gesellschafts- und Staatswissenschaft, 1865. 

Géttling. De Notione servitutis apud Aristotelem (dissertation, Jena, 1821). 

Grote, G. Plato (4 vols.). 

Aristotle (2 vols.). 

Guiraud, P. La main-d’euvre industrielle dans Vancienne Gréce (1900), 
pp. 36-50. On theory.* 

La propriété fonciére en Gréce jusqu’a la congtete Romaine (1893), 

pp. 573-612. On socialistic ideas.* 

Etudes économiques sur Vantiquité (1905), chap. i. On the impor- 
tance of economic questions in Greece.* 

Hagen. Observationum oeconomico politicarum in Aeschinis dialogum qua 
Eryxias inscribitur (dissertation, 1822). 

Haney, L. W. History of Economic Thought (1911), pp. 39-52.” 

Heidel, W. A. Pseudo-Platonica (dissertation, Chicago, 1896), pp. 59-61. 
On Eryxias. 

Herzog, C. “Communismus und Socialismus in Alterthum,” Beilage sur 
allgemeine Zeitung, 1894, No. 166. Conservative on the influence of 
socialism in the ancient world. 














BIBLIOGRAPHY 153 


Hildebrand, B. Xenophontis et Aristot. de oeconomia publica doctrinae illus- 
trantur (dissertation, Marburg, 1845). Part on Aristotle not published. 

Hoderman, M. ‘“Quaestionum oeconomicarum specimen,” (dissertation, 
Berlin, 1896), Berlin Studien fiir class. Philol. und Arch., XVI, No. 4. 
On the so-called Economica. 

Ingram, J. K. History of Political Economy (1907), pp. 7-26.* 

Jowett and Campbell. Republic of Plato (3 vols., 1894). 

Kaulla, R. Die geschichtliche Entwickelung der modernen Werttheorien (1906), 
pp. 3f. On Aristotle. 

Kautsky, K. Die Geschichte des Socialismus in Einszeldarstellungen (1897), 
ur. 

Kautz. Theorie und Geschichte der national Oekonomie (Wien, 2d ed., 1860), 
Pp. 102-43).* 

Knies, Karl. Die politische Economie vom geschichtlichen Standpunkt (1883). 
Of but slight interest for ancient theory. 

Loos, I. A. “Studies in the Politics of Aristotle and the Republic of Plato,” 
Bull. of the University of Iowa, 1899. 

Mabille. “1,6 communisme et le féminisme ἃ Athénes.”’ 
Mémoires de l’académie de Dijon, 4 série, t. 7, pp. 317 ff. (Paris, 1900). 

Martiis, S. de. Cognetti (Socialismo antico, Turin, 1899).* 

Menger, Karl. Art. “Geld,” Handwéorterbuch der Staatswissenschaft (2d ed.), 
IV, 82 ff. 

Newman. The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1877, 4 vols.).* 

Oncken, A. Geschichte der Nationalékonomie (1902), 1, 27-49. | 

Palgrave’s Dictionary. Art. “Aristotle.” This and the above-named article 
on “Geld” will serve as sufficient notice of the several Dictionaries of 
Political Economy, to which other references might be made. 

Platon, G. “Le socialisme en Gréce,” Devenir Social., January, 1897 ff. 

Poehlmann, R. Geschichte des antiken Socialismus und Kommunismus (Min- 
chen, 1893-1901, 2 vols.; 2d ed., 1912, Geschichte der sozialen Frage und 
des Socialismus in der antiken Welt). A thorough treatment of Greek 
socialistic tendencies both in theory and in practice, though it exagger- 
ates the development of capitalism in Greece, and draws analogies too 
freely between ancient and modern socialism. Our citations are from 
the second edition.* 

“Die Anfinge des Sozialismus in Europa,” Sybel’s Hist. Zeitschrift, 
Bd. 79, H. 3, pp. 385-451. 

Rambaud, J. Histoire des Doctrines économiques (Paris, 1902). 

Regnier, M. L’économie politique et rurale des Grecs. 

Robin, L. ‘“Platon et la science sociale,” Revue de metaphysique et de morale, 
March, 1913 (reprint by Armand Colin, Paris).* 

Roscher. ‘Ueber das Verhiiltniss der national Oekonomik zum klassischen 
Alterthume,” Ansichten der Volkswirtschaft, 1 (1878), I-50.* 





154 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Roscher. De doctrinae oeconomico politicae apud Graecos primordiis (Leipzig, 
1866). 

Salvio, G. Salomo. I/ concetto della schiavitu secundo Aristotile (Rome, 1881). 

Communismo nella Grecia antiqua (Padua, 1883). 

Schneider. Die staatswirtschaftlichen Lehren des Aristotles (dissertation, Neu 
Puppin, 1873). 

Schrohl, O. De Eryxias qui fertur Platonis (dissertation, 1901). Chiefly on 
the authorship of the Eryxias. 

Schulte, J. Quomodo Plato in legibus publica Atheniensium instituta respex- 
erit (dissertation, 1907). 

Sewall, H. “Theory of Value before Adam Smith,” Publication of American 
Economic Association, II, Part 3. Four pages on Aristotle. 

Shorey. Paul (“‘Plato’s Laws,” Classical Philology, October, 1914. 

Simey, Miss E. ‘‘Economic Theory among the Greeks and Romans,” Eco- 
nomic Review, October, 1900. 

Souchon, A. Les Théories économiques dans la Gréce antique (1898; a 2d ed. 
in 1906, but slightly changed).* 

Stein, Ludwig. Das erste Auftauschen der sozialen Frage bet den Griechen 
(dissertation, Bern, 1896). 

Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie (Stuttgart, 1903, 2d ed.), 

pp. 150-82. 

“Die staatswissenschaftliche Theorie der Griechen vor Arist. und 
Platon,” Zeitschrift fiir die gesammte Wissenschaft, 1853, pp. 115-82 
(Tiibingen). 

Stewart. Notes to Ar., Nic. Ethics (2 vols.).* 

St. Hilaire, B. Preface to translation of the Politics of Arist. 

Thill, J. Die Eigenthumsfrage im klassischen Alterthum (Luxembourg, 1892). 

Thomissen. Histoire du socialisme depuis l’antiquité jusqwd la constitution 
francaise du 14 jan., 1852. 

Trinchera, F. Storia critica dell’ economia publia (epoca antica) (Naples, 1873). 

Vanderkindere, L. ‘‘Le Socialisme dans la Gréce antique,’ Revue de l’Uni- 
versité de Brussels, 1, 4, pp. 241-46. 

Vogel, G. Die Oekonomik des Xenophon; eine Vorarbeit fiir die Geschichte 
der griechischen Oekonomik (Erlangen, 1895). 

Walcker, K. Geschichte der Nationalékonomie und des Socialismus (Leipzig, 
1902). 

Wallon. Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité (Paris, 1879, 2d ed.). One 
chapter on theories of slavery. 

Wolf, H. Geschichte des antiken Soszialismus und Individualismus (1909). 
A merely popular treatment. 

Wilhelm, F. “Die Oeconomica der Neupythagoreer,” Rhein. Mus., XVII, 
No. 2 (1915), 162 ff. 

Zmavc, J. ‘‘Die Werttheorie bei Arist. und Thos. Aquino,” Archiv fiir die 
Geschichte der Philosophie (Berlin, 1899), pp. 407 fi.* 











BIBLIOGRAPHY 155 


Zmave, J. “16 Geldtheorie und ihre Stellung innerhalb der Wirtschaft und 
staatswissenschaftliche Anschauungen des Arist., Zeitschrift fiir die ges. 
Staatswissenschaft, 1902, pp. 48-79.* 

As stated, a large number of the foregoing list deal chiefly with actual 
conditions, rather than with theory. Besides these, many other works on 
phases of Greek economic history are cited in the course of our discussion, 
the names of which, with page-references, may be found in the index. All other 
works that are incidentally cited are also listed there. For an excellent pres- 
entation of the political economy of John Ruskin, and a selected bibliography 
on his work as a social and economic reformer, cf. the Library Edition of his 
works, from which we have often cited (George Allen, London, Introduction 
to Vol. XVII, 1905; bibliography, p. cxii). 





INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND AUTHORS 


Acquisition, 25, 27, 29, 50, 66, 78, 88, 80, 
90, 93, 105, 111-15, 128, 138, 144, 147. 
See also Chrematistik; Exchange. 


Adam, 36, 96, 151. 

Adler, 55, 151. 

Aeschines, 62. 

Agriculture, 14 f., 18, 29 f., 31, 34, 38, 590, 
63, 66-68, 79, 89-91, 93, 96, 114, 116, 
128, 145 {., 148. 

Alcaeus, 14. 

Alcidamas, 17. 

Alesio, 151. 

Antisthenes, 65, 126, 131 f., 134. 

Apollodorus, οι. 

Aquinas, 148. 

Ardaillon, 75. 

Aristippus, 129. 

Aristo, 141. 

Aristophanes, 57, 66, 93, 110, 138. 

Aristotle, 9, 12, 16,17, 19, 21 f., 28, 29, 30, 
32, 33, 37,39, 43) 44, 40, 48, 40, 51, 52, 
53; 54; 56, 66, 67, 68, 69, 74, 755 79; 81- 
$24, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 
133, 130, 137, 140, 142, 143, 147, 148. 

Ashley, 113 f., 151. 

Athenaeus, 133, 140. 

Aulus Gellius, 52. 


Barker, 9, 15, 16, 17, 84, 85, 90, 97, 98, 
100, IOI, 104, 105, 108, 110, 124, 130, 
149, 151. 

Barter, 35, 101, 106, 108, 113. 

Bawerk, E. Boehm von, 106. 

Bebel, 145. 

Beloch, 9, 20, 45. 

Bergk, 14. 

Blanqui, 29, 48, 68, 82, 104, 151. 

Boeckh, 9, 41, 47, 106, 134. 

Bonar, 26, 28, 32, 36, 37, 48, 84, 90, 118, 
ie ΤΡῚ: 

Bright, 149. 

Bryson, 126. 

Biicher, 20. 

Biichsenschiitz, 65, 93. 

Bussy, 48, 151. 


σι 


Callicles, 16. 
Callicratidas, 126. 
Capital, 18, 30, 35, 47, 65, 67, 68 f., 91-93, 


104, 117, 124, 137, 146. See also the 
Greek index for term. 


Capitalism, 7, 8, 18, 19, 20, 21, 30, 40, 47, 
62, οὔ, 106, 112. 

Carlyle, 25, 44, 99, Ior. 

ate system in Plato’s Republic, 37, 
48 

Charetides, gt. 


Chrematistik, -105,) ΤΙΌ, Tir) ΤΙ, ΤΥ2. 
115, 123, 124. See also Acquisition; 
Exchange. 


Christ, W., 63, 81. 

Chrysippus, 141 f. 

Cicero, 125, 126, 130, 139, 142. 

Civic strife, 13, 25, 26, 54, 55, 62, 74, 78, 
79, 87, 118, 144, 147. 

Cleanthes, 141. 

Clement Alex., 15, 140. 

Cognazzi, De, 151. 

Collectivism, 31, 61, 123, 124. 

Columella, gt. 

Commerce. See Exchange. 

Communism. See Socialism. 

Communism of family, 18, 54, 55, 56, 117, 
120, 133, 140, 142, 143, 145. 

Competition, 14. 

Conservation, 30, 147. 

Consumption, 27, 46, 68, 91, 92, 105, 113, 
114, 137, 145, 147, 140. 

Cope, 83, 93. 

Cornford, 14, 18, 41, 53. 

Cossa, 67, 82, 134, 151. 

Crantor, 125. 

Crates, 133, 138, 139. 

Credit, 39, 105, 106, 146. See the Greek 
index for term. 

Croiset, 17, 63, 81. 

Cynics, τὸν 97; 1908, 125; 20,90275.0205 
130, 131-33, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 
141. 

Cyrenaics, 129, 130. 


~ 


158 GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Decharme, 18. 

Democritus, 15, 17, 23. 

Demosthenes, 13, 45, 62, 66, 68, 69, 77 ἴ., 
105, τού, 114. 

Dichaearchus, 143. 

Diels, 15, 17. 

Dietzel, 32, 57, 152. 

Diminishing returns, 67, 146. 

Dio Chrysostom, 13, 126, 130, 131, 132. 

Diodorus, 145. 

Diogenes, 131, 132 f., 138. 

Diogenes Laertius, 17, 52, 100, 126, 127, 
130, 131, 132, 133, 136, 139, 140, 141, 
142. 

Distribution, 12, 46 f., 51, 57, 74, 84, 102, 
115-17, 118, 140. See also the Greek 
index for term. 


Distributive justice, 102, 107. 

Dobbs, 16, 25. 

Doering, 69, 152. 

Droysen, 45. 

Drumann, 29, 57. 

DuBois, 28, 35) 555 82, 92, 104, 109, 114, 
152. 

Diihring, 71, 82, ΙΟΙ, 152. 

Diimmler, 17. 

Dunning, 130, 152. 


Economica, 9, 14, 63, 69, 81, 94, 125, 
126 f., 127-29, 131, 133. 

Economic demand, 34, 64, 70, 72, 82, 83, 
84, 86, 104, 108, 109, II0, 135, 146. 
See also the Greek index. 

Economy: and asceticism, 12, 25, 60, 65, 
131, 136, 137, 139; and ethics, ro, 18, 
21, 29, 63, 81, 90, 146, 148, 149; domes- 
tic and public, 9, 63, 81 f., 111, 112, 113, 
126,146; influence of Greek, 8, 146-50; 
mediaeval, 39, 148; modern, 8, 11 f., 
27, 44, 115; Ricardian, 8, 10, 11, 50. 

Education, 50, 54, 95, 118, 121, 122, 149. 

Eisenhart, 32, 152. 

Ely, 11. 

Ephorus, 143. 

Epictetus, 133. 

Epicurus, Epicurean, 52, 126, 129, 130. 

Equality, 55 f., 60 f., 62, 79 f., 83, 100, 
LLO; 119: ΤΙ; 120. 121, 1455 147. 

Eryxias, 17; 103, 132, 123..27. 

Esmein, 52. 

Espinas, 9, 28, 29, 38, 43, 60, 61, 63, 65, 
142, 148, 152. 


Eudemian ethics, 81, 83, 87, 98, 107, 112, 
120, 125, 128. 

Eudemus, 127. 

Euhemerus, 144 f. 

Euripides, 17 f., 96, 136. 

Exchange: Greek attitude toward, 14, 32, 


33, 41-45, 50, 59, 66, 70, 73 f., 77, 795 
82, QI, 92, 94, 105, 109, 110, 111-15, 
16, 123, 128, 140, 143, 145, 147, 148; 
regulations for, 43,123; theory of, 35 f., 
38, 40, 41, 83, 84, 89, 102, 104, 106-110, 
II5, 119, 128, 146,147. See also Chre- 
matistik; Acquisition; and the Greek 
index for terms. 


Ferrara, 152. 

Fontpertuis, 64, 67, 68; 96, 152. 

Francotte, 20, 29, 32, 55, 57; 62, 124, 134, 
152) 


Gernet, 45. 

Gilliard, 14. 

Glaser, 152. 

Gottling, 152. 

Gold, 15, 40, 54, 133, 137. 
Gomperz, 17, 49, 131, 133, 137. 
Grain supply, 45. 

Grote, 13, 49, 152. 

Grundy, 45. 


Guiraud, 29, 37, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 69, 
125; 152: 


Hagen, 134, 152. 

Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaft, 
τοῦ. 

Haney, 7, ΤΙ, 19, 20, 21, 35, 48, 71, 72, 
82, 84, 89, 105, LIO, 113, LIQ, 148, 152. 

Harpocration, 68. 

Hasbach, 130. 

Hecataeus, 144. 

Heidel, 125,\133; 134, 137, £52. 

Hense, 137. 

Heraclitus, 15. 

Hermann, 43. 

Herodotus, 19, 45, 63, 66. 

Herzog, 152. 

Hesiod, 14, 17, 30, 33. 

Hesychius, 93. 

Hierocles, 126. 

Hildebrand, 153. 

Hippias, 16, 17. 


INDEXES 


Hippodamas of Miletus, 15, 52; the 
Pythagorean, 52. 


Hippolytus, 52. 

Hobbes, 16. 

Hoderman, 126, 127, 134, 153. 
Homer, 14, 52. 

Horace, 129. 


Individualism, 16, 56, 57, 75, 79, 119, 122, 
130, 140 f., 142, 143. 

Industry, 14, 29, 32, 35, 36, 47, 66, 69 f., 
79, 90, 92, 95, 111, 116. See also 
Labor; Production. 

Ingram, 7, 10, 72, 89, 104, 149, 153. 


Interest, 31, 39 f., 59 f., 78, 92, 93, 105, 
106, 148. See also Capital; Capital- 
ism; and the Greek index for terms. 


Isocrates, 13, 66, 68, 77-80, 88, τού, 143. 


Jackson, 108. 

Jamblichus, 15, 52, 127. 
Jambulus, 145. 

Jesus, 26, 49, 87, 136. 
Jowett, 60, 95, 114, 153. 
Just price, 23, 107, 108, 140. 


Kaulla, 65, 153. 

Kautsky, 153. 

Kautz, 9, 12,14, 15, 18, 31) 48, 65; 67, 70, 
72, 89, 107, 134, 153. 

Knies, 153. 

Koutorga, 106. 


Labor: attitude toward, 14, 17, 20, 20, 
31-34, 37, 59, 69 f., 77, 79, 89, 91, 93- 
96, 116, 128, 132, 142; division of, 19, 
29, 33, 34-47, 38, 41, 70 f., 73, 79, οὔ, 
145, 146; in production, 18, 31, 47, 67, 
83, 84, 96, 108, 110, 146. See also Pro- 
duction; Laborer; and the Greek in- 
dex. 

Laborer, attitude toward, 47-50, 74, ΤΟΙ, 
10, 117, 145. 

Lamb, 18. 


Land tenure: in Aristotle’s state, 122 f.; 
in Greece, 51; in Plato’s Laws, 58 f., 
62, 122; in other writers, 133, 144. 


Law, overestimate of, 13, 51, 56, 61, 75. 
Laws, historical basis of Plato’s, 43 f. 


Leisure, 29, 87,94, 95, 101, 116. See also 
the Greek index. 


Lenormant, 72. 
Liberality, 87, 121. 


159 


Loos, 153. 

Lychophron, τό, 17, 119. 
Lycurgus, 69, 140, 143. 
Lysias, 45, 68. 


Mabille, 153. 

Macaulay, 103. 

Magna Moralia, 81, 84, 87, 88, 125. 
Malthus, 45 f. 

Malon, 55. 

Martiis, De, 52, 57, 153. 

Marx, 84, 124. 

Menger, 108 f., 153. 

Mercantilism, 41, 72, 86, 103, 104. 
Mesnil-Marigny, Du, 151. 
Metrodorus, 127. 

Meyer, 9, 20, 21, 106. 

Mill, 8, 27, 50, 68, 85, 86, 92, 117, 149. 
Mines, mining, 13, 66, 67, 74, 75, 128. 


Money: and wealth, 72, 86, 103, 104,!135, 
137,146; attitude toward, 73, 106, 105, 
140, 141, 145, 148; functions, 15, 38 f., 
41, 84, 101 f., 103, 106, 108, 113, I15, 
146; history of, 35, 38, ror f., 112, 146; 
intrinsic value of, 40, 72, 102, 103, 104, 
135, 137, 146; materials, 40, 60, 72, 
105, 129; stability, 72, 104, 146. See 
also Interest; Gold; Silver; Mercantil- 
ism; and the Greek index. 


Monopoly, 110, 129, 147. 
More, 149. 

Mueller, 143. 

Mullach, 15, 125, 131, 132, 133- 


Nationalism, 62, 124. 

Nauck, 17 f. 

Nearing, 40. 

Nettleship, 37. 

Newman, 17, 86, 89, 91, 97, 101, 103, 112, 
TEA 122. Το 

New Pythagoreans, 127. 

Nic. Damasc., 143. 


Oncken, 37, 48, 55, 129, 134, 140, 149, 
150, 153. 
Oresme, 148. 


Paley-Sandys, 106. 

Palgrave’s Dictionary, 104, 153. 
Pericles, 12. 

Periktione, 126. 

Peters, 108. 


160 


Phaleas, 16, 53, 118, 120, 142. 
Philodemus, 126, 127, 130. 

Phintys, 126. 

Photius, 52. 

Physiocratic tendencies, 28 f., 30, 41, 89, 


IIo, 140, 149. See also Exchange; 
Production. 

Pindar, 83. 

Plato, Ὁ. 11, 12. 132, 14, 15; 17; 10: 22.062] 
63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 78, 79, 
81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 
95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 104, 106, 107, 
108; IIT, LI5, στὸ TLS. 119, 120), ToT" 
T22 9023) Ten es ΤΏ), Testing mT age 
134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 
144, 145, 148, 149. 

Platon, G., 153. 

Plutarch, 125, 126, 127, 140, 143 f. 

Poehlmann, 7: 20, 21, 29, 32, 33, 36, 47, 


48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54) 55) 56, 57, 58, 
61,625, 74,75; ΟῚ 101), πο τοῦ; 112? 


117. IIQ, 120, 124, 140, 141, 142, 143, 
144, 145, 153. 

Pohlenz, 53, 56, 57. 

Pollux, 93. 

Polybius, 143 f. 

Population, 45 f., 59, 74, 115, 120. 

Porphyry, 52, 126, 143. 

Poverty, 14, 15, 27, 47, 48, 50, 55, 56, 59, 
60, 74; 75) 78, 79; 87, 109, 115, 120, 130, 
132, 133, 138, 139, 140, 144, 147. 

Prices, regulation of, 43, 45, 47, 108, 110, 
147. 

Private property. See Socialism. 

Prodicus, 17. 

Production, 27-37, 66-69, 74, 83, 88-93, 
96,146,149. See also Industry; Physi- 
ocratic tendencies; and the Greek in- 
dex. 


Profits, 46, 74, 109, 110, 116. 
Protagoras, 17. 

Publicity, 45, 60, 61, 147. 
Pythagoras, 15, 52. 


Quesnay, 80. 


Rambaud, 153. 

Rassow, 108. 

Reciprocity, 34, 41, 96, 146. 
Regnier, 153. 

Ricardo. See Ricardian economy. 
Ritchie, 83. 

Robin, 22, 27, 28, 37, 43, 52, 153. 


GREEK ECONOMIC THOUGHT 


Rodbertus, 20. 

Roscher, 9, 18, 32, 72, 148, 153. 

Rousseau, 131, 143, 149. 

Ruskin, 9, ΤΙ, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 
34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 55, 
61, 63, 64, 67, 87, 92, 93, 95, 99, 100, 
IOI, 105, 109, I10, III, 135, 137, 138, 
145,149, 150, 154. 


Salvio, 154. 

Sappho, 14. 

Say, 148. 

Schaeffle, 112. 

Schneider, 154. 

Schoenberg, τι. 

Schrohl, 134, 136, 154. 

Schulte, 43 f., 154. 

Seligman, 11. 

Seneca, 130, 139, I41. 

Sewall, 64, 83, 154. ; 

Shorey, 18, 28, 36, 55, 56, 58, 62, 99, 154. 

Silver, 40, 54, 65, 72, 133, 137. 

Simey, 72, 134, 154. 

Slavery, 16, 18, 21, 32, 37 f., 62, 67, 70, 
86, 91, 92,94, 95, Θ7 ἼΟΙ, 123, 126, 128, 
129, 132, 133, 142, 147. 

Smith, Adam, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 64, 
71, 75, 82, 86, 91, 92, 93, 115, 149. 
Social contract, 15, 16, 22, 119, 130, 146. 

Social origins, 22, 34, 119 f., 146. 

Socialism and communism, 12 f., 45, 51, 
53, 79, 147, 151; in Aristotle, 96, 105, 
118-24; in Greece, τῶ ὃ; 51, 142: in 
Laws, 58-62; in Republic, 48, 49, 50, 
54-58; in Xenophon, 75f.; in other 
writers, 15, 52-54, 79f., 130, 140f., 
142-45. 

Socrates, 22,.26, 31, 57, 63, 67, 69, 73, 74, 
129, 134, 136, 144. 

Solon, 13, 14. 

Sophists, 16, 17, τ, 22; 36, 73. ΟἿ, ΤῊ; 
110, 130, 131, 142. 

Souchon, 7, 10, 17, 31, 36, 37, 41, 48, 49, 
52, 53) 55 57) OF, 62, 72, 82, 88, 89, 93, 
104, 100, 123, 124, 141, 142, 143, 148, 
150, 154. 

Spencer, 35. 

Speusippus, 125. 

Stein, 55, 140, 154. 

Steinhart-Mueller, 134. 


Stewart, 83, 84, 92, 94, 95, 102, 107, 108, 
116, 110, 154. 


INDEXES 


St. Hilaire, 81, 82, 154. 

Stimson, 149. 

Stobaeus, 15, 52, 126, 127, 130, 137, 139, 
τῆι. 

Stoics, 16, 19, 125, 126, 127, 130, 134, 135, 
136, 139-42, 143, 144. 

St. Paul, 49, 120, 132. 

Strabo, 132, 143. 

Susemihl, 81, 89, 96, 127, 128. 

Sussitia, 60, 117, 122 f. 


Tariff, 41, 73, I10, 129. 

Teles, 132, 133, 137-39. 
Theocritus, 143. 

Theognis, 14. 

Theophrastus, 91, 125, 126, 127. 
Theopompus, 144. 

Thill, 154. 

Thomissen, 154. 

Thoreau, 12, 25, 26. 
Thrasymachus, 16. 

Thucydides, 10, 12, 18, 45, 66, 68, 69. 
Timaeus, 52. 

Trinchera, 154. 


Usener, 130. 

Utility, 22 f., 64, 65, 83, 88, 134, 135, 138, 
146, 149. 

Value, 22f., 64f., 82-84, 85, 96, 115, 
134 ἴ., 149. See also the Greek index. 

Vanderkindere, 154. 

Varro, οἱ. 

Villeneuve-Bargemont, De, 152. 


161 


Vogel, 154. 
von Arnim, 133, 139, 140, 141, 142. 


Wages, 17, 46, 47, 74, 116. 

Wagner (Pastor), 136. 

Wagner, 150. 

Walcker, 154. 

Walker, 86. 

Wallon, 97, 98, 154. 

War, 25, 27, 36, 37, 66, 67, 70, 73, 79, 
128, 147. 

Wealth: attitude toward, 15, 17, 18, 24- 
27, 48, 50, 55, 56, 60, 65 £., 77, 78, 79, 
81, 86-88, 109, 125 f., 127, 129, 130, 
131 £., 133-37, 138f., 139 f., 141, 144, 
146, 147; defined, 24, 27, 65, 85 f., 91, 
112, 133,146,149. See also the Greek 
index. 

Wilhelm, 7, 127, 154. 

Wolf, 57, 141, 154. 


Xenocrates, 125, 126. 

Xenophon, 9, 10, 15, 17, 19, 22, 23, 25, 39, 
38, 42, 46, 63-76, 81, 84, 89, 91, 96, 97, 
III, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 
135, 136, 138, 149. 


Zell, τος. 

Zeller, 15, 17, 32, 34, 48, 49, 52, 81, 97, 
125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 130. 

Zeno, 139 f., 141, 142, 144. 

Zimmern, 9, 14, 29, 37, 38, 41, 43, 446, 
45, 66. 

Zmave, 9, 81, 82, 84, 90, 104, 115, 124, 
148, 154. 


INDEX OF GREEK TERMS 


ἀγοραστική, 40. 

ἀδιάφορα, 125, 130. 

αἰτίας, 28. 

ἀλλαγή, 38, 30, 40, 41, 89, 106, 140. 

ἀξία, 23, 64, 84, 86. 

ἄπειρος, 25, 85, 112. 

ἀπολαυστική, 40, 68. 

ἀργύριον, 24, 72. 

ἀσχολία, 66. 

αὐτάρκεια (αὐτάρκης), 34, 112, 138, 144. 

αὐτοπωλική, 40. 

αὐτουργός, 18, 40, 80, 96. 

αὐτόφυτον, 89, 113. 

ἀφορμή, 68, 79, 92, 96, 106, 111, 131. 

βάναυσος (βαναυσικαί, Bavavola), 70, 93, 
95, 113, 140. 

δημιουργός, 23, 36, 48, 93. 

διανομή, τις, 116. 

διορθωτικόν, 102. 

ἐγγυητής, 103. 

εἰσαγώγιμα (ἐπεισαγωγίμων), 35, 110, 128. 

ἔμπορος (ἐμπορική, ἐμπορία), 35, 41, 42, 73, 
ΠῚ 111: ; 

évepyd, 69. (ἀργά, 68.) 

ἔξαγώγιμα (ἐξαγομένων), 110, 128. 

épavos, 68. 

ἐργασία, 66, 89, 90, 113. 

εὐμεταχείριστον, 102. 

θησαυρισμός͵ 85, 86. 

ἰσότης, τό. f 

κάπηλος (καπηλική, καπηλεία), 35, 40, 41, 
42.785) ΒΟ LIL, ΣΤ2) ΤΙ ΤΙΣ 

κάρπιμα, 68. 

κατά τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, 83. 

κεφάλαιος, 30, 69. 

κίβδηλος (ἀκίβδηλοΞ), 42, 43. 

κτήματα, 24, 64, 82, ὃς, 88, 138. 

κτῆσις, 25, 65, 92, 125, 128. 


162 


κτητική, 28, 88, 111, 112, 113. 

μεταβλητική, 40, 82, III. 

μισθαρνία, 89, 113. 

vaukAnpla, 113. 

νόμισμα, 38, 30, 84, 102, 103, 128, 133, 
140. 

νόμος, 16, 103, 110, 127, 142. 

ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς, 102. 

ὀβολοστατική, 10S. 

οἰκειατάτη, ΟἹ, 113. 

οἰκονομική (οἰκονομία, οἰκονόμος), 9, 107, 
TII, 112. 114. 126. 125} 126. 

ὄργανον, 86, 88, OI, 97. 

παράστασις, 113. 

mloris, 68, 77, 106. 

πλοῦτος (πλούσιον), 24, 85, 112, 125, 127, 
1325135. 

ποίησις (ποιητική), 28, 69, 88, 92, 97. 

πρᾶξις (πρακτική), 69, 88, 92, 97. 

στάσις (διάστασι5), 13, 25, 62, 87. 

συμβλητά, 102. 

συναιτίους, 28. 

σχολή, 87. 

τέχνη, 66, 93, 113, 145. 

τίμη, 84. 

τὸ ἴσον ἀντιπεπονθός (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς Kar’ 
ἀναλογίαν), 96, 107, 121. 

τόκος (τοκισμός)͵, 39, 93, 105, 113. 

φορτηγία, 113. 

φύσις, 16, 36, 89, 96, 98, 106, 113, 127, 
125. 121 112; Tae 

χρεία, 34, 82, 84, 102, 108. 

χρήματα, 15).24, 25, 28, 38, 64, 65, 84, 
112, 134, 135, 137, 138. 

χρηματιστική (χρηματιστήΞς), O, 26, 42, 73, 
855 88, τοῦ, 107, LLO ΤῊ ΤΥΣ ΤΠ: 
140, I4I. 

χρυσός (χρυσίον), 24, 72, 83. 

















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